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I. INTRODUCTION 
This is an Article about things in law. By “things” I mean tangible 
objects and intangible concepts, invisible physical substances and 
intangible “virtual” things, the Roman res and the common law chat-
tel personal, and the colloquial “thing.” It is an inclusive, elastic defi-
nition, not a strict one, and I use the word “thing” conscious of its 
lack of rigor.1 I do so for a simple reason. Things are important to the 
                                                                                                                  
†  Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Email: madi-
son@law.pitt.edu. Copyright © 2005 Michael J. Madison. Earlier versions of this paper were 
presented to the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Intellectual Property Law Association; 
the 2004 Intellectual Property and Communications Law Scholars Roundtable at Michigan State 
University College of Law; a faculty colloquium at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law; 
the 2004 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association; and the Fourth Annual Intellec-
tual Property Scholars Conference, hosted by the DePaul University College of Law. Thanks to 
participants at each for invaluable comments and suggestions. Thanks as well to Barton Beebe, 
Tom Cotter, Brett Frischmann, James Gibson, Sonia Katyal, Jay Kesan, Adam Mossoff, Josh 
Sarnoff, Gordon Smith, and George Taylor for comments, counsel and encouragement, and to 
some improbable sources of insight on legal scholarship—Jeff Brenzel, Niles Eldredge, Natalie 
Jeremijenko, Carl Johnson, Peter Kindlmann, and Peter Machamer—for their suggestions. 
1 Bill Brown notes the obscure character of the term “thing” itself, “both at hand and 
somewhere outside the theoretical field, beyond a certain limit, as a recognizable yet illegible 
remainder or as the entifiable that is unspecifiable. Things lie beyond the grid of intelligibility 
the way mere things lie outside the grid of museal exhibition, outside the order of objects.” Bill 
Brown, Thing Theory, 28 CRITICAL INQUIRY 1, 5 (2001). Others are more precise. See, e.g., 
MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES 50 
(W.D. Halls trans., 1990) (1925) (identifying “thing” with the Roman res); E.J. Lowe, Things, in 
The OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY (1995) (“‘Thing’, in its most general sense, is inter-
changeable with ‘entity’ or ‘being’ and is applicable to any item whose existence is acknowl-
edged by a system of ontology, whether that item be particular, universal, abstract, or con-
crete.”); Frederick Pollock, What Is a Thing?, 10 L.Q. REV. 318, 318-21 (1894) (describing a 
thing variously as “whatever can be separately perceived,” what is “distinct and measurable,” 
what is “recognized by the usage of mankind,” and that “which can, in the widest sense, be 
owned”). Though most definitions distinguish between the object and its representation, Carol 
Rose suggests that these are one and the same. Things are both what we see, and what we de-
scribe. Things are stories. See CAROL M. ROSE, Seeing Property, in PROPERTY AND 
PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 267, 285-89 
(1994); cf. Thomas J. Palmeri & David C. Noelle, Concept Learning, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
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law in ways that cross disciplinary boundaries and engage multiple 
theoretical perspectives. The law has no all-purpose theory of things. 
But it should.2 This Article is a step in that direction. 
Things change. For the most part, though, until very recently, the 
law has accepted things as given. The question has been what to do 
with them. As the Legal Realists taught us, the answer generally has 
been that the law deals with rights and, specifically, with rights be-
tween people, not rights in things.3 Thingness is prior. The law is 
post. That sequence appears to be changing. Law and thingness 
emerge together in a variety of ways that I describe below. Property 
theorists have recently raised the problem of things in the law, recog-
nizing the paradox that in an era of increasing dephysicalization of the 
artifacts of our lives, thingness may matter more than ever.4 Similar 
expressions of concern are part of contemporary discourse in intellec-
                                                                                                                  
 
BRAIN THEORY AND NEURAL NETWORKS 252 (M.A. Arbib ed., 2003) (discussing “concepts” as 
fundamental building blocks of human knowledge); Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis, Con-
cepts and Cognitive Science, in CONCEPTS: CORE READINGS 3 (Stephen Laurence & Eric Mar-
golis eds., 1999) (same). 
2 My project echoes recent thing inquiries in other disciplines. See BILL BROWN, A 
SENSE OF THINGS: THE OBJECT MATTER OF AMERICAN LITERATURE (2003) (exploring Amer-
ica’s fascination with things and the difficulty American literature had in dealing with objects at 
the turn of the century); LEARNING FROM THINGS: METHOD AND THEORY OF MATERIAL 
CULTURE STUDIES (David Kingery ed., 1996) (gathering works from diverse scholars and em-
phasizing the importance of a multidisciplinary approach for analyzing objects); MATERIAL 
CULTURES: WHY SOME THINGS MATTER (Daniel Miller ed., 1998) (collecting essays showing 
how artifacts illustrate social values and contradictions); THINGS (Bill Brown ed., 2004) (col-
lecting essays by scholars from diverse fields inquiring into the nature and importance of 
things); Andreas Reckwitz, The Status of the “Material” in Theories of Culture: From “Social 
Structure” to “Artefacts,” 32 J. THEORY SOC. BEHAVIOR 195 (2002) (analyzing the role of 
material objects in social theories).  
3 See A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 128-30 
(A.G. Guest ed., 1961) (expressing skepticism that thing is a useful construct for investigating 
ownership).  
4 See Anita Bernstein, The Representational Dialectic (With Illustrations from Obscenity, 
Forfeiture, and Accident Law), 87 CAL. L. REV. 305, 310 (1999) (“[T]he physical object occu-
pies an unbudging place in legal doctrine.” (citing Rosemary J. Coombe, The Cultural Life of 
Things: Anthropological Approaches to Law and Society in Conditions of Globalization, 10 AM. 
U. INT’L J. L. & POL’Y 791 (1995))); C.M. Hann, Introduction: The Embeddedness of Property, 
in PROPERTY RELATIONS: RENEWING THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL TRADITION 1 (C.M. Hann ed., 
1998); Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163 (1999); 
Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 474 (2004); 
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 
111 YALE L.J. 357, 359, 384-85 (2001); J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Prop-
erty, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 799-818 (1996); ROSE, supra note 1, at 269, 282 n.59; Jeanne L. 
Schroeder, Death and Transfiguration: The Myth that the U.C.C. Killed “Property,” 69 TEMP. 
L. REV. 1281, 1285-86 (1996); Emily Sherwin, Two- and Three-Dimensional Property Rights, 
29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1075, 1086 (1997); Timothy P. Terrell & Jane S. Smith, Publicity, Liberty, and 
Intellectual Property: A Conceptual and Economic Analysis of the Inheritability Issue, 34 
EMORY L.J. 1, 25-32 (1985). The notion of property as relations between persons with respect to 
things derives from Kant. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 49-86 (Mary 
Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) (1785). 
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tual property law (the continuing role of first sale and exhaustion doc-
trines, for example), in commercial law (the law of software licensing 
and of secured financing, for example), and in antitrust law (in the 
question of allegedly anticompetitive marketing restrictions, such as 
tying, for example). The concern is largely inchoate. Scholars and 
courts struggle to apply the traditional sequence (thing first, law sec-
ond) to the new, integrated order. They have had only modest suc-
cess. We ought to be asking a different set of questions and seeking a 
different set of answers. We ought not to focus exclusively on rights 
in things. Instead, to assure that we have a regulatory toolkit of ap-
propriate scope, we should examine the origins of things. My ques-
tion is the cousin of the philosopher’s “What is a thing?”5 In law, 
where and how do we find things? What makes a thing a thing?6 
Traditionally, the notion of the “legal” thing has been practically 
and conceptually distinct from the “real” thing. In patent law, for ex-
ample, there is the actual device that the inventor developed, and 
there is the legally distinct thing that the patentee owns, which the law 
knows as the patent claim. In the Hart/Fuller debate over the hypo-
thetical “No vehicles in the park,” the question was which “actual” 
things should be treated as legal “vehicles” for purposes of the rule.7 
                                                                                                                  
5 The philosopher E.J. Lowe distinguishes four uses of “is”:  
the ‘is’ of attribution (‘Socrates is wise’, ‘Grass is green’), the ‘is’ of identity (‘Na-
poleon is Buonaparte’, ‘Water is H20’), the ‘is’ of instantiation (‘Mars is a planet’, 
‘A horse is a mammal’), and the ‘is’ of constitution (‘This ring is gold’, ‘A human 
body is a collection of cells’).  
E.J. LOWE, KINDS OF BEING: A STUDY IN INDIVIDUATION, IDENTITY AND THE LOGIC OF 
SORTAL TERMS 3 (1989). Lowe argues that the “is” of identity and instantiation are logically 
more fundamental than the others. Id. at 4, 28-42. He also notes the “is” of existence, though he 
argues that there are not different kinds of existence, but only different kinds of things that exist. 
Id. I visit the ontological question in Part III. 
6 Conceptually similar efforts to comprehend the legitimacy and authority of concepts 
and objects by analyzing how they are produced include Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Decon-
structing Code, 6 YALE J.L. & TECH. 277 (2003–2004); Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for 
Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 525 (2004); Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the 
Evolution of Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117 (2005); see also Landgon Winner, Upon 
Opening the Black Box and Finding It Empty: Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of 
Technology, 18 SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 362, 368-73 (1993) (critiquing the absence of 
evaluation in social constructivist literature and noting that what a thing is matters). 
7 On the Hart/Fuller debate in contemporary context, see Steven L. Winter, Transcenden-
tal Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
1105, 1172-80 (1989). The debate is significant in itself, and I return to it in Part III. Focusing 
on its linguistic implications at times obscures its connection to an underlying disagreement 
over the relationship of systems of law to morality and over criteria for judging those systems. 
In Hart’s framework, law responded to the world (that is, the world as it is, in its core sense), 
and people responded to the law. A thing, then, was what people used and experienced. Moral 
judgments came later. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 
HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958). Fuller replied that the relationship between law and morality was 
more complex, even interdependent, and he insisted, accordingly, that the understanding of a 
legal thing depended not only on its context, but also on its purpose. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism 
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At the margins, there are exceptions to the law’s sense of taking real 
things for granted. At the margins, things may be regulated for health 
and safety purposes.8 But this is the exception, rather than the rule. 
On the whole, if we encounter problems with real things, we leave 
them alone. We regulate what people do. 
As I describe in more detail in the next Part, “real” things and “le-
gal” things are increasingly blended.9 The authority of the real thing 
and the authority of the legal thing overlap to the point of being indis-
tinguishable. Real things can be manipulated just as we can manipu-
late legal things (leading to the suspicion, common to philosophers 
and physicists for a much longer time, that real things are more ma-
nipulable than they seem).10 Legal things are increasingly taken for 
granted. Copyrights and patents, for example, are increasingly seen as 
perfectly robust and self-evident things that justify their own scope. 
                                                                                                                  
 
and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 663 (1958). 
8 Examples include regulation of telecommunications facilities to assure consumer access 
to emergency services, access for law enforcement purposes, and access for disabled users. Jay 
P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 319, 338 (2005). Kesan and 
Shah include these among what they characterize as “numerous” examples of “technology-
forcing regulation.” Id. That category, however, includes examples of regulation intended to 
prompt technological development, as well as design mandates themselves. 
9 The philosopher W.V.O. Quine argued that the notions of the analytic (the “real” or the 
“true”) and the synthetic (the “manufactured”) express two points on a continuum. See W.V.O. 
QUINE, Ontological Relativity, in ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND OTHER ESSAYS 26 (1969) 
[hereinafter QUINE, Ontological Relativity] (specifying the circularity of any alleged universal 
ontology of kinds); W.V.O. QUINE, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF 
VIEW 20 (2d ed., 1961) [hereinafter QUINE, Two Dogmas of Empiricism].  
As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ul-
timately for predicting future experience in light of past experience. Physical objects 
are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries—not by 
definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epis-
temologically, to the gods of Homer.  
QUINE, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, supra, at 44. “The myth of physical objects is epistemo-
logically superior to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for 
working a manageable structure into the flux of experience.” Id. Thus the question is to describe 
the truth or falsity of statements rather than to prove the existence of things or objects them-
selves. Bruno Latour later articulated a related thesis, that modernity imposed an artificial dis-
tinction between inanimate objects and human subjects, in BRUNO LATOUR, WE HAVE NEVER 
BEEN MODERN 10-11 (Catherine Porter trans., 1993) (1991). See also THEODOR W. ADORNO, 
NEGATIVE DIALECTICS 189-94 (E.B. Ashton trans., 1973) (1966) (arguing against the subordi-
nation of the object in traditional epistemology and phenomenology). 
10 Thus the lament, “Things are seldom what they seem, Skim milk masquerades as 
cream; Highlows pass as patent leathers; Jackdaws strut in peacock’s feathers.” W.S. GILBERT 
& ARTHUR SULLIVAN, Things Are Seldom What They Seem, in H.M.S. PINAFORE (first per-
formed May 25, 1878). A related claim has been made by legal scholars. See Dan Hunter, Cy-
berspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 442-46 
(2003); Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521, 523-25 (2003) (both 
describing the inadequacies of “real space” metaphors to capture interests in cyberspace legal 
disputes). 
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Patents are explained via reference to ordinary dictionaries.11 Copy-
right infringement is characterized as “stealing.”12 
As this line blurs, it makes sense to blend the tools of real-thing 
analysis and legal-thing analysis, that is, to think about legal things 
using the tools developed for real things (Where do they come from? 
Are they real? How do we know them?) and to think about real things 
using tools for legal things (What is the character of their legitimacy 
and authority?). One way to do this might be to examine how changes 
to real things do and should influence the constitution of legal things: 
What limits should exist on the regulation of real things? But this 
understates the contingent character of real things. I suggest that we 
should interrogate the construction of things more generally. The 
transition from legal thing to real thing, and the reverse, is often 
transparent or automatic. To focus on one without likewise analyzing 
the other is to tell only half the story. We have for centuries been con-
cerned with the two questions of existence and identity (“What is 
real?” and “What is not?”13). It may be time for the law to recognize 
that these are not necessarily two questions, but one.  
I borrow observations from metaphysics, epistemology, semantics, 
social psychology, and sociology, among other disciplines, but 
without “doing” any of them. Philosophers, linguists, and other social 
scientists may not sanction this method.14 The method is, by contrast, 
a presentation of how themes in those disciplines are recognized by 
the law, as the law borrows them and simplifies them for its purposes, 
with much of the intellectual messiness that often characterizes the 
legal system. “Things” are classically understood as instances, tokens, 
or artifacts of a particular category, and the classical question seeks 
the criteria or conditions that qualify this thing for membership. What 
conditions characterize the category? Does this thing possess those 
conditions? A variety of intellectual traditions have investigated this 
question; we have philosophical “realists” and “idealists,” empiricists 
and pragmatists, materialists and constructivists. There is the 
linguistic turn, focusing on the relationship between the thing and 
language. All of these traditions, in one way or another, argue that the 
sources of evidence for this question are more or less objective and 
                                                                                                                  
11 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (approving 
use of dictionaries in claim construction); Joseph Scott Miller & James A. Hilsenteger, The 
Proven Key: Roles and Rules for Dictionaries at the Patent Office and the Courts, 54 AM. U. L. 
REV. 829 (2005). 
12 See Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 1 (2004). 
13 See WALTER BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction 
(1936), in ILLUMINATIONS 217 (Hannah Arendt ed. & Harry Zohn trans., 1968). 
14 I acknowledge the risk of criticism for disciplinary abuse. See Brian Leiter, Intellectual 
Voyeurism in Legal Scholarship, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 79, 80 (1992). 
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are more or less broad. Some would look to the essential properties of 
the category and to the presence or absence of those properties in the 
thing. Some would look to the function of the thing, or its purpose, or 
its use, or to its role in linguistic or other social conventions, patterns, 
or practices. Others would look to the relationship between the thing 
and prototypical tokens, and still others would look to the relationship 
between the thing and known exemplars. Some traditions deny the 
objectivity of the question itself. For reasons philosophical or 
empirical, categories may be as contingent as their conditions of 
satisfaction.  
Investigating and applying each of these methods to the law would 
take volumes, and I have only a handful of pages. Fortunately, the law 
is neither so diverse nor so methodologically precise. There are, I 
believe, five basic approaches to things represented in various legal 
traditions, each of which borrows bits and pieces from the foregoing 
inventory. One approach is the ontological sense of things. Things are 
real and independent of the legal system (thing-by-nature).15 They are 
defined by their (equally real) properties. The task for legal institu-
tions is to define those properties and then to investigate in a particu-
lar dispute whether those properties are present. Alternatively, things 
may be constituted, that is, they are not “real” in an antecedent sense. 
Things are not found. They are made. The question is how. They may 
be made by their makers (thing-by-design). They may be made via 
private bargains (thing-by-contract). They may be made via some 
social process or practice (thing-by-practice). Or things may be made 
by law, purely as a function of public policy (thing-by-policy). Law 
itself may make the things that society needs and wants. 
If we look at thingness in this light, the implications of the analysis 
become clearer. Moving from beginning (things as found by law) to 
end (things as constituted by law), we can see that options for regulat-
ing thingness move from few to many. A system that treats things as 
independent and fixed has little choice but to recognize things and to 
                                                                                                                  
15 Of course, before we wonder about their origins and significance, we need to be sure 
that things exist. Philosophers do not take the answer for granted. Though they do not quite 
argue (any longer) that things do not exist, there is a rich debate regarding the metaphysical 
primacy of the particular. Compare P.F. STRAWSON, INDIVIDUALS: AN ESSAY IN DESCRIPTIVE 
METAPHYSICS (1959) (arguing that the particular, rather than the concept, is the paradigm 
logical subject), and E.J. Lowe, The Metaphysics of Abstract Objects, 92 J. PHIL. 509, 522-23 
(1995) (arguing for a metaphysical understanding of objects), with ROBERT B. BRANDOM, 
ARTICULATING REASONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INFERENTIALISM 123-55 (2000) (arguing in 
favor of privileging inference (use of concepts) over reference (use of singular terms); objects, 
or singular terms, exist in light of logical linguistic conditional conventions of the form, “If X is 
a dog, then X is a mammal”). Cf. JACQUES BARZUN, A STROLL WITH WILLIAM JAMES 58-65 
(1983) (commending focus on the concrete and particular, rather than the abstract; “the things of 
worth are all concretes and singulars”). 
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look elsewhere to influence how they are used. A system that treats 
things as creatures of public policy has innumerable options for defin-
ing and manipulating things. That flexibility may be welcome from 
the lawmaking perspective, but from the perspective of legitimacy 
and authority, it creates difficulties. Thingness matters, both to us and 
to law, because things are durable and stable. Having standards for 
thingness that are manipulable in the service of public policy is a 
short step from having no standards; and without standards, it is diffi-
cult to say that we have things at all—especially in a world where 
such a conclusion is flatly inconsistent with our everyday intuition. 
Policy-based thingness may be the most pliable but least authoritative 
approach that the law might choose.  
In the middle lie what may be the most interesting regulatory 
choices—areas where thingness is constrained in one way or another, 
but where those constraints offer distinct regulatory advantages and 
drawbacks, and raise comparable questions about legitimacy. My 
point is not to argue that one model is better than any other, either in 
general or in a particular context. My point is simply that legal regula-
tors have these choices to make, and that their choices have implica-
tions for legitimacy and authority. All too often, thingness is either 
taken for granted by law or becomes the object of regulation, without 
regulators being aware that this is what is happening. 
This Article is organized around presentation and evaluation of the 
five methods of thing-making that I referred to above, which I 
characterize as thing-by-nature, thing-by-design, thing-by-contract, 
thing-by-practice, and thing-by-policy. Each one is manifest in 
contemporary legal practice. Each derives from one or more 
important philosophical, psychological, and/or economic analytic 
traditions—again, using each of those labels in a less than perfectly 
rigorous sense. I illustrate each framework with examples drawn 
primarily from copyright, patent, and trademark law, but the analysis 
links intellectual property concerns to antitrust concerns, to 
commercial law, and to tangible property, among other things. Each 
analytic framework is given its own Part below. The sequence is 
designed crudely to mirror the extent to which a thing may be a 
function of itself, of its creator, of individuals or firms closest to it, 
and/or of those that give it context. Part III deals with natures, Part IV 
with designers, Part V with contracts, Part VI with culture, and Part 
VII with welfare. Part II, which follows this Introduction, briefly 
reviews the character of the social, technical, and legal changes that 
warrant framing the examination as I have. 
 9/19/2005 9:50:08 PM 
388 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:2 
There is an important set of questions that is subsidiary to “what 
makes a thing a thing?,” including: Is this a thing? What kind of thing 
is it? Which thing—if there is more than one available—should we 
focus on, and how should the question be decided? When does 
“thingness” matter? When does physical thingness matter, and when 
does conceptual thingness matter? And do these differ?16 To an ex-
tent, each of them is considered below. Yet each of them is not truly 
new, and none of them is entirely distinct from the others. Each one 
involves challenges to age-old choices between trusting what we see 
rather than what we know, and between valuing what we construct 
rather than what we are given. Below, both illustrations and analysis 
bring out historical, thematic conflicts between art and nature, and 
between perception and cognition, that are bundled up in searches for 
legal things. This is not an argument about property as such, or about 
intellectual property, or about antitrust or commercial law. I have 
something to say about these and other specifics, but in combining 
arguments and examples from a host of nominally distinct doctrines 
and theories, I reach for a different, more general, and clearly more 
difficult point. I want to prompt a reexamination, at a fundamental 
level, of how law and society interact.  
As the phenomenal world evolves, and as we change it, how we 
approach that world—our methods of studying and analyzing it—
should evolve as well. I use the term “things” as an organizing princi-
ple, but I am conscious of its protean character. All of the connections 
among my doctrinal and theoretical examples may not yet be ex-
posed; some of the connections I present below may prove mistaken. 
I am convinced, however, and describe in the next Part, that the times 
call for a novel view of the landscape. Ishmael, narrator of Melville’s 
Moby-Dick, contemplated the headless carcass of a sperm whale, 
floating among the waves, and he considered that for years afterward, 
ships would avoid the spot of the dead whale for fear of breaking up 
on spurious “rocks”: “There’s your law of precedents; there’s your 
utility of traditions; there’s the story of your obstinate survival of old 
beliefs never bottomed on the earth, and now not even hovering in the 
air! There’s orthodoxy!”17 To the importance of whales and things, 
metaphorical and otherwise, I now turn. 
                                                                                                                  
16 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
17 HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK, OR THE WHALE 309 (Northwestern Univ. Press 
1988) (1851). I borrow the quotation from John T. Matteson, Grave Discussions: The Image of 
the Sepulchre in Webster, Emerson, and Melville, 74 THE NEW ENG. Q. 419, 440 (2001), a 
thoughtful discussion of representations of law in nineteenth century American literature. The 
cetacean metaphor is not so fanciful as all that. Moby-Dick is partly a narrative of epistemology. 
Should one accept the illusion (Ishmael’s perspective) or pursue the truth (Ahab’s)? I prefer 
Melville here only slightly to Borges, who reported on “a certain Chinese encyclopedia entitled 
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF THINGS 
Things have always been special to us in law and culture, whether 
we have acknowledged it or not, because they have at least three im-
portant effects. One is retrospective. Things embody history and 
knowledge. One is prospective. Things communicate that history and 
knowledge to others and to future generations. The third is contempo-
rary. The bridge between the retrospective and prospective influence 
of things lies in their authority, that is, in the behavioral and cognitive 
influence they exert over individuals and firms that buy, consume, 
and reuse things, and, importantly, the extent to which that influence 
may be challenged by (that is, mediated by) those individuals and 
firms. Things embody meaning. Felix Cohen resisted thingification 
precisely because, socially and legally, things are authoritative—they 
govern, exercising authority over our behavior by virtue of what they 
can, and cannot, be used for. Thingness thus has a symbolic and com-
municative function as well as a material function in any discipline or 
community in which particular tangible objects play roles.18 The rela-
tive permanence and stability of the thing helps to give it authority, 
                                                                                                                  
 
Celestial Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge” that recorded that  
animals are divided into (a) those that belong to the Emperor, (b) embalmed ones, (c) 
those that are trained, (d) suckling pigs, (e) mermaids, (f) fabulous ones, (g) stray 
dogs, (h) those that are included in this classification, (i) those that tremble as if they 
were mad, (j) innumerable ones, (k) those drawn with a very fine camel’s hair brush, 
(l) others, (m) those that have just broken a flower vase, (n) those that resemble flies 
from a distance. 
JORGE LUIS BORGES, The Analytical Language of John Wilkins (1942), reprinted in OTHER 
INQUISITIONS: 1937–1952, at 101, 103 (Ruth L.C. Simms trans., 1964). Updating Melville, and 
prompted by Borges, Foucault wrote: “In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing we appre-
hend in one great leap, the thing that, by means of the fable, is demonstrated as the exotic charm 
of another system of thought, is the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking 
that.” MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN 
SCIENCES xv (1970) (1966). 
18 On the role of artifacts in mediating scientific communities, see DAVIS BAIRD, THING 
KNOWLEDGE: A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENTS (2004); DIANA CRANE, INVISIBLE 
COLLEGES: DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE IN SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITIES (1972); DEREK J. DE 
SOLLA PRICE, SCIENCE SINCE BABYLON (1961). For discussions of the simultaneously oppres-
sive and liberating possibilities of material culture in other contexts, see MIHALY 
CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & EUGENE ROCHBERG-HALTON, THE MEANING OF THINGS: DOMESTIC 
SYMBOLS AND THE SELF (1981); DONALD MACKENZIE, KNOWING MACHINES: ESSAYS ON 
TECHNICAL CHANGE (1996); MATERIAL CULTURES: WHY SOME THINGS MATTER (Daniel 
Miller ed., 1998); LANGDON WINNER, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, in THE WHALE AND THE 
REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR LIMITS IN AN AGE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY 19 (1986); Arjun Appa-
durai, Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value, in THE SOCIAL LIFE OF THINGS: 
COMMODITIES IN CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (Arjun Appadurai ed., 1986); Margaret Jane Radin 
& Madhavi Sunder, Introduction: The Subject and Object of Commodification, in RETHINKING 
COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE (Martha M. Ertman & Joan 
C. Williams eds., 2005) [hereinafter RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION] (noting that asking how 
things are created is a way of asking how law constructs culture). 
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mediated via the artifact itself, rather than through interpersonal 
communication or other institutions.19 
The authoritative nature of things, like all authority, comes from 
somewhere. In an immediate, physical sense, that authority comes 
from materiality. Things exert a behavioral influence. Less directly, 
but no less importantly, things are authoritative because of their social 
roles. A thing is not a “thing” in a relevant sense unless the object is 
given a relatively stable, communicative existence. It is not enough 
that the object has material limitations. We must also refer to the ob-
ject as the “thing” that it is or appears to be, and once we do so, we 
must act accordingly. That authority may arise organically, via prac-
tice.20 Not infrequently, though, that authority stems from legal rec-
ognition of thingness. Some would argue that the processing of prac-
tice by law is an iterative process that produces things.21 An object or 
                                                                                                                  
19 See ADRIAN JOHNS, THE NATURE OF THE BOOK: PRINT AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE 
MAKING (1998). On how salient and stable objects enable collaborative activity, see Barbara 
Tversky & Paul U. Lee, How Space Structures Language, in LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER 
SCIENCE; SPATIAL COGNITION, AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO REPRESENTING AND 
PROCESSING SPATIAL KNOWLEDGE 157, 163 (Christian Freska, et al. eds., 1998) (describing the 
role printing played by in the formation of scientific knowledge). The classic discussion of focal 
points as solutions to problems among group members is THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE 
STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960). 
20 See BRANDOM, supra note 15, at 163-83 (analyzing one primary representational solu-
tion of ordinary language); see also ROBERT B. BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT: REASONING, 
REPRESENTING, AND DISCURSIVE COMMITMENTS (1994) (discussing the relationship between 
meaning and use). 
21 See Penner, supra note 4, at 807.  
The beginning of wisdom here is to realize that there is not a world of “things” 
out there all ready to be appropriated as property. This was the spark of genius in 
Hohfeld’s claim about property as a complex aggregate of legal relations. “Thing” 
here is a term of art which restricts the application of property to those items in the 
world which are contingently related to us, and this contingency will change given 
the surrounding circumstances, including our personal, cultural, and technological 
circumstances.  
Id.; Schroeder, supra note 4, at 1285 n.17 (“We don’t ‘reify’ intangibles, in the sense of treating 
that which is not ‘naturally’ a thing as a thing. Rather, the very concept of what is or is not a 
‘thing’ is itself artificial—a matter of legal characterization or definition.”); Sherwin, supra note 
4, at 1088 (“[T]he objects of property need not be physical things, they need only be sufficiently 
well-defined to retain their identity in a variety of settings. They must be legal things, the 
boundaries of which are not physical lines but legal rules expressed in a physical form.”). This 
theory of things is conceptually related to Alan Hunt’s constitutive theory of law. See ALAN 
HUNT, EXPLORATIONS IN LAW & SOCIETY: TOWARD A CONSTITUTIVE THEORY OF LAW (1993) 
(arguing that law and society scholarship should investigate the extent that law constitutes social 
relationships). The constitutive theory is iterative, but maintains a conceptual distinction be-
tween law and its object that I suspect is disappearing, at least in part. The constitutive theme 
operates not only at these most conceptual of levels, see JAMES C. EDWARDS, THE AUTHORITY 
OF LANGUAGE: HEIDEGGER, WITTGENSTEIN, AND THE THREAT OF PHILOSOPHICAL NIHILISM 
(1990), but also at the most mundane. See GEOFFREY C. BOWKER & SUSAN LEIGH STAR, 
SORTING THINGS OUT: CLASSIFICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1999) (discussing the con-
struction of classification systems); BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE: 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS 277 (1986) (describing laboratory practice); MARY 
POOVEY, HISTORY OF THE MODERN FACT: PROBLEMS AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE SOURCES OF 
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concept is or is not a thing in this sense until the legal system says 
that it is. Legally, things do not simply spring forth by appropriation 
from the domain of the unowned and unclaimed.22 They arise via an 
iterative analytic process that produces their authenticity and legiti-
macy.23 Once we have determined that something is a thing, we must 
determine what sort of thing it is, that is, what kind of authority it has 
and the legitimacy of that authority. 
This authoritative role extends to conceptual things as well as to 
physical things and, importantly, to those sorts of blended things that 
are of particularly modern legal concern. Trademarks, for example, 
are not things in an organic sense, but the organic production of 
meaning associated with a given symbol may give rise, legally, to the 
thing that we call a trademark. Even if the notion of trademark-as-
thing is not part of the conventional understanding of trademark law, 
Barton Beebe’s semiotic analysis of trademarks confirms that the 
trend toward trademark-as-thing is specifically observable, and per-
haps justifiable, in two classes of cases: (1) the “merchandising right” 
cases, in which the mark becomes a good in its own right, as in the 
case of marks of manufacturers of athletic apparel or professional 
sports teams;24 and (2) product design cases, in which the mark is 
indistinguishable from the tangible form of the product.25 In both con-
                                                                                                                  
 
WEALTH AND SOCIETY (1998) (describing the evolution of numeric representations of wealth). 
The law struggles to keep up, but it has not succeeded. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. 
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991) (denying the possibility of copyright in facts on the ground 
that facts lack authorship). 
22 This is the classic but mistaken premise of property doctrine. See, e.g., Haslem v. 
Lockwood, 37 Conn. 500 (1871) (holding that a plaintiff can maintain a cause of action for 
trover against a defendant who appropriated a pile of manure that the plaintiff collected from 
droppings on the public street and left untended for a period of time). 
23 Law is ontologically subjective though epistemologically objective. JOHN R. SEARLE, 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 8-13 (1995). A practical example (I resist the tempta-
tion to call it a real world example) is the copyrightability of things manufactured by players 
within the confines of virtual reality environments: this is thingness created by practice, vali-
dated by law. See F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. 
L. REV. 1 (2004). The non-legal antecedent of this point is BENJAMIN, supra note 13 (question-
ing the continuing vitality of value-based distinctions between original works of art and me-
chanically-produced reproductions). 
24 See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 
657-61 (2004); see also Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile 
Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461 (2005) (arguing that the so-called merchandising 
right is fragile as matters of both trademark doctrine and policy); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with 
Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1728-29 (1999) (criti-
cizing this trend). 
25 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (holding that pat-
entability of device in which plaintiff claimed a trademark interest was strong evidence of its 
functionality); Beebe, supra note 24, at 661-67. 
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texts, the mark-as-thing serves as its own authority, validated by a 
legal regime that permits it to do so.26 
The weight of the authority of things varies, like the weight of le-
gal authority. The traditional character of the authority of a thing de-
pends largely on the ex post regulatory regime to which the thing 
belongs. A thing that is part of the regime of trade secret law is less 
authoritative than a thing that is part of the patent regime, because the 
trade secret regime permits most attempts to “reverse engineer” the 
trade secret—take apart the device to learn how it works—and the 
patent regime does not. A book, which can be resold by a lawful pur-
chaser, is less authoritative than a computer program, the use of 
which is frequently limited to the authorized “licensee.”  
If and when law and design merge in physical and conceptual 
senses, following metaphoric and in some cases literal blending that I 
describe below, what happens to this authority? Either the authority of 
law may be reduced, or the authority of things may increase.27 Tech-
nical controls embedded in the design of physical artifacts, blessed by 
courts under a variety of legal regimes, facilitate the creation of 
“things” that regulate behavior in the sense that they constrain how 
people use or experience those things, but are not subject to regula-
tory review equivalent to the review accorded legal regulation. For 
example, not only may a traditional “book” be lawfully resold without 
the consent of the copyright owner, but its intellectual content like-
wise may be reused, under the fair use doctrine or under doctrines 
distinguishing idea from expression and similar from dissimilar copy-
ing. An electronic book that embeds technology-based copy and use 
controls need not be exposed to these vagaries of ex post copyright.28 
The dividing line here is not sharp, but it is clear that in the latter 
                                                                                                                  
26 See also Kenneth Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The De-
velopment of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 328-29, 341-48 (1980) 
(noting dephysicalization of American property law during the nineteenth century, and the rise 
of “conceptual imperialism” and physicalist fictions); Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A 
History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law 86 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (on 
file with author) (describing pre-Realist view of goodwill as a natural, property-like “thing” 
recognized by trademark law and arguing that goodwill-as-thing gets in the way of proper 
policy goals of trademark law, which is consumer protection). 
27 Emily Sherwin notes the costs of what she calls three-dimensional things, that is, fully 
or partly specified things, in contrast to two-dimensional, or unspecified, things. The specifica-
tions may be arbitrary, may interfere with or constrain government regulation (such as redis-
tributive goals), and are resistant to change. See Sherwin, supra note 4, at 1099. 
28 The phenomenon has been characterized by some in terms of enabling and disabling 
technologies. Analog technologies enable. By their nature, they allow for disassembly and 
tinkering for access to the knowledge they embody. Digital technologies disable, because they 
can be easily configured to limit that access. See Bob Colwell, The Coolest Thing on Earth, 10 
COMPUTER, Nov. 2002, at 74 (reminiscing about the virtues of the Heathkit “build your own” 
computer kit). 
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class of cases, law and design merge. Property interests are now con-
ventionally understood as forms of governance.29 When governance 
and artifact are combined, the thing itself regulates. We move from ex 
post regulation via law to ex ante regulation via thing. Recent claims 
alleging that peer-to-peer networks wrongfully allow individuals to 
share or swap songs may be recast as arguments about the thingness 
of the musical work and of the recording that embodies that work, or 
about the thingness of the record album, distinct from the recording of 
the particular song.30 There is the landscape of claims made under the 
anticircumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act, in which producers of entertainment products31 and of “ordinary” 
objects32 argue that the “things” they produce are inherently techno-
logically bound. A DVD can be played only on a CSS-enabled 
“DVD” player or disk drive. A computer printer can be used only 
with a designated ink cartridge. A garage door opener can be used 
only with a designated remote control. Consumers argue that unfairly 
restrictive controls have been superimposed on preexisting objects. 
Producers reply that the things themselves have been redesigned.  
The basic question in these cases is the extent to which arguments 
over the thingness of the object should be divorced from how the ob-
ject is used or experienced. The question extends beyond computer 
technology. Bioengineered seeds tolerate engineered pesticides but 
not others (are these different seeds, or the same seeds coupled with 
anticompetitive restraints?).33 “Disposable” cameras are labeled “sin-
gle-use only”34 to prevent the development of aftermarkets in camera 
                                                                                                                  
29 See Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and 
Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23 (2001) (describing the role of private property rights in regulating 
the information economy); Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 
(1927); Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000).   
30 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (re-
versing summary judgment granted in favor of developer of file sharing software for copyright 
infringement); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 648 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming 
injunction against operator of file sharing system); Shubha Ghosh, Turning Gray into Green: 
Some Comments on Napster, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 563, 564-65 (2001) (discussing 
Napster’s role as a new distribution network for songs, allowing users to rebundle songs as a 
new product). 
31 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming in-
junction against “trafficking” in technology enabling circumvention of CSS system for DVD 
playback). 
32 See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 
2004) (rejecting claims by makers of computer printers); Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink 
Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (similarly rejecting claims by makers of garage 
door openers). 
33  See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (affirming judgment 
against farmer who saved and planted “Roundup Ready” seeds in violation of agreement with 
producer). 
34 See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (rejecting 
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bodies. Ink cartridges for computer printers include the warning, “Li-
censed For Single Use Only” to prevent the cartridges from being 
refilled by consumers or others.35 Can these “single-use” cameras and 
cartridges be remanufactured, that is, used twice? 
That question plays unfairly with the words “can” and “use,” but 
in each of these examples, there is an implicit or explicit claim being 
made that one ought not to be able to use or reuse these “things” in 
ways that violate their inherent “thingness”—whatever that is.36 The 
cases thus conceptually link problems that have been pointed out in 
isolation by a disparate group of scholars. Margaret Jane Radin and 
Julie Cohen each have discussed the linkage of machine-based and 
contract-based regulation of information.37 Glen Robinson has sug-
gested that servitudes that forbid unauthorized use or disposition of 
chattels should ordinarily be enforceable, basing his argument largely 
on the law of computer software licensing.38 Annelise Riles has 
championed a call for humanistic legal scholarship to expose the 
workings of physical and conceptual “black boxes” in law, which she 
calls “the technicalities of law”—devices that work because of the 
knowledge that is built into them, rather than because of the knowl-
edge that must be applied to them.39 
                                                                                                                  
 
patent infringement claims by manufacturer of “single-use” cameras against importer of re-
manufactured cameras). 
35 See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp., 123 F.3d 1445, 1453-
54 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (rejecting patent infringement claims against remanufacturer of ink car-
tridge, but suggesting in dicta that sale with a “restriction having contractual significance” might 
change the result); cf. Arizona Cartridge Remanufacturers Ass’n v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 421 F.3d 
981, 986-88 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that patent law permits printer cartridge manufacturer to 
sell cartridges subject to reuse restrictions, where restrictions were printed on packaging and 
customers assented by opening packages). 
36 Randal Picker characterizes a related problem as “the extent to which we are willing to 
reengineer these scope-of-permission goods [multiple variants of goods defined by access 
restrictions and/or added and disabled features]—to re-scope them—to enable entry.” Randal C. 
Picker, Unbundling Scope of Permission Goods: When Should We Invest in Reducing Entry 
Barriers?, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 189, 189-90 (2005). Anupam Chander argues that focusing on 
thingness opens a discussion regarding distributional issues. See Anupam Chander, The New, 
New Property, 81 TEX. L. REV. 715, 720-21 (2004). In the case of digital goods, Dan Burk notes 
the equivalence of designed things, shrink-wrap limitations on the use of things, and technologi-
cal controls embedded in software. See Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital 
Rights Management Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 546-47 (2005). 
37 See Julie E. Cohen, Overcoming Property: Does Copyright Trump Privacy?, 2002 U. 
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 375; Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and the Integration 
of Text and Machine, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125 (2002); cf. Margaret Jane Radin, Regime 
Change in Intellectual Property: Superseding the Law of the State with the “Law” of the Firm, 
1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 173, 187 (2003–2004) [hereinafter Radin, Regime Change] (dis-
cussing the implications of regulation by machine rather than by contract).  
38 See Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449 (2004).  
39 Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Tech-
nicalities, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 973, 975-76 (2005); see also BAIRD, supra note 18, at 162-65 
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The changes implicit in these arguments are not merely (or even 
primarily) shifts from the tangible to the intangible—and back 
again—wrought by technology. The conceptual and physical evolu-
tion is both broader and more subtle. In an earlier era, and focusing on 
the legal objects of constitutional takings doctrine, Radin character-
ized the issue as “conceptual severance,” that is, the ability of courts 
to narrow the scope of a property interest in order to heighten the se-
verity of a government regulation.40 Today, however, the analytic 
arrow may point instead to aggregation, rather than severance, and it 
may point to physical changes as well as to conceptual ones. In each 
instance, it is not perfectly clear whether the regulatory referent has 
changed (so that the proper regulatory regime should shift), or 
whether the referent has not changed but the context of the regulation 
has (so that the regime should remain the same, but the manner in 
which the rule is applied should change). In some instances, one 
changes or the other does. In many instances, it may be both. To the 
extent that legal institutions take the thing as given and consider how 
to regulate it, they miss a significant opportunity to regulate via the 
construction and evolution of the thing itself. They also miss the abil-
ity to constrain improper regulation by nonlegal institutions involved 
with creating and changing thingness. There are, I think, at least five 
                                                                                                                  
 
(describing “black-boxing” as the movement of knowledge from outside the machine (you have 
to know how to use the machine) to inside it (you can use the machine anyway, without that 
knowledge, meaning that knowledge becomes tangible and portable across space and disci-
pline)); BRUNO LATOUR, PANDORA’S HOPE: ESSAYS ON THE REALITY OF SCIENCE STUDIES 304 
(1999) [hereinafter LATOUR, PANDORA’S HOPE] (describing how the evolution of science and 
technology brings opacity, that is, complexity that is made invisible by its own success); BRUNO 
LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION: HOW TO FOLLOW SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS THROUGH 
SOCIETY 2-3 (1987) (describing the use of black boxes); Langdon Winner, Upon Opening the 
Black Box and Finding It Empty: Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Technology, 18 
SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 362 (1993) (arguing that black boxes are expressions of the inter-
actions of social networks and institutions). 
40 Margaret J. Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Juris-
prudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1677 (1988). Thomas Merrill argues, instead, 
that takings cases are characterized by limits of a sort. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape 
of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885 (2000) (characterizing takings and due process 
cases according to “patterning” approaches to what constitutes a constitutional property interest 
in ways that limit opportunities for conceptual severance). Copyright law reflects similar efforts 
to define the copyrighted work either extremely narrowly or extremely broadly, to suit the 
purposes of the plaintiff and the court. Compare Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g 
Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 1998) (locating copyright in the entire television series 
“Seinfeld”), and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287, 
1293 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (locating copyright in the James Bond character “as expressed and de-
lineated in Plaintiffs’ sixteen films”), with Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 
390 (6th Cir. 2004) (protecting a recording of an arpeggiated chord, three notes, struck closely 
together, as a copyrighted work). 
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sorts of transformations appearing in the world around us, with im-
portant implications for the law. 
The first is clearly and purely technological. To borrow a term 
from Herbert Simon, both computer technology and biotechnology 
have increased our practical awareness of the “decomposability” and 
dynamism of things,41 particularly (but not only) tangible things, and 
our ability to use that decomposability and dynamism for an 
extraordinary range of ends.42 Complex systems are known to be 
often “decomposable” into simpler, distinct subsystems that are more 
comprehensible. Features can be added. Features can be removed. Is 
the feature a thing? Is the reconfigured object a thing? Moore v. 
Regents of the University of California,43 a property rights contest 
between a patient whose spleen was surgically removed and 
physicians who profited from patents based in part on the patient’s 
tissues, is an early example of how this sort of “decomposability” 
creates problems for the law. Is the spleen a cognizable thing or not? 
The court did not decide the case on this basis, and it consciously 
                                                                                                                  
41 HERBERT A. SIMON, The Architecture of Complexity: Hierarchic Systems, in THE 
SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 183, 197-201 (3d ed. 1996). In Simon’s thinking, a decomposable 
system is a complex system that can be effectively described as a set of subsystems, where the 
interaction within subsystems is independent of one another. “Near decomposable” systems 
involve subsystems whose interactions are weak, but are not negligible. Both concepts are 
introduced to illustrate how the hierarchies implicit in complex systems can be broken down so 
that the systems themselves can be understood. “The fact then that many complex systems have 
a nearly decomposable, hierarchic structure is a major facilitating factor enabling us to under-
stand, describe, and even ‘see’ such systems and their parts.” Id. at 207. Any computer network, 
program, protocol, dataset, or combination thereof can be reduced from its most abstract, hu-
man-readable interpretation to its most elemental binary interpretation. That is a central feature 
of modern computing. Digital “information” can be sliced almost endlessly into “bytes” and 
“bits,” for processing purposes, and into “packets,” for Internet transmission purposes. Bits, 
bytes, and packets can be disassembled and reassembled; objects and files can be broken down 
and rebuilt at almost any scale. In digital form, a book literally and simply may be a collection 
of individual words. The neologism “Napsterization,” after the infamous Napster file sharing 
system, is sometimes applied to the widespread, uncontrolled disassembling and reassembling 
of digital things. 
42 Bill Brown speculates that concern with things blossomed in cultural studies in the 
1990s just as it did in the 1920s for reasons related to technology-based changes in the prox-
imity of people to objects. In the 1920s, it was film; in the 1990s, it was computers. Distance, in 
both cases, approximates value. See Brown, supra note 1, at 16. It would be impossible to 
catalog all of the types of decomposability that we are now capable of. One particularly interest-
ing example is the AURA technology developed at Microsoft Research, by which consumers 
could use portable handheld computers, combined with bar code scanners, to create a user-
maintained database of information keyed to Uniform Product Codes (UPCs). See Marc A 
Smith, et al., Object AURAs: A Mobile Retail and Product Annotation System, 2004 PROC. 5TH 
ACM CONF. ON ELECTRONIC COM. 240 (2004). (The author Bruce Sterling refers to a similar, 
speculative combination of RFID technology and consumer control over object metadata as an 
“Internet of Things.” Bruce Sterling, Risky Business, WIRED, Aug. 2005, at 74.) What “is” the 
product specified by the UPC? The information given in the manufacturer-compiled database? 
Or the information compiled by consumers? Both?  
43 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
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avoided the temptation to resolve the case in the patient’s favor on the 
basis of his property interest in the spleen.44 But as James Boyle 
argued, the case really does revolve around the thingness of the 
spleen.45 Confrontations between law and dynamic thingness are 
unavoidable. 
Going a step further, we now increasingly possess the power tech-
nically to manipulate those subsystems not only to embed ordinary 
design choices into our things but consciously to embed very specific 
policy choices as well. Examples include protean systems of “Digital 
Rights Management” of digitized copyrighted and other works of 
information, such as those built into DVD players, computer printers, 
and garage door openers,46 as well as seeds designed for maximum 
production when used with compatible, engineered pesticides.47 In 
principle, “decomposability” now allows us not only to remove the 
spleen but also to engineer the removal so that the patient can monitor 
subsequent disposal or reuse of the tissue. 
A second development is the spillover of this kind of lexico-
architectural regulation of human conduct48 to a broadening array of 
“ordinary” or “everyday” things, both physical and conceptual. We 
have the computer printer that requires an ink cartridge produced by 
the same manufacturer and the garage door opener designed to 
function only with the original manufacturer’s remote control. There 
is the experimental automobile with a “hood” that can be opened only 
by an authorized service representative of the car’s manufacturer.49 
                                                                                                                  
44 Id. at 490. 
45 See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE & SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 102-07 (1996). 
46 See Susan P. Crawford, The Biology of the Broadcast Flag, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & 
ENT. L.J. 603, 647-51 (2003) (describing the code/law “petri dish” that supports innovation in 
digital networks). 
47 Not only have researchers produced “Roundup Ready” seeds that are specifically resis-
tant to “Roundup” pesticides, but they have also made progress toward production of self-
policing seeds that produce a sterile crop. V-GURTS (varietal or variety-level GURTS, or 
Genetic Use Restriction Technologies), commonly known as Terminator seeds, are genetic 
restriction technologies that restrict or control the reproductive capacity of plants, producing 
sterile seeds. The seeds were controversial when their commercial introduction was threatened, 
and their marketing has been limited, at least so far. See Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anti-
Commons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-So-Brave) New World Order of International 
Intellectual Property Protection, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11, 54 (1998). “Terminator” 
technology physically instantiates comparable limitations on saved seed imposed on farmers via 
“bag-tag” licenses printed on seed packaging. For a discussion of judicial treatment of such 
“one-time-use” licenses, see infra note 250 and accompanying text. 
48 See Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403 (1996); Joel R. 
Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technol-
ogy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1997). James Gibson has christened this “technolegical” regulation, 
to note how thingness can complement law, as well as substitute for it. James Gibson, Re-
Reifying Data, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 163, 167-68 (2004).  
49 See Jorn Madslien, Girl Power Softens Volvo’s Edges, BBC NEWS, Mar. 3, 2004, 
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The components of an automobile can now be interlinked via 
computer microcode, essentially turning the automobile into a 
hardware platform for an automotive operating system.50 This 
benefits the consumer who wants to design her own automobile by 
specifying interoperable “modules” (brakes, suspension, and 
transmission, for example) designed to run on the car’s operating 
system. It also benefits the manufacturer that wants to protect 
aftermarkets for parts and service, by controlling the design of the 
operating system and controlling access to it.51 Consumers may have 
to fight for the legal right to repair their own vehicles.52 The 
phenomenon of regulation-by-artifact is hardly new. An entire 
discipline—Science and Technology Studies (STS)—has grown up 
around examining the social consequences of technology. What 
appears to be changing is the degree to which technology permits 
social consequences, originally theorized to be the consequence of 
engineering decisions,53 to be part of the design process itself. 
                                                                                                                  
 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/em/fr/-/2/hi/business/3528757.stm. The design is ostensibly aimed at 
women, who are stereotypically disinclined to bother with their own car repairs. So as not to 
leave a one-sided impression of how the world of things is changing, consider a parallel devel-
opment in the automotive universe: Ford (the parent of Volvo, as it happens) is demonstrating a 
concept vehicle that incorporates a Wi-Fi antenna, so that in effect, the car becomes an Internet-
enabled device or, more precisely, a node on a peer-to-peer file sharing system. Drivers and 
passengers could upload and download digital files and store them on a memory device built 
into the car. See Mike Wendland, SUV’s Wi-Fi System Lets Drivers Leave CDs at Home, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 24, 2004, http://www.freep.com/money/tech/mwend24_ 
20040624.htm. 
50 See Norman Mayersohn, Beyond the Programmable Car, AUTOMOTIVE INDUS., Aug. 
1999, at 40; Manufacturers Aim for Change in Electronics, AUTOMOTIVE INDUS., Apr. 6, 2001, 
at 5. Automotive subsystems have been controlled by computerized Electronic Control Units, or 
ECUs, for years. The contemporary shift involves a reduction in the number of ECUs (thus 
standardizing the control protocols) and a simultaneous expansion in the number of systems 
controlled by each one. 
51 Cf. Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding that the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) prohibits reverse engineering of software platform for 
multiplayer video game in order to construct more stable equivalent); Storage Tech. Corp. v. 
Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., No. Civ.A. 02-12102RWZ, 2004 WL 1497688 (D. 
Mass. July 2, 2004) (barring technology owner from repairing device manufactured by plaintiff 
because doing so would involve “circumvention” of software owned by plaintiff), vacated, 421 
F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Interestingly, while the Federal Circuit rejected Storage Technology 
Corp.’s effort to limit third-party repairs to its computers, the court relied heavily on the fact 
that the software license delivered with the computers was drafted so that it was “tied to the 
piece of equipment on which the software resides. Thus, the authorized use is tied to a particular 
machine, rather than a particular person.” Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & 
Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
52 That precise principle has been raised in the proposed Motor Vehicle Owner’s Right to 
Repair Act. See H.R. 2735, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 2138, 108th Cong. (2004). 
53 See, e.g., JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (John Wilkinson trans., 
1964) (1954); LATOUR, supra note 9; LEWIS MUMFORD, TECHNICS AND CIVILIZATION (1934); 
Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS, Winter 1980, at 121. The notion 
of control-by-design dates at least to Jeremy Bentham’s proposal for a panoptic prison. JEREMY 
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Third is the blurring of distinctions between physical thingness and 
legally significant conceptual categories that include assent, property, 
antitrust, copyright, and patent, among others. Antitrust law looks to 
the domination of markets. In some markets, control of the thing is 
tantamount to control of the market. A court that defers to the design 
of the thing yields application of antitrust principles to the authority 
of the designer. In the copyright context, Julie Cohen has observed 
and objected to this sort of deference:  
Precisely because copyright does not subsist in things, the 
things in which copies of works are embodied take on near-
iconic significance. Rights in the work and rights in the thing 
merge to constitute a sort of über-copyright, a property right 
delineated as absolute sovereignty over the disposition and 
use of both work attributes and thing attributes. . . . Rights in 
the work and rights in the thing become conflated, and strict 
controls are imposed upon access to and use of the thing to 
guard against perceived vulnerability of rights in the work.54 
A manufacturer might design a device that automatically decays 
after a single use. Under nearly all circumstances, barring health or 
safety concerns, the law would defer to that choice, and in the event 
the device were the subject of a patent, the law might even bar the 
user from reconstructing the object, that is, from making it anew.55 A 
manufacturer might instead design a nondecaying, multiple-use thing 
labeled “single-use only.” The manufacturer’s anticompetitive moti-
vation is likely the same, but using a label rather than a design may be 
less wasteful and may appear to intrude less on consumer autonomy.56 
On the one hand, but for precisely that reason, it seems foolish to 
evaluate the latter choice under an “assent” framework rather than 
                                                                                                                  
 
BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS (Miran Bozovic ed. Verso 1995) (1791). 
54 Cohen, supra note 37, at 379. 
55 See infra notes 114-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the “right to repair” 
rule in patent law. For a comparative evaluation of technological and contractual “product 
degradation,” see Randal C. Picker, Copyright and the DMCA: Market Locks and Technological 
Contracts, in ANTITRUST, PATENTS & COPYRIGHT: EU AND US PERSPECTIVES (Francois 
Leveque & Howard Shelanski eds., 2005). 
56 See Robinson, supra note 38, at 1467-68 (making precisely this argument regarding 
servitudes on chattels). The conclusion here depends on the prevailing conception of personal 
autonomy. On the one hand, and as the text assumes, a consumer who is aware of a restrictive 
notice may choose to disobey the restriction; a consumer confronted with a restrictive design 
may not be aware of the design constraint, though there is the option not to use the item at all. 
On the other hand, the consumer may reflexively obey the notice but may not be aware of the 
sense in which the design constrains choice. In the second construction, the design restriction is 
superior to the restrictive notice in preserving personal autonomy.  
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under property or antitrust or patent law principles. On the other hand, 
a court that endorses the label—and the trend in the cases is to do 
so57—enables the manufacturer successfully to collapse a series of 
traditional, distinct legal regimes into one, which is the thing itself. 
The fourth shift is the assimilation to tangible things of legal forms 
developed for intangible things. The central illustration here is the 
phenomenon of licensing, which is migrating up a semantic ladder 
from the purely conceptual to the purely physical.58 A copyright or a 
patent can be licensed. Under current practice, a computer program (a 
semiphysical thing that depends on copyright and patent law for legal 
protection) can be licensed. It may shortly be the case that “ordinary” 
tangible objects, with no particular connection to underlying intellec-
tual property interests, can likewise be licensed. There is the Hewlett-
Packard printer cartridge, labeled so that it is not “licensed” for more 
than one use.59 There is a woodworking jig sold under a “shrink-
wrap” license that is worth quoting in full: 
The purpose of the TemplateMaster
TM 
is to clone itself. 
Therefore we are verifying your honesty that only you will 
use the tool and you will not be passing it around to others to 
use for free. It is exactly the same as the “shrink-wrap” 
agreement that comes with almost all computer software. 
Please help us fight “tool piracy.”60 
It is far from certain that licenses of tangible objects would be en-
forceable under current law, even if a buyer were to “assent” to them. 
What is noteworthy in the examples is the collapse of a distinction. If 
computer software can be licensed, can anything be licensed? The 
doctrinal answer likely would be that copyright law makes software 
different. But the software industry has not rested its case on copy-
right, nor on the law of assent. In Adobe Systems, Inc. v. One Stop 
Micro,61 the software developer Adobe Systems argued that its soft-
                                                                                                                  
57 What I call a trend is discernible by combining cases from several different sources, in-
cluding enforcement of shrink-wrap and click-wrap agreements, which are mere notices in all 
but pure form, and trespass to chattels cases. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Regis-
ter.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004); eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 
F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
58 Cf. Hunter, supra note 10 (decrying the uncritical application of real property legal the-
ory and metaphor to intangible property issues); Lemley, supra note 10 (same). 
59 The label partly responds to a patent law concern, see supra note 35 and accompanying 
text, but nothing in or on the cartridge links the “license” to that concern. Neither the cartridge 
nor its packaging is marked with a patent number. 
60 FAQ [for Stots Corporation, manufacturer of woodworking jigs], http://www.stots. 
com/faqs.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2005). 
61 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
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ware license was enforceable against a defendant who unbundled and 
resold Adobe’s programs without Adobe’s permission. This was so, 
not because the defendant had agreed to it (in fact, there was no as-
sent), and not because the inherent reproducibility of software re-
quires more precise producer control over its use, but because it was 
the very nature of computer software that it be licensed.62 The license 
was built into the nature of the thing. 
Fifth, and last, is the widely discussed trend to reify the physical 
thing-like characteristics of concepts and intangible “information” 
phenomena, such as computer programs, computer networks, and 
information-oriented inventions and other intellectual creations. 
Computer networks are “places” or “things,” and unauthorized access 
to them will support claims for trespass of a sort that echo claims for 
trespass to real property.63 Copyrighted music and satellite and cable 
television signals can be “stolen” or “pirated.”64 A business method is 
no less an invention than an industrial machine, and it is no less pat-
entable.65 The Realist scholar Felix Cohen warned of the thingifica-
tion of concepts that enables courts to avoid considering the policy 
consequences of their decisions,66 a concern that applies to natural 
and artificial objects as well as to the purely social. It remains to be 
seen whether thingification is as wholly bad as Cohen intimated, but 
the phenomenon is with us still. 
It is not the case, I suspect, that all five of these changes have hap-
pened, or even that they all are happening to the same degree. They 
are related tendencies in law and culture that offer entrées to a differ-
ent way of looking at problems clustered familiarly around the notion 
of relations between people. Where the Legal Realists asked, when 
and how should the law regulate one person in her dealings with an-
                                                                                                                  
62 See id. at 1090-92. 
63 See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004); eBay, Inc. v. Bid-
der’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000). David McGowan insists that these 
courts did not really see Internet facilities as physical places; at most, courts were using place-
oriented language metaphorically, rather than as bases for their decisions. See David McGowan, 
The Trespass Trouble and the Metaphor Muddle, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y (2005). The blending of 
the metaphorical and the physical is precisely the point. The problem is not that courts cannot 
tell the difference. They clearly can. But they do not see a compelling reason to do so.  
64 See McRoberts Software, Inc. v. Media 100, Inc., 329 F.3d 557, 568 (7th Cir. 2003); 
321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 
2004). 
65 See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
66 See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 814-17 (1935) (declaring that it is wrong for courts to declare the exis-
tence of a “pre-existent Something” as the basis for assigning and enforcing property rights). 
Modern concern over “commodification” of information captures a related but narrower con-
cern. See generally Radin & Sunder, supra note 18. 
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other?, the evolving blending of relations and things suggests that we 
should again ask, when and how should the law regulate what can and 
cannot be done with a thing? Together these developments might be 
characterized metaphorically as a substantial blending of software 
(the subjective, intangible, or conceptual) and hardware (the objec-
tive, the physical, or the concrete). Treat the law as a computer. A 
“classical” view of law applied software (that is, law)67 to hardware 
(that is, physical reality). Just as a contemporary technologist under-
stands that there is no meaningful conceptual distinction between 
computer hardware and computer software,68 a contemporary under-
standing of law requires accepting metaphorically an equivalent dis-
appearance of boundaries. There once was, à la Dr. Seuss, a Thing 
One and Thing Two. Today we are witnesses to the fluidity of thing-
ness, the increasing lack of givenness of both material and conceptual 
things.69 
                                                                                                                  
67 Cf. A. Michael Froomkin, Article 2B as Legal Software for Electronic Contracting—
Operating System or Trojan Horse?, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1023 (1998) (characterizing 
proposed Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code as a bug-ridden operating system for a 
computer). The same point might be made using a biotechnology metaphor. Jim Chen notes that 
a seed is simultaneously a chattel and a container for a genome, and that genome itself is both a 
cumulative record of the organism’s evolutionary history and an instruction set for building and 
operating another chattel. See Jim Chen, Webs of Life: Biodiversity Conservation as a Species of 
Information Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 495, 565 (2004). 
 68 Theory and technological reality are closing in on one another. The technology 
known as Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), sometimes known as “systems on a 
chip,” can be used in computer chips to configure hardware resources to implement func-
tionality, as if those resources were software. Xilinx (http://www.xilinx.com) and Altera 
(http://www.altera.com) are industry leaders. See Bill Roberts, Software or Silicon?, 
ELECTRONIC BUS., Oct. 2003, at 17; Altera Corp. v. Clear Logic, Inc., 424 F.3d 1079 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (affirming legal right of Altera to tie chip design services to sale of designed 
integrated circuits). 
69 Thingness matters not only at the creation of things, but also at their destruction, see 
JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN 
CULTURAL TREASURES (1999) (reviewing a variety of conflicts over privatization of culturally 
significant artifacts); Lior J. Strahilevitz, The Right To Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005), and 
during their existence. See Randal C. Picker, Rewinding Sony: The Evolving Product, Phoning 
Home and the Duty of Ongoing Design, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 749 (2005). 
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This is more than mere manipulation of language,70 though there is 
undoubtedly authority in the language that we (and courts) use. The 
relationship between an object and its description is subject to redefi-
nition in ways that significantly affect how the object exercises au-
thority in law. But that redefinition is not endlessly malleable. It is 
limited by social structures and social conditions. How courts attach 
language to things has real-world influences and real-world conse-
quences, and it is possible to understand the range in which courts 
work. The real world payoff, in other words, is the following. When 
courts and legislatures answer the questions, “Is this a thing?” and 
“What kind of thing is it?,” they are simultaneously choosing legal 
and social practices to attach to that thing, both descriptively and pre-
scriptively. Others have noted that the world of regulatory technology 
raises questions about the who of our material environment.71 My 
concern is expressly the how. It is not enough to know the source of 
things. We need to understand the processes of things. Taking apart 
the construction of legal things—showing links between the technical 
and the social—can expose the true complexity of the regulatory pal-
                                                                                                                  
70 I invoke semantics at this point only to counter the anticipated objection that my argu-
ment can be reduced to the point that language, including the language of things, generates and 
reinforces power-based relationships. The point does not go far enough. If the goal of analyzing 
things is to expose a power dynamic at work in their construction, it is not enough to complain 
about terminology. See Edward L. Rubin, Computer Languages as Networks and Power Struc-
tures: Governing the Development of XML, 53 SMU L. REV. 1447, 1465-67 (2000) (“When a 
new language is created, . . . its creators are able to exercise political effects of a more compre-
hensive nature by the design decisions that they make.”). We need to understand the specifics of 
the processes that the law uses. A computer language is not merely a medium of communica-
tion. It is simultaneously an object, that is, a thing, which in this case is potentially copyright-
able. See Trotter Hardy, The Copyrightability of New Works of Authorship: “XML Schemas” as 
an Example, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 855 (2001). Rubin turns from the diagnosis of thing-as-regulators 
to a solution based on a direct connection between the design process and interpretation of 
design by users, omitting the role of legal institutions in taking the designer’s work and making 
it legally meaningful. 
I use the term “semantics” here in the nontechnical sense as “analysis of meaning.” On the 
formal distinction between semantics (meaning as something that sentences have) and 
pragmatics (meaning as something that people do) in linguistics and in philosophy, see Kent 
Bach, The Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction: What It Is and Why It Matters, in 1 THE 
SEMANTICS/PRAGMATICS INTERFACE FROM DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW 65-84 (Ken Turner ed., 
1999). Wittgenstein’s distinction between semantics (the meaning of language) and pragmatics 
(the use of language) is discussed infra at notes 276-79 and accompanying text, in connection 
with Wittgenstein’s “family resemblances” perspective on the application of language to 
objects. 
71 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); James Boyle, 
Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 
177 (1997); Cohen, supra note 37, at 379, 382-83 (arguing that the problem of thingness is a 
problem of power). See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by 
Machine, 160 J. INST. THEORETICAL ECON. 142 (2004) (describing the effect of mass standard-
ized contracts and digital rights management systems on the distribution of intellectual property 
rights); Radin, Regime Change, supra note 37 (describing “sovereignty” of work controlled by 
Digital Rights Management technology (DRM)). 
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ette, allow us more clearly to appreciate the virtues and drawbacks of 
the different shades of that palette, and to promote or resist changes in 
how the palette is applied.72 The following Parts of this Article ex-
plore the character of the mechanisms that produce contemporary 
things.  
III. THING-BY-NATURE 
If the premise of the Article is explicitly pragmatic,73 then the bulk 
of the Article shows that courts and legislatures have largely failed to 
learn the pragmatist lesson. By taking legal institutions at their word, 
I intentionally set aside the argument that focusing on things them-
selves is error.74 This Part begins, then, with the reminder that a great 
deal of our “things” jurisprudence takes up thingness ontologically, or 
to put the matter more colloquially, relies on a crude essentialist or 
Aristotelian approach to thingness. Aristotle observed that objects in 
the natural world could be understood, described, and classified ac-
cording to their properties, the most fundamental or foundational of 
which were their “essential” substances. The Aristotelian tradition is 
alive and well in both law and philosophy, notwithstanding various 
calls to avoid categorizing and analyzing the world based on the way 
things “really” are. Things are what they naturally are, and that means 
they are what their properties specify them to be. 
I (and in the examples I review below, courts) bundle together 
some issues that philosophers have been careful to distinguish. What I 
have labeled an “Aristotelian” or “essentialist” approach is a rough 
synthesis of an intellectual tradition that began with Plato and Aris-
totle, continued through Augustine and Descartes, and culminated in 
Kant.75 That tradition seeks to draw important distinctions based on 
                                                                                                                  
72 See Boyle, supra note 71, at 205 (pointing out the Lochnerian sense of technology, like 
the free market, as “just the way things are” and thus relatively immune to analyses of its coer-
cive implications and effects). 
73 See Michael Sullivan & Daniel J. Solove, Can Pragmatism Be Radical? Richard Pos-
ner and Legal Pragmatism, 113 YALE L.J. 687, 692-714 (2003) (book review) (defending a 
“thicker” form of legal pragmatism). 
74 For example, Arjun Appadurai argues that “even though from a theoretical point of 
view human actors encode things with significance, from a methodological point of view, it is 
the things-in-motion that illuminate their human and social context.” Appadurai, supra note 18, 
at 5; see also Radin & Sunder, supra note 18 (arguing that things themselves are neither opti-
mistic nor pessimistic; it depends upon how they are used). 
75 Eighteenth century Kantian and early nineteenth century Hegelian traditions postulated 
the existence of “things” with reference to objects existing outside the self, and in which both 
object and thing were essentially static. Kant’s unknowable but essential “thing in itself” (or 
“things considered in themselves”) (“noumenon”), distinguished from its knowable “appear-
ance” (or “things considered as they appear”) (“phenomenon”), presupposed the existence of an 
“object,” the target of perception and representation and dependent on space and time. See 
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON at B295-B315 (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood 
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the nature of reality, whether that consists of the “true” nature of real-
ity (that is, the ontological question of what “kinds” of things exist) or 
of our thought about that reality. Philosophers have asked whether a 
thing exists at all, that is, whether we can know the existence of the 
thing that is distinct from our knowledge of the thing. Aristotle held 
that “definition is of what a thing is and of a reality,”76 or in other 
words, that the world as it is and the world as we define it are congru-
ent, the so-called correspondence theory of truth. The key to knowl-
edge in the Aristotelian scheme was understanding the universal itself 
as a “thing.”77 To define a substance meant to establish its essential 
attributes, among various accidental ones, and to establish especially 
the one attribute that caused the substance to be as it is. The problem 
was to discern the “right” attributes that must be specified in the defi-
nition78 so that while each attribute might singly apply to other things, 
as a whole they would apply only to this thing.79  
                                                                                                                  
 
trans. & eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1781). Related distinctions between the material 
and immaterial, and between idea and expression made their way into copyright law, where they 
persist. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (rejecting copyright in processes and methods); 17 U.S.C. 
§ 202 (2000) (distinguishing copyrighted work from its tangible medium).  
76 ARISTOTLE, POSTERIOR ANALYTICS 90b30-31 (Jonathan Barnes trans., Clarendon Press 
1975) (350 B.C.E.) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, POSTERIOR ANALYTICS]; see also ARISTOTLE, 
METAPHYSICS 1011b25 (W.D. Ross trans., Clarendon Press 1924) (350 B.C.E.) [hereinafter 
ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS] (“To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, 
while to say what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true”); ARISTOTLE, The Catego-
ries 12b5, 14b15 (Harold P. Cooke trans.), in THE ORGANON (Harvard Univ. Press 1938) (350 
B.C.E.) (describing correspondence between statements of affirmation or denial, and the matters 
of fact (pragmata) that are affirmed or denied); ARISTOTLE, On Interpretation 16a3 (Harold P. 
Cooke trans.), in THE ORGANON supra (describing thoughts as representations or likenesses of 
objects). On the distinction between Aristotle’s argument concerning essences and the distinct 
notion of “Platonic essence,” see Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Order in Multiplicity: Aristotle on 
Text, Context, and the Rule of Law, 79 N.C. L. REV. 577, 634-38 & n.206 (2001). 
77 “An ‘experience’ in the Aristotelian sense was a statement of how things happen in na-
ture, rather than a statement of how something had happened on a particular occasion.” PETER 
DEAR, DISCIPLINE AND EXPERIENCE: THE MATHEMATICAL WAY IN THE SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTION 4 (1995). 
78 ARISTOTLE, POSTERIOR ANALYTICS, supra note 76, at 96a15. See generally 
ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, supra note 76, at 1017b 27, 1029a 27-28 and Books VII-IX. 
79 In the Aristotelian scheme, the true character of reality is shown via subject/predicate 
assertions, in which features or properties of things are shown to inhere in individual substances. 
Things of some kind have certain features, or predicates. “Substance” is the most crucial among 
the ten different kinds of predicates, since it describes the thing in terms of what it most truly is, 
the essence of the thing, not predicated on anything else. The other nine categories (quantity, 
quality, relative, where, when, being in a position, having, acting on, and being affected by) 
describe features that distinguish this thing from others of the same kind. Used in combination, 
the ten kinds of predicate provide a comprehensive account of what any individual thing is.  
Substance therefore represents both essence (its form, or its intelligible character) and sub-
stratum (matter) of a thing. A substance possesses attributes but is the attribute of nothing. There 
remains a distinction, however, between essence (what the thing is in itself, not common to 
anything else, or what is necessary for its individual existence or for membership in a specific 
kind) and form (the intelligible, verbalized character of the thing). The essence of a thing is 
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Modern extensions of this tradition not only inquire into the 
“proper” classification of things, but they use our descriptions and 
experiences of things as guides for identifying the “correct” features 
of things. Ontological and epistemological questions depend on ques-
tions of language and practice.80 Aristotle posited the close connec-
tion between essence and form. In his examinations of language, 
Wittgenstein expanded the scope of the inquiry in order to include the 
problem of related linguistic forms used to describe apparently dis-
similar phenomena. Though Wittgenstein shifted the inquiry from the 
question of objective features of the thing to the question of proximity 
to prototypes,81 in an importance sense, his “family resemblance” 
analysis of language and concepts follows an essentially Aristotelian 
model. A conceptual category is not defined by the “true” features 
that defined each member of the category so much as the category is 
populated by members that resemble, to a greater or lesser extent, 
“core” members.82 Semioticians ask the related question of whether 
we are dealing with a category of things, an abstraction, as it were, or 
a particular exemplar or embodiment, that is, a type or a token.83 Ma-
                                                                                                                  
 
what is formulated as a universal in the mind and in language. See CHARLOTTE WITT, 
SUBSTANCE AND ESSENCE IN ARISTOTLE: AN INTERPRETATION OF METAPHYSICS (1994); 
GARTH L. HALLETT, ESSENTIALISM: A WITTGENSTEINIAN CRITIQUE (1991) (providing a theo-
retical sampling of essentialism). 
80 Language and function tell us what the thing is; they do not constitute the thing itself. 
On this point, I distinguish the thing-by-nature model from the thing-by-practice model, de-
scribed infra in Part VI.  
81 See Carl S. Bjerre, Secured Transactions Inside Out: Negative Pledge Covenants, 
Property, and Perfection, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 353-64 (1999) (summarizing fruits of 
modern research on role of metaphor in conceptual reasoning and connecting that research to 
Wittgenstein). 
82 See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 66-69 (G.E.M. 
Anscombe trans., 1968) (1953) (describing the concept of “family resemblance” as “a compli-
cated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, 
sometimes similarities of detail”); George Lakoff, The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor, in 
METAPHOR AND THOUGHT, 202 (Andrew Ortony ed., 2d ed. 1993) (describing “feature based” 
view of concepts as running from Aristotle through Wittgenstein). For illustrations of the Witt-
gensteinian approach in legal analysis, see Craig A. Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 2 (2000) (discussing the Federal Circuit’s use of interpretative theories 
when interpreting patent claims); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 
1087 (2002) (applying a Wittgensteinian approach to the concept of privacy); Steven L. Winter, 
Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1105 (1989). The “family resemblance” analysis is significant elsewhere, of course, not 
only in its Aristotelian sense, particularly as the theory moves farther from individual mental 
states and closer to shared experience. See infra notes 275-82 and accompanying text (situating 
Wittgenstein in the context of thing-by-practice).  
83 My invocation of semiotics literature is deliberate, though as I note later, modern semi-
otics is generally more preoccupied with relations among signifiers and the signified, rather than 
with things themselves. The type/token distinction comes from Peirce: the schematic aspect of a 
symbol is its type; a written sign itself is a token. Similar formulations of the distinction be-
tween a universal and an instance from others include Saussure’s distinction between langue 
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terialist epistemology asks the question of nature in terms of what the 
thing does, rather than in terms of how we talk about it.84  
The practice of the essentialist technique in American law is 
largely divorced from its philosophical underpinnings, meaning that 
courts seek the “truth” of the thing without being genuinely con-
cerned with whether the thing really exists. In law, Aristotelian meth-
odology is not truly an ontological or an epistemological exercise, but 
an echo that uses related methods to achieve the relative certainty, 
durability, and predictability that genuine ontology is supposed to 
provide. To theorists of legal language and statutory interpretation, 
the Hart/Fuller debate over the character of statutory interpretation 
and language in the law85 may be framed as an argument over “core” 
versus “contextual” meanings of language, with Hart allegedly de-
fending the former position and Fuller allegedly defending the latter. 
Both, however, accepted the importance of contextual understandings 
of legal language. They differed over the moral implications of that 
experience. As to meaning itself, however, both perspectives are, in 
the end, “essentially” Aristotelian.86  
Because of the intuitive appeal of the essentialist approach, or 
what I call thing-by-nature, legal examples are legion. What the thing 
“is,” according to some set of properties (whether identified abstractly 
or contextually), determines the outcome of the case. At times, courts 
are quite direct in their adoption of thing-by-nature. At the purer 
metaphysical end of the spectrum, there is Sherwood v. Walker,87 in 
which the Supreme Court of Michigan concluded that a “barren cow 
is substantially a different creature than a breeding one”88 and accord-
ingly supported the right of the seller, who believed that the cow was 
                                                                                                                  
 
(language, or scheme) and parole (talking) and Chomsky’s distinction between competence 
(schema) and performance (instantiation or actualization). For a comprehensive review of basic 
semiotic theory and its application to trademark law, see Beebe, supra note 24.  
84 See Davis Baird, Thing Knowledge—Function and Truth, 6 TECHNÉ: J. OF THE SOC’Y 
FOR PHIL. & TECH. 13, 15 (2002) (“I claim that an artifact bears knowledge when it successfully 
accomplishes a function.”). For the proposition that Aristotelian categories are really functional, 
see PETER MCLAUGHLIN, WHAT FUNCTIONS EXPLAIN: FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATION AND SELF-
REPRODUCING SYSTEMS 42-61, 211 (2001). 
85 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
86 Maureen Cavanaugh argues that this result better reflects the pragmatism of Aristotle, 
by reconciling the intuition that concepts and language have core meanings with the inevitability 
and necessity of looking to functional results in reaching ultimate conclusions. See Cavanaugh, 
supra note 76, at 629-42 (describing a functionalist dimension to the Aristotelian view of iden-
tity). See generally James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local 
Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685 (1985) (critiquing the conceptual possibility of objectiv-
ist or essentialist understandings of legal language, but noting division among critical scholars 
between pure subjectivists and structuralists). 
87 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887). 
88 Id. at 923. 
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barren, to rescind the contract after learning that the cow was preg-
nant.89 Judge Friendly’s famous opinion in Frigaliment Importing Co. 
v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp. is renowned for its masterful and 
contextual exposition of contract interpretation, yet at its core the case 
raises a question of the thing; it opens with the line, “The issue is, 
what is chicken?”90 Comparable ontological premises inform 
McBoyle v. United States91 (is an airplane a “motor vehicle”?); Nix v. 
Hedden92 (is a tomato a vegetable?); United States v. 103 Electronic 
Gambling Devices93 (what is bingo?); and Avon Products, Inc. v. S.C. 
Johnson & Son, Inc.94 (what is insect repellant?). Rules that expressly 
mandate outcomes based on classifications lend themselves to the 
same approach. Interpretations of United States tariff classifications 
are replete with “is this an X?” questions, based on the essential char-
acteristics of how the imported thing is used.95 As Justin Hughes 
notes in his recent work on geographical indicators, the authentic ori-
gin of the thing is largely a matter of ex ante definition.96 A similar 
                                                                                                                  
89 The court later limited Sherwood to its facts in Lenawee County Board of Health v. 
Messerly, 331 N.W.2d 203 (Mich. 1982), holding that rescission for mutual mistake must be 
based on a claim that the error goes to a “basic assumption” underlying the contract, see id. at 
209. In other words, the court replaced one metaphysical inquiry with another. 
90 190 F. Supp. 116, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).  
91 283 U.S. 25 (1931). 
92 149 U.S. 304 (1893). 
93 223 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2000). 
94 984 F. Supp. 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
95 See, e.g., Rollerblade, Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 481 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (boots for in-
line skates); Benziger v. United States, 192 U.S. 38 (1904) (“casts of sculpture”); Pistorino & 
Co. v. United States, 607 F.2d 989, (C.C.P.A. 1979) (beam cutting machines); United States v. 
Colibri Lighters (U.S.A.) Inc., 47 C.C.P.A. 106, 109 (1960) (parts for lighters); H.J. Baker & 
Bros. v. United States, 37 C.C.P.A. 52 (1949) (sunflower seed meal); Amorient Petroleum Co. 
v. United States, 607 F. Supp. 1484 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1985) (motor fuels); Pistorino & Co. v. 
United States, 461 F. Supp. 331 (Cust. Ct. 1978) (models); ACME Marble & Granite Co. v. 
United States, 324 F. Supp. 503 (Cust. Ct. 1971) (shrines); Moral Re-Armament, Inc. v. United 
States, 317 F. Supp. 261 (Cust. Ct. 1970) (fine art). On the legal standards for applying tariff 
classifications, see generally Anhydrides & Chemicals, Inc. v. United States, 130 F.3d 1481 
(Fed. Cir. 1997). Cf. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977) (examining 
whether imported artifacts were “stolen”). 
Using functional characteristics to determine the essential identity of the thing appears in 
trademark law. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001) (defin-
ing unprotectible functionality under trademark law according to whether the feature “is essen-
tial to the use or purpose of the device or when it affects the cost or quality of the device”); 
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (same). It also appears in anti-
trust law. See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 55-58 (1st Cir. 2002) (ana-
lyzing “single entity” question using functional benchmarks, but deciding case on assumption 
that the league is not a single entity, for Sherman Act section 1 purposes); cf. Copperweld Corp. 
v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984) (describing “unity of interest” standard 
to capture the degree of corporate and economic integration among nominally distinct entities). 
96 See Justin Hughes, The Spirited Debate Over Geographic Limitations (2004) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author). Authentic Champagne, for example, comes only from 
the Champagne region of France. A British law defines “scotch whisky.” See The Scotch 
Whisky Order 1990, 1990 No. 998 (Eng.) (implementing The Scotch Whisky Act 1988, itself 
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approach tends to govern “new use” problems in copyright law, in 
which some novel technological form must be evaluated for its con-
gruence to some controlling legal instrument that fails to mention that 
form. Courts in these cases have responded largely by resorting to 
techniques of definition rather than by relying on techniques of con-
tract interpretation (draft ambiguous language against the drafter, for 
example). A new use is (or is not) covered by an existing license de-
pending on whether the new medium “is” or “is not” the medium 
specified in the license.97  
Thing-by-nature, and its concern with the “true” or “authentic” na-
ture of the thing, also plays a central foundational role in legal doc-
trines and traditions that do not clearly rely on what the thing “is.” In 
this sense, the essentialist tradition in law is an appropriate starting 
point not only philosophically, but also historically, in the sense that 
much of the common law was premised on the world as it was found. 
Judges and commentators organized the law around it. Blackstone, for 
example, took “things” as they were understood to be given, in the 
classical sense of “external things in the world.”98 Such “things” 
might be either real or personal; chattels might be “real” (such as 
leaseholds, attached to real estate), or “personal.”99 Common law pro-
hibitions on restraints on alienation100 and injunctions against waste101 
                                                                                                                  
 
the successor to legislation that extends back to the turn of the twentieth century).  
97 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (what is a newspaper?); Random 
House v. Rosetta Books, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (what is a book?), aff’d, 283 
F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002); Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. The Walt Disney Co., 145 
F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998) (what is a motion picture?); Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 
F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988) (what is television?). Other “new use” cases of this sort include Para-
mount Publix Corp. v. Am. TriErgon Corp., 294 U.S. 464 (1935) (sound recordings); Manners 
v. Morosco, 252 U.S. 317 (1920) (motion pictures); Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 
391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968) (television); Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481 
(3d Cir. 1956) (television broadcasts); L.C. Page & Co. v. Fox Film Corp., 83 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 
1936) (motion pictures with sound); Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163 
(N.Y. 1933) (motion pictures with sound). 
98 Fred Yen points out that in its dependence on the world around it, the common law car-
ried on a natural law tradition inherited from Roman law. He notes that the Roman system was 
structured to interrogate the world as it actually was; the common law was structured so as to 
assume a given world, a world that was as aspirational as real. See Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the 
Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 532 n.37 (1990). 
99 Blackstone further distinguished between personal property attendant to real property 
(chattels real), such as leaseholds, and chattels personal, that is, chattels considered purely as 
movable goods. The bulk of Blackstone’s description of the latter is directed to animals. 
100  See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *398. Joan Williams argues that the 
fixed hierarchy of relationships among legal estates expressed the fixed social structure that 
characterized feudal society. The character of an estate in land, like the character of one’s place 
in the Great Chain of Being, was simply given. See Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 
IOWA L. REV. 277, 290-91 (1998).  
 101 See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *224 (describing common law rules 
against waste); see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *281-84 (defining waste). In 
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reflected the sense that the world was as it was given naturally and, 
both socially and physically, should remain essentially so.102 Men and 
markets should behave accordingly.103 
Manifestations of this sense of the natural condition of things 
showed up in hostility to encumbrances on moveable goods, includ-
ing (among other places) prohibitions on unnecessarily multiplying 
the types of legal interests in property (corresponding to the civil law 
numerus clausus principle),104 on “equitable servitudes” in chattels 
that purported to prohibit how they could be used,105 and on market-
ing arrangements that would be condemned under modern antitrust 
law as species of “tying” and “resale price maintenance” because they 
limited the terms on which goods could be bought and sold.106 In this 
                                                                                                                  
 
the United States the law of waste turned away from protection of the identical “thing” to pro-
tection of the economic interests of the future property owner. See Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 
79 N.W. 738, 738-39 (Wis. 1899). 
102  See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 540-41 
(5th ed. 1956) (tracing the prohibition on restraints on alienation to the Statute Quia Emptores 
of 1290). 
103  As Lord Coke wrote:  
And so it is if a man be possessed of a lease for yeares, or of a horse, or of any other 
chattel reall or personall, and give or sell his whole interest or propertie therein upon 
condition that the donee or vendee shal not alien the same, the same is void, because 
his whole interest and propertie is out of him . . . . 
EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR, A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 
223, § 360 (1628).  
104  See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000) (arguing that the structure of 
the common law of property incorporates the policies underlying the numerus clausus princi-
ple). 
105  On the natural law implications of rules regarding equitable servitudes in chattels, see 
Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1, 53-54 
(1997) (characterizing equitable servitudes as a form of moral rights); John M. Kernochan, The 
Distribution Right in the United States of America: Review and Reflections, 42 VAND. L. REV. 
1407, 1413-15 (1989) (comparing copyright’s first sale doctrine). 
106  The Commentaries of Chancellor Kent, first published in 1826, married the English 
common law to the American economy of the nineteenth century, in a way that both reflected 
and anticipated a construction of legal “things” via the demands of the market, rather than as 
given by God. See JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (Charles M. Barnes ed., 
Little, Brown and Co., 13th ed. 1884) (1826). The physical dimension of property retained its 
classic treatment, both under the doctrine of waste, see JAMES KENT, Lecture 35, in 2 
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, supra, at 340-55, and under the doctrine of bailment. See 
JAMES KENT, Lecture 40, in 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, supra, at 559-611. Kent, 
however, laid the foundation for legal distinctions between the legal integrity and the physical 
integrity of things, by connecting the value of things to their marketability (in Kent’s terms, 
alienability), rather than to their natural forms. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & 
PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776–1970, at 
138-39, 141-47 (1997) (noting the transition from Blackstone’s physicalist view of property as 
“things” to Kent’s view of property as legal interests in both things (i.e., objects) and land). The 
evolution anticipated by Kent was complete by the end of the century. Commentators concluded 
with confidence that in American law, the common law prohibition on restraints on alienation of 
personal property had entirely merged with (and overtaken) the common law premise that 
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spirit, Adam Mossoff argues that modern patent law owes a debt to 
natural law concepts in the common law of property.107 Similarly, 
Jeanne Schroeder argues that the “grasped object,” both physical and 
metaphoric, remains a central metaphoric concern of commercial 
law.108 Thomas Merrill concludes that federal constitutional property 
questions in due process and in takings cases tend to follow a “pat-
terning” approach in trying to determine the thingness of property.109 
The law tends to prescribe a set of criteria that an interest must have 
to qualify as “property,” though the patterns themselves differ in tak-
ings and due process cases. 
Intellectual property law offers a rich palette of examples of essen-
tialist premises. All of patent law might plausibly be reduced to a 
single question: What is “the invention” to be protected by the patent 
right? The evolution of American patent doctrine can be mapped by 
the techniques that Congress and courts have mandated for answering 
this question. In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court confirmed 
in Winans v. Denmead110 that a patent covered the “thing” described 
in the patent, regardless of its form. By the end of that century, patent 
law practice had moved toward peripheral claiming, that is, defining 
                                                                                                                  
 
property in a thing was defined by the character of one’s “estate.” The demands of commerce 
required the conclusion that the definition of a “thing” was that it was owned, and limitations on 
the alienability of that thing (the most important dimension of ownership) were presumptively 
invalid. See, e.g., JOSEPH J. DARLINGTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
33-35 (1891); JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 19-21 (5th 
ed., 1918). In important respects, this conclusion begs the question of thingness itself, which is 
the extent to which a restraint may be validly imposed by characterizing the property transfer as 
involving less than a fee simple absolute. Legal formalism based on a naturalistic view of things 
persisted, see, e.g., JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY 278-
81 (2d ed. 1895) (presenting a formalist analysis that distinguishes the validity of restraints 
imposed under different estates), but defenders of the faith shifted the ground of the debate from 
thingness itself to the relationship between thingness and function. Compare Merrill L. Schne-
bly, Restraints upon the Alienation of Legal Interests: II, 44 YALE L.J. 1186, 1200-01 (1935) 
(arguing that the grantor of personal property should have the power to declare that the convey-
ance involved less than complete ownership and thus impose an enforceable condition on the 
grantee’s use and disposition of the item), with Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on 
Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1928) (arguing that equitable servitudes on chattels ordinarily 
should not be enforced). Where thingness remains important in the law, it is typically the truth 
of the idea of the thing that is really paramount, rather than the truth of the thing itself. Philoso-
phical distinctions between the two are not particularly important. A weak form of social con-
struction theory applies in the end. Cf. Robinson, supra note 38, at 1483-85 (arguing that the 
policy justifications for the modern rule against restraints on alienation are empty, and that the 
rule rests not on a common law version of the numerus clausus principle of property law, but on 
an underlying assumption about the nature of objects). 
107  See Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 
1550–1800, 52 HAST. L.J. 1255 (2001).  
108 Jeanne L. Schroeder, Some Realism About Legal Surrealism, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
455, 491 (1996). 
109 Merrill, supra note 40, at 927. 
110  56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 342-43 (1853).  
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the scope of the patent according to the outer boundaries of the inven-
tion, rather than according to its central inventive characteristic.111 
Congress confirmed that technique in the 1870 revision and re-
codified it in the 1952 Patent Act. As a result, the rule of Winans has 
been reinterpreted as early support for what we now know as the Doc-
trine of Equivalents.112 The change in claiming technique, however, 
has not changed the underlying character of the inquiry. By one de-
vice or another, the question for patentees and alleged infringers is 
whether the thing made, used, or sold by the latter is the very thing 
that is covered by the patent. The paradoxical nature of the ques-
tion—its search for authenticity, coupled with ever more arcane rules 
for construing the relevant patent claims113—reinforces the sense that 
patentable things are constructed by the law, but that the law is striv-
ing to understand their essential or “true” character. 
The process of claim construction is not the only place in patent 
law where essentialist reasoning dominates the search for the relevant 
thing. Patent law has labored to divine the distinction between “re-
pair” and “reconstruction” of a patented invention by a customer who 
obtained a patented device legitimately, then wore it out. Since patent 
law grants the owner of a patent the exclusive rights to make and use 
the invention, a user of a patented device who repairs the device (by 
replacing a worn part, for example) might be accused of “making” 
that device anew. The Federal Circuit and predecessor courts have 
clung to the notion that the owner of the device may “repair” it so 
long as the device is not “spent” and maintains its original “identity,” 
concepts that derive from the Supreme Court’s early decision in Wil-
son v. Simpson.114 The analytic technique here is not precisely the 
                                                                                                                  
111  See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 35 (1997). Joshua 
Sarnoff views this history as support for an argument that the modern Doctrine of Equivalents in 
patent law originated as part of the practice of central claiming and has no relevance to a system 
of peripheral claiming. See Joshua Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern Doctrines of Equivalents 
and Claiming the Future: Part I (1790–1870), 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 441 
(2005). 
112  See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 723 (2002) 
(citing Winans for the proposition that “a patent’s scope is not limited to its literal terms, but 
embraces all equivalents to the claims described”). 
113  See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
114  50 U.S. (9 How.) 109, 126 (1850) (finding no patent infringement where the defendant 
replaced knives that were part of the invention, where the nature of the invention demanded 
replacement of knives at periodic intervals; the “identity of the machine” was not altered); see 
also Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425, 433 (1894) 
(finding no infringement by a defendant who sold paper usable in connection with a patented 
toilet paper fixture, “where the element made by the alleged infringer is an article of manufac-
ture perishable in its nature, which it is the object of the mechanism to deliver, and which must 
be renewed periodically, whenever the device is put to use”). The leading modern case is Aro 
Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961) (finding no in-
fringement by a defendant who replaced the worn fabric of a patented but worn automobile 
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same as the one used in “new use” cases in copyright law. The ques-
tion is not identity of media, but a different, though related issue of 
identity: does the machine as rebuilt by the alleged infringer share an 
“identity” with the machine patented by the patentee—or merely with 
the machine purchased by the alleged infringer in the first place? 
What, in short, is the essence of the patentee’s invention? Is the re-
constructed version the same thing? 
Mark Janis points out that judicial adherence to the “identity” con-
cept has been erratic, and it has been coupled with equally erratic (and 
sometimes simultaneous) adherence to the notion of “intent,” as in, 
what did the parties to the original transaction intend regarding the 
scope of repair and reconstruction rights?115 It is said, accordingly, 
that the patentee’s patent interest is “exhausted” by an unrestricted 
sale of the patented item, such that the patentee has received a full 
reward on account of the sale.116 Nonetheless, strong echoes of adher-
ence to some form of “identity” test persist, as suggested in the Fed-
eral Circuit’s recent rulings in Husky Injection Molding Systems Ltd. 
v. R & D Tool Engineering Co.,117 Jazz Photo Corp. v. International 
Trade Commission,118 and Bottom Line Management, Inc. v. Pan 
Man, Inc.119 
                                                                                                                  
 
convertible top). The related doctrine of exhaustion of the patent right is traceable to Adams v. 
Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873) (coffin lids) and Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (15 
How.) 539 (1852) (planing machines).  
115  See Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the Apocryphal Axe: Repair, Reconstruction, and the Im-
plied License in Intellectual Property Law, 58 MD. L. REV. 423 (1999) (criticizing “spentness 
rhetoric” that distinguishes repair from reconstruction, because it encourages courts to consider 
the physical qualities of the subject devices in a vacuum, rather than using qualities as proxies 
for underlying expectations of patentee and purchaser). 
116  See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2001). So 
that the rule is consistent with the territorial effect of the patent laws, the relevant sale must 
occur within the United States. See Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). 
117  291 F.3d 780 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding no infringement of plaintiff’s patented injection 
molding system by supplying unpatented carrier plates to plaintiff’s customers, for use in the 
system). The court distinguished three scenarios: first, possible reconstruction of a “spent” 
patented item (an inquiry that involves several factors, including the nature of the device, the 
patentee’s intent, and the character of the market for servicing components of the item); second, 
replacement of a spent unpatented part, which never constitutes infringement; and third, re-
placement of an unspent unpatented part, which enables the patented machine or process to 
perform better or differently. This third category is “akin to [permissible] repair.” Id. at 787. 
118  264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that reconditioning of bodies of patented “sin-
gle-use” cameras does not involve infringing “reconstruction,” since the reconditioning pre-
serves the life of the original article, rather than making a substantially new article). The line 
between permitted repair of an unpatented part of the invention and unpermitted reconstruction 
of the entire thing reconstitutes the “nature of the thing” question in a different analytic frame-
work. See, e.g., Kendall Co. v. Progressive Med. Tech., Inc., 85 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996); 
Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 45 F.3d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
119  228 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that a company that repaired the surfaces of 
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A final example of essentialist or thing-by-nature approaches in in-
tellectual property law comes from subject matter distinctions both 
within and between copyright and patent law. Based on the premise 
that a given form of inventive or creative activity should be regulated 
primarily by one system of law, we want to know what should be 
regulated by intangible property systems and what should be regu-
lated by other systems. We also want to know which intangible prop-
erty system applies.  
Certain technologies raise especially acute problems of both sorts. 
The most obvious problem case involves the computer program:120 Is 
the program a form of copyrightable expression, or is it a patentable 
machine or process? What kind of “thing” is a computer program? 
The doctrine currently proposes that the answer is a Berra-esque 
“both”—a result that appears to derive from analytic and precedential 
processes that have focused mostly on the true character of computer 
programs. The earliest attempts to categorize computer programs 
arose in a technological era in which programs and the machines that 
ran them were tightly integrated. Courts nonetheless insisted on dis-
tinguishing physical (substrate) and intangible (inventive or creative) 
forms in which programs were embodied, and distinguishing “expres-
sive” and “inventive” dimensions of the program from “natural” rules 
and from “ideas.” The result is a barely coherent body of law defining 
the circumstances under which computer programs are patentable and 
copyrightable. In the search for the essential thingness of the com-
puter program, the law has concluded that computer programs, by 
their nature, are simultaneously both intangible things and tangible 
things, patentable machines and copyrightable expression. 
On the patent side, the early history of computer technology coin-
cided with the Supreme Court’s decision in Gottschalk v. Benson,121 
which forbids the patenting of a computer program that is nothing 
more than an electronic representation of a mathematical algorithm. 
That is, a computer program is not a thing at all. It is math.122 That 
decision has been buried, if not overruled, by the Federal Circuit’s 
                                                                                                                  
 
patented cooking plates was engaged in permissible repair, since the repair affected unpatented 
components).  
120  The “useful article” doctrine in copyright law, which tries to distinguish function from 
expression, is a similar example of a subject matter distinction based on the nature of the thing. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” and “useful 
article”); Poe v. Missing Persons, 745 F.2d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1984) (asking whether the work 
is a swimsuit, or a work of conceptual art). 
121  409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
122  See Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Al-
gorithms and Other Computer-Program Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025 (1990). 
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holding in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial 
Group, Inc.123 that a device or method (such as a computer program) 
is patentable if it naturally produces a specific, tangible, useful result. 
A computer program is now a machine, a tangible thing (in patent-
ese, an “article of manufacture”) so long as it generates a result. Pat-
ent law achieved roughly the same result via the early theory that a 
“general purpose computer” loaded with a computer program inher-
ently became a distinct and thing-like “special purpose computer,” 
entitled to patent protection.124 In this case, one thing turns into a dif-
ferent thing, and it becomes patentable along the way. 
On the copyright side, the law likewise has tried to maintain a 
sense of the “true” nature of a computer program. Copyright law ac-
cepts computer programs as protectible works of authorship because 
they exist, as a matter of course, in “literary” form, that is, as recita-
tions of text that instantiate copyrightable “expression.”125 Material 
excluded from copyright when it appears in novels and plays—
material characterized as “merger” (the tight integration of idea and 
expression) and “scenes à faire” (the stock or standard representa-
tions)—is likewise excluded from protection when it appears in a 
computer program.126 The very nature of a computer program, in 
other words, is to be a literary work. The computer program is, how-
ever, also irreducibly functional, and so copyright has simultaneously 
and awkwardly tried to limit its scope with respect to “genuinely” 
                                                                                                                  
123  149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
124  A “general purpose computer in effect becomes a special purpose computer once it is 
programmed to perform particular functions pursuant to instructions from [particular] program 
software.” WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quot-
ing In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc)); cf. In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 
1395, 1400 (C.C.P.A 1969) (“[I]f a machine is programmed in a certain new and unobvious 
way, it is physically different from the machine without that program; its memory elements are 
differently arranged.”); see Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in 
the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 10 (2001) (summarizing evolution of Federal Cir-
cuit’s rules on patenting computer programs); cf. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 
F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding computer program “command hierarchy” unprotected by 
copyright law as a “method of operation”), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 
(1996). 
125  This is the premise that underlies application of Judge Hand’s abstractions test for 
evaluating infringement of dramatic works, such as plays, to computer programs. See Computer 
Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). In its effort to disassemble the 
computer program function-by-function in search of its expressive essence, the Altai case is 
generally contrasted with the earlier opinion of the Third Circuit in Whelan Associates v. Jaslow 
Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), which took a more holistic view of the 
program as work of authorship. 
126 See Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 714-17. The usefulness of the literary analogy has 
been thoughtfully explored in the context of broader examinations of computer programs. See 
Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1209 (1998) 
(characterizing doctrinal allocation of copyright interests in computer programs as based largely 
on convention).  
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functional dimensions.127 A computer program may embody unpro-
tected “methods of operation,”128 and competitors of the copyright 
owner have been given leeway to engage in the kind of reverse engi-
neering of functional things that is afforded the owners of objects that 
embody trade secrets.129 
Distinguishing the “natural” from the “artificial” with respect to a 
computer program dovetails with the broader intellectual property 
principle that limits legal protection to that which humans create, ex-
pressed in the patent law as the prohibition on patent protection for 
“products of nature.”130 “Products of nature” cannot be patented 
unless they can be recharacterized as “things.” As Judge Learned 
Hand concluded in Parke Davis v. H.K. Mulford,131 ruling that a puri-
fied form of the extracted substance known as adrenalin could be pat-
ented because “it became for every practical purpose a new thing 
commercially and therapeutically.”132 As flimsy as this argument is, it 
                                                                                                                  
127 The author John Hersey dissented from the CONTU Report on the ground that com-
puter programs were primarily and essentially functional. NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 27-28 (1979); DAVID 
R. KOEPSELL, THE ONTOLOGY OF CYBERSPACE: PHILOSOPHY, LAW & THE FUTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2000) (arguing, following John Searle, for a materialist interpreta-
tion of computer-generated objects, i.e., that they consist of ordinary objects (like electrical 
charges) in computer equipment, and therefore do not belong in the legal universe that regulates 
“expression”). The crude ontological approach to new technologies has led courts down some 
awkward paths with respect to the existence of infringing “copies” of copyrighted works. Com-
pare MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding a 
temporary RAM reproduction of a computer program to be an infringing “copy”), with White-
Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908) (finding that a player piano roll 
did not comprise a “copy” of a copyrighted musical composition). 
128 See Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d 807; Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copy-
right Subject Matter, 35 CONN. L. REV. 439, 509-10 (2003) (arguing for a broad view of the 
functional dimensions of computer programs, and that “functional” expression generally should 
be categorically assigned to the patent system).  
129 See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). Permission to 
reverse engineer copyrighted program code helps to reinforce the distinction between copyright 
and patent systems; in the latter, reverse engineering usually infringes. Enforcement of contrac-
tual arrangements that limit reverse engineering of copyrighted works weaken that distinction, 
by muddying the waters regarding the kind of “thing” a given work is. See Bowers v. Baystate 
Techs, Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (enforcing a contract term that prohibited software 
licensee from reverse engineering the licensed program). 
130 See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948); O’Reilly v. 
Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853) (holding that abstract principles are not patentable subject 
matter); Richard S. Gruner, Intangible Inventions: Patentable Subject Matter for an Information 
Age, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 355, 371-72 (2002); Dan L. Burk, Software as Speech, 8 SETON 
HALL CONST. L.J. 683, 690 (1998). 
131 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912). 
132 Id. at 103; see also Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 162 
(4th Cir. 1958) (holding that a purified form of an existing natural product is patentable only if 
the new product differs from the old in kind, not merely degree). The origins of the term “manu-
facture” as a predicate for patent protection in these cases offers additional support for an essen-
tialist reading of thingness in patents. See Allen Bloom, Designer Genes and Patent Law: A 
Good Fit, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1041, 1043-44 (1981) (noting origins of the patent term 
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has been adopted as a justification for allowing patents on isolated 
genetic sequences. A sequence of genetic codons chemically isolated 
from its chromosomal context can be patented because that “thing” 
does not exist as such in any natural state and therefore has been 
“made by man.”133 From such a denaturalizing, decontextualized per-
spective, under this regime anything may be, or become, a thing.134  
For all of the flaws of an essentialist or thing-by-nature approach, 
from a policy standpoint the approach has some obvious and impor-
tant virtues. The most important one is the relative stability and con-
sistency of the things that it produces. Things usually are as they ap-
pear to be, and they usually should and do remain the same across 
contexts. If we conclude in one domain that a thing is a thing and a 
certain kind of thing, then it should retain that status if either we are 
or the thing is transposed to some other domain. To make this abstract 
example concrete, if I conclude that something is “television” for 
purposes of a copyright case, then it is likely right that this medium 
should be treated as “television” for antitrust law, telecommunications 
law, and commercial law. For example, whether broadband Internet 
service to the home is a “cable service” or a “telecommunication ser-
                                                                                                                  
 
“manufacture” in customs cases levying import duties on manufactures and distinguishing raw 
materials). 
133 See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Patent and Trademark 
Office Jan. 5, 2001); Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double 
Helix: A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 303 (2002) (urging rejection of the “isolation and purification” standard for patentability). 
The proposition that genetic sequences are patentable according to their structure, rather than 
function, is heavily criticized in Robin Cooper Feldman, Rethinking Rights in Biospace, 79 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
134 Compare Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding no 
patent infringement where imported result of foreign use of patentee’s process was “informa-
tion,” not a product), with AT&T v. Microsoft Corp., No. 01 Civ. 4872(WHP), 2004 WL 
406640 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2004) (holding that exporting a master copy of a computer program 
constituted exporting a component of a patented program-related invention, rather than “mold” 
for a component of the invention), aff’d on other grounds, 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005), and 
Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 99 C 0626, 2004 WL 170334 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2004) 
(rejecting defendant’s argument that it is not liable for sales of infringing computer programs, 
where each infringing copy was not embedded in tangible media), vacated in part, 399 F.3d 
1325 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 568 (2005). The Eolas patent at issue in the last of 
these cases was later invalidated as a result of a reexamination proceeding in the Patent Office. 
See also SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(Gajarsa, J., concurring) (concluding, in a bioscience context, that the patent failed to disclose 
patentable subject matter where there is no discrete “thing,” since the technology involved a 
patented “thing” that was spontaneously and automatically created by production of a non-
patented thing), vacated and petition for reh’g en banc granted, 403 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(vacating opinion as to experimental use). For a recent objection to this approach, see Eileen M. 
Kane, Splitting the Gene: DNA Patents and the Genetic Code, 71 TENN. L. REV. 707, 752 
(2004) (urging application of the “law of nature” doctrine to bar patents on DNA sequences, 
partly on the ground that the “essential attributes” of the genetic code describe a fixed, univer-
sal, and timeless relationship).  
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vice” under the Communications Act of 1934 implicates not only the 
scope of applicable telecommunications regulation, but also the char-
acter of competition policy.135 Philosophically speaking, a thing 
should not have a different existence simply because a different set of 
legal principles is applied.136 
In addition, thing-by-nature is comparatively cheap. Legal regula-
tion is relatively straightforward.137 Lawmakers only have to describe 
the here and now of an object, as opposed to perspectives on an ob-
ject, and they are not required to anticipate how things may change in 
the future. Cognitively, there is a related universality and finality that 
appears to attach to definitions of things. This is especially true for 
definitions that appear in statutes, but it is equally relevant to judicial 
analysis. Clarisa Long makes this “cognitive economy” the center-
piece of her analysis of copyright and patent interests;138 Thomas 
Merrill and Henry Smith make a related argument in support of their 
theory that property law generally allows recognition of a limited 
number of legal forms.139 Having to decide what television “is” in the 
first place is expensive enough; reconsidering the thingness of televi-
sion every time a new suit is brought is intellectually wasteful. It gen-
erates uncertainty among commercial players, it engages legal institu-
tions in problematic semantic exercises, and it leaves confusion and 
skepticism among consumers. We expect categories. At an individual 
level, it can be difficult to keep multiple senses of television alive in 
one’s head. At a social level, if we cannot agree on what television is 
in some stable sense, how can we watch our favorite shows? Cultural 
                                                                                                                  
135 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005) 
(concluding that the Federal Communications Commission plausibly construed the Communica-
tions Act to characterize cable broadband internet service as an “information service”); Me-
diaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 257 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2001) (concluding that local 
“equal access” regulation applicable to Internet access provider unlawfully required provider to 
supply “telecommunication service” in violation of federal regulatory scheme); Rob Frieden, 
The FCC’s Name Game: How Shifting Regulatory Classifications Affect Competition, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1275 (2004) (urging abandonment of classification-based regulatory 
system). Part of the conceptual problem derives from what Orin Kerr has characterized as the 
problem of choosing between “internal” and “external” perspectives on computer technology. 
See Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357 (2003). 
136  For discussions of the problems that ensue from different regulatory classifications of 
the same underlying things, see Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Irreconcilable Differences? Congres-
sional Treatment of Internet Service Providers as Speakers, 3 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 70 
(2001); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Open Internet Access and Freedom of Speech: A First Amend-
ment Catch-22, 75 TUL. L. REV. 87, 127-34 (2000). 
137  See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction 
and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525 (2004) (arguing that policy-
makers pay insufficient attention to legitimate process-oriented consumer concerns in regulating 
potentially harmful or dangerous goods). 
138  See Long, supra note 4, at 540 (arguing that thingness is a cognitive heuristic that re-
duces information processing costs). 
139  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 104, at 24-42. 
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practice demands some basic agreement on what things are. The best 
argument in favor of an essentialist approach may be the fact that 
there is an irreducible and inescapable extent to which we—
individuals and institutions—manage our lives and worlds in this 
way.140  
IV. THING-BY-DESIGN 
The universality of thing-by-nature is its greatest strength. The au-
thority of such a thing is literally irresistible and apparently indisput-
able. Yet legally as well as philosophically, thing-by-nature runs 
some major risks. A system that searches for and enforces the truth of 
a thing—even the truth of the idea of a thing—may get the answer 
wrong, with potentially catastrophic results. The unknowability of 
things was the centerpiece of Kant’s philosophy; for lawyers, as an 
epistemological matter, Learned Hand may have put his finger on the 
problem with what is known as the “abstractions” test for distinguish-
ing protectible expression in copyright from unprotectible idea.141 We 
can never really know what the right level of abstraction is. Is this a 
thing itself, or merely a feature of a larger thing, or part of a system? 
What is the thing? There may be more than one. What is worse, 
things change,142 but thing-by-nature assumes that the world does not. 
And the virtues of “cognitive economy” conceal important “who” and 
“how” questions: who does the thing-making, and how does it get 
done?143 Wittgensteinian “family resemblance” analysis of language 
                                                                                                                  
140  This conclusion forms the point of departure for the Realist and critical critique of 
property. See Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in 22 NOMOS: PROPERTY 69 (J. 
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) (describing the distinction between the intui-
tive image of property, as absolute power over things, and the more “sophisticated,” Hohfeldian, 
legal view of property as relationships among people (citing BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE 
PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 97-100, 113-67 (1977))). Grey’s dichotomy is between 
laypeople and experts, whom he identifies as lawyers and economists. Id.; cf. Vandevelde, supra 
note 26 (describing the evolution of the “dominion” view of property). 
 141 As Judge Hand wrote: 
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing 
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last 
may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is about, 
and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of ab-
stractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could 
prevent the use of his “ideas,” to which, apart from their expression, his property is 
never extended. . . . Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody 
ever can. 
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
142  See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(questioning the extent to which a court should intervene in product design decisions in the 
context of a dynamic market).  
143  See Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, 51 DUKE L.J. 1783, 1784-85 
(2002) (noting that the value of property is taken for granted, so that people ask who will control 
it, rather than whether to control it). 
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has been challenged by cognitive linguists, who argue that language, 
thought, and reality are isomorphic not at the level of “true” features 
found in the world, but at the level of ordinary experience. The focus 
on the true nature of things undermines our common understanding 
that we really do make the world around us, that we manufacture 
meaning along with manufacturing things, and that creators of things 
are presumptively entitled to define both.144 Jed Rubenfeld suggests 
that copyright law and the First Amendment can be unified under a 
rubric that he describes as the “freedom of imagination,”145 a freedom 
that likely embodies not only autonomy to play inside the mind, but 
also autonomy to represent one’s thoughts in material form.146 Phi-
losophically, Aristotelian monism is a short step from Cartesian dual-
ism that places cognition ahead of perception. We have the ability to 
create our “reality” and then to characterize it. This emphasis on a 
power and the right-to-design is a move toward a moral foundation 
for thingness and away from a foundation based on intuition. In many 
cases, the law presumes that our ability to create this reality justifies 
an entitlement to do so. Things are what we design them to be.  
The shift from thing-by-nature to thing-by-design reflects evolu-
tion from the Kantian and Aristotelian traditions noted in the previous 
Part, on the one hand, and toward later philosophers, including and 
especially Hegel, on the other. Philosophically speaking, the basic 
framework that analyzed the world as it was in terms of the world as 
we perceived it, inherited from the ancient Greeks,147 remained intact, 
but it was liberated from a theological assumption that the perfect, 
true universe could only be the product of divinity (and the corre-
spondingly measured role for individual autonomy).148 Kant, like Ar-
                                                                                                                  
144  One might be tempted to draw a sharp distinction between the material flexibility that I 
described in Part II and interpretive flexibility, and so reconcile what I call thing-by-nature with 
our entitlement to make meaning from the world. One of my premises, following my construc-
tivist take on the problem of materiality in the first place, is that these two sorts of flexibility are 
far less distinct than they appear. See also supra note 9 and accompanying text (describing 
Quine’s critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction). 
145  Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE 
L.J. 1 (2002). 
146  See Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom To Design and Freedom To Play in Vir-
tual Worlds, 90 VA. L. REV. 2043, 2079-80 (2004). Balkin argues that the “freedom to design” 
of virtual worlds game developers may be worthy of constitutional significance under the First 
Amendment. As design edges towards commodification, it may be overridden by property and 
contract rules and by public regulation.  
147  Aristotle and Kant stand in for a rich tradition exploring the roles of the real and ideal, 
material and immaterial, and subject and object. See Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American 
Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1154, 1264, 1290 (1985). 
148  See JAMES BARRY, JR., MEASURES OF SCIENCE: THEOLOGICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
IMPULSES OF EARLY MODERN THOUGHT (1996). Barry draws a distinction between knowing as 
appearance and perception in earlier (especially Aristotelian) frameworks, on the one hand, and 
the later conclusion (Descartes, Newton, and eventually Kant) that reality was instead based on 
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istotle, could ask whether “things” are defined by our perceptions of 
them, or by what lies behind the perceptions, because he assumed that 
things themselves were given by God. Hegel postulated a world cre-
ated by man, so that a “thing” consisted of that which was alienated 
from the self. An act of will was required. Given that, it was a short 
step to conclude that the object consisted of that which the individual 
had elected to alienate—and thus was definable by the individual in 
the first place.  
For Hegel, a “thing” was the extension of the personality of the 
subject into the world of the object. As Radin notes, Kant and Hegel 
shared a basic concern with objects “separate from the self.”149 “If the 
person/thing distinction is to be treated as a bright line that divides the 
commodifiable from the inalienable, we must know exactly which 
items are part of the person and which not.”150 Hegel viewed “things” 
as external objects (contrasted with internal things) that exist without 
a free will151 and that can be possessed in property.152 For Kant, the 
difficult question was the relationship of the individual will to objects 
found in the world. Hegel answered this question by postulating that 
objects in the world are defined by the acts of will that created and 
defined them. The act of will that creates the thing simultaneously 
defines it.  
                                                                                                                  
 
knowing, and thinking, on the other hand. Aristotelian theory favored the perception of the 
senses, that knowledge derived ultimately from perception of things-in-the-world, that is, physi-
cal science descended from common sense. Cartesian (and eventually Newtonian and Kantian) 
thought granted immaterial—unobservable—things, such as forces, the status of real or natural 
things, favoring the role of the intellect. Newton confirmed this view: material things were 
theoretically shaped bodies, framed by the force of absolute space-time. Time and space, among 
other things, were elevated to “real” status. In Barry’s formulation, however, Newtonian science 
still depended on “the things themselves” as recapitulations of the divine universal, i.e., as 
immanent theoretical structures that could be natural and therefore real only if they were ulti-
mately produced by God. See id. at 153-55. 
149  MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 34 (1996). 
150  Id. at 40. 
151  G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. 
Nisbet trans., 1991) (1821) “‘[T]hing’ [is to be] understood in its general sense as everything 
external to my freedom, including even my body and my life. This right of things is the right of 
personality as such.” Id. at 71. What is an “object”?  
[A]nything that is not capable of becoming a subject—that which has no will and 
cannot achieve self-consciousness. Objects are those things that may properly be 
treated as ends. . . .  
   One implication of this is that there are no “natural” objects. An object obtains its 
status by its identification as such by an act of will by an individual seeking to be-
come a subject. 
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Unnatural Rights: Hegel and Intellectual Property 12 (Cardozo Law, 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 80, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
abstract=518182. Objects might be conceptual as well as tangible. See HEGEL, supra, at 74-75. 
The question is whether something can be given an external existence and disposed of.  
152  See J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 175-80 (1997). 
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I describe the Hegelian framework to point out that thing-by-
design ultimately relies on the broader intellectual construct that is 
personal autonomy. It has a specific and important intellectual lineage 
that is manifested both in American law and elsewhere in American 
thought and culture. For example, the history of other social sciences 
during the twentieth century reflects recognition of the implications of 
our ability both conceptually153 and physically154 to create and rede-
fine ourselves and the world around us. Scholars as diverse as Herbert 
Simon155 and Leo Marx156 have commented on the profoundly artifi-
                                                                                                                  
153  There are a number of related intellectual movements that focus on truth and/or mean-
ing as dependent on our use of language, rather than on knowledge of the world itself. Nominal-
ism denies the objective reality of the sorts, or kinds, that define a proper ontology and asserts 
that naming alone produces meaning. See SAUL KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY (1980); 
HILARY PUTNAM, The Meaning of “Meaning,” in 2 MIND, LANGUAGE AND REALITY 215 
(1975); W.V.O. QUINE, Natural Kinds, in ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND OTHER ESSAYS, 
supra note 9, at 114-38. Intentionality locates both reality and meaning in the cognitive relation-
ship between some belief or thing and what that belief represents. See JOHN SEARLE, 
INTENTIONALITY: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (1983); JOHN HAUGELAND, HAVING 
THOUGHT: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (1998). Haugeland distinguishes theories of 
intentionality that locate it primarily in individual mental states, an approach associated with 
Jerry Fodor; those that locate it in environmentally situated agents, associated with Daniel 
Dennett and W.V.O. Quine; and those that locate it in the social and cognitive practices of a 
community, associated with Wilfred Sellars and Robert Brandom. HAUGELAND, supra. The 
second and third constructions overlap with social construction theory. See IAN HACKING, THE 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? (1999); J.R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL 
REALITY (1995); PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
REALITY (1966). Searle’s and Austin’s theory of speech acts is a third framework that is con-
ceptually related to these two. See J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (2d ed. 
1975); JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969) 
(distinguishing “propositional” from “performative” speech—utterances that do things rather 
than assert things). 
Nominalism can be contrasted with (Frege-Russell) descriptivism, according to which a 
name refers to an object by virtue of the name being associated with a description that the object 
in turn satisfies. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 530-31 & n.85 (1988) 
(considering the possibility that language taken alone may itself be authoritative). Schauer 
distinguishes the category to which a rule applies (i.e., the predicate facts) from the conse-
quences following from the existence of those facts or application of the rule. Id. at 534 n.78 
(citing W. TWINING & D. MIERS, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH RULES 136-40 (2d ed. 1982); see 
also Sherwin, supra note 4 (advocating the adoption of relatively hard-edged rules in formulat-
ing relatively determinate forms of property, adopting Schauer’s notion of “semantic auton-
omy,” as opposed to relying on contextual and perhaps discretionary “standards” based determi-
nation). As the discussion in Part VI infra suggests, contextual decision-making is not 
necessarily inconsistent with durable thingness. 
154  Levi-Strauss’s materialist turn-of-the-century sociology remains conceptually vigorous. 
See, e.g., JEAN BAUDRILLARD, THE CONSUMER SOCIETY: MYTHS AND STRUCTURES (George 
Ritzer trans., 1998) (1970) (adapting and abstracting Levi-Strauss with respect to signs); 
MARSHALL SAHLINS, CULTURE AND PRACTICAL REASON 176-78 (1976).  
155  See HERBERT SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL (3d ed. 1996).  
156  See LEO MARX, THE MACHINE IN THE GARDEN: TECHNOLOGY AND THE PASTORAL 
IDEAL IN AMERICA (1964). Marx described contradictions in American culture that required the 
persistence of an older, pastoral idea alongside a technologically-driven society that largely 
conceals its mechanistic, ordered, even inevitable reality from those participating in it, the 
artificial and the industrial, and the natural and the pastoral, becoming one contradictory whole. 
He argued that American culture has strived, often without success, to meld modern machine 
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cial character of twentieth century culture, particularly American cul-
ture, and on the modern American instinct to naturalize that culture, 
to make it appear as though what we have created were in fact merely 
a natural result.157  
The impact of the thing-by-design argument can be seen in a vari-
ety of places in the law. We may regulate designed things on the basis 
of demonstrated health or safety concerns,158 but difficulties with 
regulating the details of designs of manufactured food and pharma-
ceutical products, for example, and even of obviously dangerous ob-
jects like handguns, are well known.159 In antitrust law, generally a 
manufacturer has no duty to make its product interoperable with 
products of any other firms.160 More (or perhaps less) pedestrian ex-
                                                                                                                  
 
technology and the perfectability and divinity of the natural world. See also DAVID E. NYE, 
AMERICA AS SECOND CREATION: TECHNOLOGY AND NARRATIVES OF NEW BEGINNINGS (2003); 
DAVID E. NYE, AMERICAN TECHNOLOGICAL SUBLIME (1996). For a more optimistic view of the 
mapping of the artificial to the natural, with naturalized machines as a source of intelligence 
rather than of oppression, see GEORGE B. DYSON, DARWIN AMONG THE MACHINES: THE 
EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE (1997). 
157  See MARX, supra note 156, at 277-319. One might say that creators’ and designers’ 
discretion facilitates the naturalization of things, a process that reinforces their authority. The 
limited functionality of a DRM-enabled electronic book may seem acceptable—may be accept-
able, in a cultural and/or legal sense—because it just comes that way. If you get to make the 
thing, you get to design the thing. If you get to design the thing, you get to design the law. What 
matters is not whether the words constitute the thing, see supra note 153, or the thing constitutes 
the words; what matters is the source of the relationship. On the transformative potential of 
things, see Bruno Latour, The Berlin Key or How To Do Words with Things (1993), in MATTER, 
MATERIALITY AND MODERN CULTURE 10 (P.M. Graves-Brown ed., 2000). 
158  See, e.g., Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775 (R.I. 1988) (address-
ing, under comment k to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the strict liability of 
product sellers, providing that sellers of unavoidably unsafe products are not strictly liable for 
harm, provided they are accompanied by proper directions and warning). 
159  The law of products liability is premised in part on what might be called a duty of safe 
design. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). In many cases, however, courts 
have blended the questions of the manufacturer’s dangerous design and its failure to provide an 
adequate warning, leading to what some view as inappropriate deference to design decisions. 
See David G. Owen, The Puzzle of Comment j, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1377 (2004). 
160  See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman, 
J., dissenting in part): 
It is without precedent to find antitrust liability premised on a theory that develop-
ment of new products is illegally anticompetitive when the new product requires 
competing suppliers to adjust their product accordingly. Commentators who have 
considered the question of “whether product innovation can ever be unlawfully 
‘predatory’” have concluded that “no administrative rule could be fashioned that 
would not exact an unreasonably heavy toll.”  
3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW § 705b (rev. ed. 1996); 
see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (expressing 
skepticism over court supervision of product design); Medtronic Minimed Inc. v. Smiths 
Med. MD Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d 578 (D. Del. 2005) (distinguishing C.R. Bard and holding 
manufacturer not liable for attempted monopolization where change to design of its infu-
sion set connector system made it impossible for competitor to sell infusion sets). 
This is a corollary of the principle that in general there is neither antitrust liability nor li-
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amples drive the argument to its conclusion. Film producers can no 
more be ordered to deliver copies of movies on multiplatform (or 
nondecaying) DVDs than authors and publishers can be required to 
use high quality paper. Whether something lasts or decays, or whether 
it works efficiently, or whether it optimizes social welfare, can be 
regulated only at the farthest margins. 
To be clear, whether because of its abiding respect for personal 
autonomy or because the effects of autonomous design decisions are 
recharacterized as “natural” outcomes, law expresses a strong reluc-
tance to interfere with good-faith decisions concerning the design of 
things. Copyright law authorizes copyright protection for works of 
authorship “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression “by or under 
the authority of the author.”161 In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal 
Studios,162 holding that manufacturers of videocassette recorders are 
not liable for infringement by their users, the Supreme Court majority 
affirmed the presumptive design right afforded the technological in-
novator.163 A VCR could be used to infringe, but the Court would not 
order that it be designed otherwise. That principle has been affirmed 
                                                                                                                  
 
ability under intellectual property law for unilateral refusals to deal or to license with respect to 
intellectual property rights. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2000) (prohibiting liability for misuse for 
failure to use or license the patent); In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) (Xerox); Miller Insituform v. Insituform of N. Am., 830 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1986) 
(holding there was no antitrust violation for exclusive patent licensee to terminate sublicense 
and enter the market itself); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 432-33 (1945) 
(holding that patentee has no obligation to use or license the patented invention). Antitrust law 
has a difficult time distinguishing (presumptively valid) unilateral refusals to deal from invalid 
concerted (i.e., contractual) restrictions. The issue comes to a head in tying cases, with condi-
tional refusals to deal. There is a distinction, reaffirmed in Xerox, between simple unilateral 
refusals to deal and conditional (but not contractual) refusals to deal that have the same eco-
nomic effects as contractual refusals, such as tying. The distinction is not perfectly clear, but 
there are some limits to the right to impose conditions on buyers. See infra notes 187-204 and 
accompanying text (describing evolution of law on restrictive notices). Compare United States 
v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (concluding that manufacturer that refuses to deal with 
buyers who refuse to follow prices set by manufacturer does not engage in illegal price fixing), 
with Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (holding that agreement to set 
resale prices constitutes illegal vertical price restraint). See also Serv. & Training Inc. v. Data 
Gen., 963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding software company’s refusal to license diagnostic 
software except to end-user customers acceptable as unilateral and not a de facto tying arrange-
ment).  
161  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining “fixed”); 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (explaining that 
copyright subsists in works fixed in tangible medium of expression); see also 17 U.S.C. § 1101 
(2000) (imposing liability for unauthorized fixation of live musical performance). 
162  464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
163  See Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement 
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1355-56 (2004). The one particularly 
notable exception in copyright law is the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, codified at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2000), which not only regulates the design of things (in this case, digital 
audio recording technology) in precise ways, but mandates that designers incorporate certain 
functions into their designs. 
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in the Internet context, as applied to peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing 
software. Courts that have rejected the design right have done so in 
cases where the designer’s good faith was not merely open to ques-
tion, but was clearly absent.164 A similar analysis pervades the deci-
sion in United States v. Microsoft Corp.,165 holding that Microsoft 
was not liable under American antitrust law for allegedly designing 
its Windows operating system software so as to disadvantage a rival 
Web browser.166 In the framework of this Article, thing-as-design 
presumptively treats the “thing” as what the creator, inventor, de-
signer, or manufacturer says that it is.167 
The best-established legal doctrine that follows this model—that a 
thing is a thing and is a specific sort of thing because the producer 
says so—lies in the area of computer software. The common law of 
property distinguished real property from chattels, and chattels real 
(connected to realty) from chattels personal (everything that was not 
realty or connected to realty). Blackstone could hardly have antici-
pated Babbage, let alone contemporary computer programs. Nonethe-
less, as the law has come to characterize a “computer program” as a 
patentable and copyrightable thing, it has also come to accept the 
proposition that a computer program is a distinct but different kind of 
chattel or “thing.” Computer programs are licensable things. The law 
recognizes programs as chattels partly by default (a computer pro-
gram is presumed to be the subject of property interests, and it is not 
                                                                                                                  
164  See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). I 
read the Court’s opinion in Grokster, which confirmed the existence of a tort known as “induc-
ing” copyright infringement, as preserving the basic principle described in the text. Mere design 
of a product capable of infringing use would not support liability; design coupled with addi-
tional evidence of intent to encourage copyright infringement would defeat the premise that the 
design was undertaken in good faith. See id. at 2781 n.12; see also In re Aimster Copyright 
Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that the defendant distributed file sharing 
technology in full awareness of its use for infringement and with no credible belief as to its 
noninfringing use); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(same). 
165  253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
166  Id. at 83-84. European regulators have been less deferential. See Commission of the 
European Communities, Commission Decision of 24.03.04 relating to a proceeding under Arti-
cle 82 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft), 2004 (C900), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf [hereinafter Com-
mission Decision of 24.03.2004] (finding Microsoft liable under European antitrust law for 
bundling operating system and media player technology); see also infra notes 396-405 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Microsoft case as a question of thing-by-policy). 
167  In many instances, the designs “speak” for themselves, that is, the law chooses not to 
regulate the design or to regulate only lightly. In others, express and implied narratives of crea-
tion are given priority over claims of competing users or regulators. Arguments in support of a 
right to make and control cultural meanings often have a critical dimension. See Chander, supra 
note 36, at 797; Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495 (2001). But they need 
not. Trademark law validates the efforts of commercial producers to use signs to define the 
properties of things. Trademark law can be construed as guarding against attempts to disrupt an 
ontology (the mark itself) that is presumptively established via the efforts of the market owner. 
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connected to real property), but it has recognized their licensable 
character largely by accepting the assertions of software developers 
that this is so.168  
The effectiveness of thing-by-design in software licensing is based 
largely on the absence of any compelling theoretical justification for 
the maxim that purports to prohibit equitable servitudes on chattels.169 
We know, because Zechariah Chafee reminded us,170 that chattels 
cannot be the subjects of servitudes, that is, obligations regarding use 
of the object that bind not only parties in privity with the originator of 
the servitude but any party that encounters the object with adequate 
notice of the obligation. Objects can be the subjects of agreements not 
to use them for certain purposes, but enforcement of those agreements 
will be limited by principles of unfair competition and antitrust law. 
Mere servitudes, unilateral in origin, typically are treated differently 
and typically are regarded as unenforceable. 
                                                                                                                  
168  See, e.g., Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1091-92 (N.D. 
Cal. 2000) (accepting and relying on testimony of software licensor’s expert witness regarding 
universality of software licensing). The few cases that reject software licensors’ attempts to 
enforce license terms, such as Softman Products Co. v. Adobe Systems, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 
1075, 1083 (C.D. Cal. 2001), rely on uncommon fact patterns or otherwise do not reflect the 
sheer uniformity of legal and commercial practice on this point. Where industry practice does 
not turn an ownable thing into a licensable thing, a particular licensor may do so by repeating 
the license mantra frequently enough. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 
(2d Cir. 2004) (enforcing license restriction on access to electronic database); M.A. Mortenson 
Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000) (enforcing license restriction on 
computer program). 
169 The leading American case, RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 
1940) (Hand, J.), relies on an antimonopoly sense that clearly echoes Coke. See COKE, supra 
note 103; see also Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 733 (1988) (citing 
Boston Store of Chi. v. Am. Gramophone Co., 246 U.S. 8, 21-22 (1918)); Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. 
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 404 (1911) (invoking Coke explicitly in the antitrust 
context). Software licenses have provoked a growing literature designed to fill precisely the gap 
described in the text. See, e.g., Bjerre, supra note 81 (describing the conceptual problem in 
terms of whether a later creditor who takes a security interest in the previously encumbered 
property knows what the thing is that is offered as security, updating the maxim, Nemo dat quod 
non habet, or “No one may give what he does not have,” and advocating a solution based on 
cognitive modeling); Jacqueline Lipton, The Law of Unintended Consequences: The Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act and Interoperability, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487 (2005) (arguing 
that products with embedded computer software should not be protected under the DMCA); 
Robinson, supra note 38 (urging the enforceability of servitudes, based on the inability to dis-
tinguish between tangible and digital objects); John A. Rothchild, The Incredible Shrinking 
First-Sale Rule: Are Software Resale Limits Lawful?, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2004) (concluding 
that resale restrictions should be unenforceable); Stewart E. Sterk, What’s in a Name? The 
Troublesome Analogies Between Real and Intellectual Property (Cardozo Law, Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 88, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=575121 (drawing 
distinctions between real and personal property for purposes of analyzing servitudes); Molly S. 
Van Houweling, Copyright Servitudes 5-10 (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with au-
thor) (articulating policy justifications for anti-servitude presumption). 
170  See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945 
(1928). 
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Computer programs, however, can be copyrighted. Copyrights 
(which are conceptual things) can be licensed. And over a relatively 
short period, the practice of licensing computer programs—the ob-
jects, not merely the copyrights—has become both standardized and 
legitimated under law. Use of computer programs is tightly regulated 
by license terms, often in ways that are far more restrictive than copy-
right law often would permit by default.171 Licensing software is ac-
ceptable, courts imply, because licensing copyrights is acceptable.172 
Both in language and function, the license controls the program, not 
the copyright.  
The law, in other words, treats the relevant “thing,” not as the pro-
gram itself in its designed or engineered form, but as the “licensed 
program.”173 The practice of software developers is to license pro-
grams. The source of the practice is declarations by software develop-
ers that as the creators of these products, they are entitled to give the 
programs shape, including their legal shape. By accepting that shape 
as a legitimate legal form, the law has created the thing—the licensed 
program.174 
                                                                                                                  
171  See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (enforcing license 
prohibition on reverse engineering of computer software). 
172  The transition from licensing the copyright to licensing the code may be an example of 
what sociologists refer to as institutional isomorphism, or a tendency toward homogenization 
among institutions and organizations in a given field. The analytic issue becomes legitimacy of 
the form, rather than its efficiency or effectiveness, since the pattern of organization and process 
that drives homogenization is not driven by efficiency considerations. See Roger Friedland & 
Robert R. Alford, Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices, and Institutional Contradic-
tions, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 232, 242-47 (Walter W. 
Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage 
Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM 
IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra, at 41. For an overview of arguments for and against the 
legitimacy of the license form, see Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 275 (2003). 
173  E.g., Davidson & Assocs. v. Internet Gateway Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1177 (E.D. 
Mo. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005) (conclud-
ing that the first sale doctrine did not apply to transactions in computer program because the 
users did not buy the software; instead, they bought a license to the software). Proponents of 
proposed Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code, later the proposed Uniform Commercial 
Information Transactions Act (UCITA), took to supporting their arguments for adoption with 
the mantra that “the [software] license is the product,” as a way of arguing that both economi-
cally and legally, the program and its license terms were indistinguishable. See Robert W. 
Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product: Comments on the Promise of Article 2B for Soft-
ware and Information Licensing, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 891 (1998); cf. Raymond T. Nimmer, 
Licensing in the Contemporary Information Economy, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 129 (2002) 
(“[A]n authorized sale of a copy [of a copyrighted work] is best viewed as a form of license.”).  
174  This may be the easiest way to justify application of Article 2 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code to transactions in software. See, e.g., Arbitron, Inc. v. Tralyn Broad., Inc., 400 F.3d 
130, 138 n.2 (2d Cir. 2005) (recognizing a lack of clarity in the case law regarding the applica-
tion of Article 2 to software licenses); Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29 
n.13 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting potential application of Article 2 to software download transaction). 
“Progam-as-licensed-thing” may also be the best way to appreciate the proposed scope of 
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Designers press further. The decomposability of the digital object 
means that the program and the digital file can be disaggregated and 
reaggregated into apparently endless, licensable sub-“things.” This is 
so not despite the physical reality that the hallmark of the digital 
world appears to be the absence of conventional, stable “thingness,” 
but because of it. Like the broomsticks of the Sorcerer’s Apprentice, 
the digital descendants of a given computer program are automati-
cally burdened with the same “licensed” character that the designer 
imposes upon the parent. This is most obviously and purposefully the 
case with respect to licenses for open source computer software, 
which have been aptly characterized as “covenants that run with the 
code.”175 
The apparent legitimacy of the license for software justifies its ex-
tension in a number of directions, under the cloak of thing-as-design. 
The functional equivalence of software licenses and technological 
limitations on access to and use of digital products yields legal valida-
tion of Digital Rights Management (DRM) technology. Technological 
DRM-based “access” and “copy” controls linked to digital content by 
authors and distributors are privileged under the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) from interference by competitors and con-
sumers,176 so long as the technical measure in question “in the ordi-
nary course of its operation, requires the application of information, 
or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, 
to gain access to the work.”177 As a practical matter, the DMCA en-
courages content owners simply to design digital versions of their 
products so that DRM controls are inextricably intertwined with the 
underlying work. The result is the DVD that can be played only on an 
“authorized” DVD player or disk drive;178 the eBook that can be 
viewed only on an “authorized” eBook reader;179 and the computer 
printer that functions only with an ink cartridge supplied by the 
printer manufacturer.180 DRM in combination with the underlying 
                                                                                                                  
 
UCITA, which authorized licenses of “information.” See Uniform Computer Information Trans-
actions Act § 102(a)(35) (2000) (defining “information” as “data, text, images, sounds, mask 
works, or computer programs, including collections and compilations of them”). 
175  David W. Operbeck, The Penguin’s Genome, or Coase and Open Source Biotechnol-
ogy, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 167, 182 (2004); see Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, 
and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 1125, 1132 (1999) (proposing the term “viral contract-
ing” for the “attempt to make commitments run with a digital object”). 
176  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000). 
177  Id. § 1201(a)(3)(B) (2000). This definition applies to “access controls.” A comparable 
definition applies to “rights controls.” See id. § 1201(b)(2)(B) (2000). 
178  See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
179  See United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
180  See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 
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work results in a single new thing, rather than in two distinct 
things.181 The behavioral “law” that results from these combina-
tions—the DVD that will not play on nonvalidated machines—has 
been matched in most cases by formal endorsement of these arrange-
ments under the DMCA, and then by courts. As the software devel-
oper declares that its software comes only in licensed form, the digital 
content producer is presumptively entitled to design that content in a 
technological wrapper and forcibly prevent consumers from unwrap-
ping that content without permission. DRM validated by the DMCA 
represents the legal priority of the designers’ discretion: the legitimate 
restricted-use thing. 
Following this reliance on the temporal priority of the designer, 
there is little reason for the law’s continued adherence to the common 
law principle that forbids equitable servitudes on chattels generally. 
Glen Robinson, in a recent article, proposes precisely this move.182 It 
is a short step from this proposition to the counterpart principle that 
equivalent discretion should be respected when use restrictions are 
simply designed into the artifact. Both cases share the presumption 
that “first owners” determine what the thing is, whether by engineer-
ing decisions, or by legal prescriptions. Robinson’s argument works 
equally effectively in reverse. Given our relative inability to regulate 
product design, there is no more compelling reason to regulate servi-
tudes, which are the functional (and often cheaper) equivalent of de-
sign.183 A limitation on use that arises from the nature of the thing (it 
decays with use, for example, and physically cannot be reused) can be 
represented and enforced via notice of the limitation. A manufacturer 
might produce a single-use camera that physically decays after one 
use, or that might be reused but for a “single-use only” legend on its 
housing. There may be no principled basis for distinguishing one 
from the other, if, as Robinson argues, the problem compounds ques-
tions of regulatory competence and baselines. Rejecting the Aristote-
                                                                                                                  
 
2005). 
181  By using this precise argument, technology vendors deny claims that they are acting 
anticompetitively by engaging in unlawful tying or misuse of intellectual property interests. See 
Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1134-35 (2003); Michael A. 
Einhorn, Digitization and Its Discontents: Digital Rights Management, Access Protection, and 
Free Markets, 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S. 279, 305-06 (2004). 
182 Robinson, supra note 38, at 1462 (“[I]t isn’t easy to explain why the second owner’s 
right to unburdened use of property should trump the first owner’s rights to burden the property. 
It also isn’t easy to see why that explanation, whatever it is, should be any different for real and 
personal property.”). 
183  See id. at 1519-21 (discussing the Microsoft antitrust litigation). 
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lian approach, the designer’s approach—whether via engineering, or 
via notice—must do.  
So understood, the law and practice of software licensing is less 
unique, and it draws support from examples of “limited use” labeling 
and restrictive notices from other corners of the law. Recent patent 
cases from the Federal Circuit have enforced “single-use only” label 
restrictions against defendants who found ways to recondition, re-
manufacture, or resell patented things,184 notably in Mallinckrodt, Inc. 
v. Medipart, Inc.185 Some, but not all, of these cases have been framed 
as claims for breach of contract (the purchaser “assenting” to an “of-
fer” stated on a package), but in all of them the court has pointed out 
the role of notice as a key element in binding the user.186 In function, 
however, the “contract” formed in these cases has borne the same 
tenuous relationship to the paradigmatic bargain—or even to a para-
digmatic form-based transaction—that characterizes the typical 
shrink-wrap license for computer software. It is not possible to use 
the product yet not “assent.” The restriction is legally designed into 
the product itself. 
This form of thing-by-design has a long pedigree. In a series of 
cases in the later nineteenth century, the American Cotton-Tie Supply 
Company obtained injunctions against reuse of buckles used in a 
patented combination to bind bales of cotton and which were reused 
on multiple bales.187 The company had stamped a single-use only 
restriction on each buckle, leading to the possible conclusion, given 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in favor of the company in American 
Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons,188 that the restriction constituted an 
enforceable servitude in patent law.189 As antitrust and unfair 
                                                                                                                  
184  See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Bowers v. Baystate 
Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 
(Fed. Cir. 1992); see also B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs, 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(holding that post-sale restrictions on the use of a patented device are valid if they are contrac-
tual in character). 
185  Mallinckrodt involved a claim for inducing infringement against a defendant who al-
legedly induced reuse of a patented medical device labeled “single use only.” Mallinckrodt, 976 
F.2d at 702. 
186  See Jazz Photo Corp. v. Dynatec, 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding no implied 
license limiting use of “single use” camera to one use, where there was no evidence that defen-
dant had agreed to “single use” limitation).  
187  American Cotton-Tie Supply Co. v. Bullard, 1 F. Cas. 625 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 
294) (reviewing cases, and granting injunction). 
188  106 U.S. 89 (1882). 
189  Because the buckles were not themselves patented but were combined with straps to 
form the patented combination, reuse of the buckles implicated the line between exhaustion of 
the patent right and reconstruction of the patented article. Not all of the early cases approving 
restrictive notices, however, ran up against that problem. See Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 
1 (1912); Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 
1896).  
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competition concerns took hold at the Court shortly afterward, 
opinions in the several decades following American Cotton-Tie were 
decidedly hostile to restrictive notices. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,190 
generally regarded as the modern foundation of the first sale doctrine 
in copyright, refused to enforce a notice fixing resale prices that 
appeared on the inside cover of a book. The Court distinguished 
American Cotton-Tie and downplayed the significance of the notice in 
the context of that case. Restrictive notices attached to motion picture 
projectors and phonographs, purporting to limit their use to film and 
content produced by the same or related manufacturers, were struck 
down as being “beyond the patent grant,” that is, as purporting to 
redefine the thing conveyed, though we would recognize them today 
as arguably anticompetitive.191 
Through the middle part of the twentieth century, the Court’s re-
cord regarding restrictive notices was mixed, as it sometimes favored 
antitrust considerations (discounting thing-by-design)192 and some-
times favored patent law considerations (supported by thing-by-
design).193 In General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric,194 
the Court affirmed a finding of patent infringement where the pat-
entee had used a notice that limited the patented motion picture pro-
jectors to amateur use, though it was not clear whether the limited use 
notice was itself the basis for the Court’s holding. Although General 
Talking Pictures has been implicitly questioned,195 it has not been 
                                                                                                                  
190  210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
191  See Boston Store of Chi. v. Am. Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8 (1918) (finding reseller 
of patented “sound recording machines” not bound by “license notice” on machines affixed by 
patentee (“licensing” the machine and requiring use only with sound boxes and needles made by 
patentee), despite actual notice, since it was transparently a price fixing scheme); Motion Picture 
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917) (same); Straus v. Victor Talking 
Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490 (1917) (same); Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 17 (1913) 
(rejecting restrictive notices as to price as not enforceable because they were “beyond the limits 
of the monopoly secured by the patent act”); cf. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Cont’l Lamp Works, 280 F. 
846 (2d Cir. 1922) (holding notice on unpatented lamp base sold by patentee effective to bar use 
of base by purchaser in manufacturing lamp patented by same patentee, where bases had nonin-
fringing uses, and purchaser knew of the notice at the time of purchase). The “not within the 
patent grant” reasoning was criticized harshly by William Baxter: “A promise by the licensee to 
murder the patentee’s mother-in-law is as much ‘within the patent monopoly’ as is the sum 
$50.00; and it is not the patent laws which tell us that the former agreement is unenforceable 
and subjects the parties to criminal sanctions.” William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploi-
tation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 277 (1966).  
192  See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942) (rejecting the ostensible “li-
cense” character of transaction by which finisher of patented lens blanks acquired the blanks, 
and holding that it was free to distribute the resulting eyeglasses). 
193  See United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926) (upholding resale price re-
strictions imposed via a manufacturing license rather than notice). 
194  304 U.S. 175 (1938), aff’d on reh’g, 305 U.S. 124 (1938).  
195  See Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 176 F.2d 799 (1st Cir. 
1949) (affirming judgment for patentee against manufacturer that unilaterally discontinued 
affixing limited use notices to patented goods, as required by manufacturing license), aff’d, 339 
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overruled, and the Federal Circuit relied on it extensively, along with 
American Cotton-Tie, in Mallinckrodt.196 Aro Manufacturing Co. v. 
Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro I),197 in the course of deter-
mining that repair of the fabric of a convertible top did not infringe a 
patent in the top, appeared to revive the idea of restrictive notices 
when it distinguished American Cotton-Tie on the ground that the 
Court had treated the restrictive notice as significant.198 Though Aro I 
is otherwise conceptually based on the notion that the repairing de-
fendant did not produce the essence of the “thing” patented, its appar-
ent endorsement of the notice-basis of American Cotton-Tie gave—
and gives—support to a thing-by-design rule. 
More recent cases, then, work outward from Aro I and General 
Talking Pictures, drawing not only on restrictive notice cases but also 
on questions of exhaustion of the patentee’s interests upon sale of the 
patented product, and on the line between repair and reconstruction of 
the patented thing.199 Exhaustion and repair and reconstruction cases 
depend in part on a premise that sale of a patented item includes an 
implied license to practice the invention and to repair the item.200 A 
natural corollary of that premise permits patentees unilaterally and 
expressly to negate such a license—via language as well as by de-
sign.201 The Federal Circuit drew precisely this connection in Mal-
                                                                                                                  
 
U.S. 827 (1950). 
196  Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 705-07 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
197  365 U.S. 336 (1961). 
198  Id. at 343 n.9. One appellate court, writing shortly after Aro I, expressed doubt as to the 
enforceability of a restrictive notice. Fromberg, Inc. v. Gross Mfg. Co., 328 F.2d 803, 809 (9th 
Cir. 1964). On the other hand, the Court of Claims, in General Electric Co. v. United States, 572 
F.2d 745, 784-85 (Ct. Cl. 1978), referred to American Cotton-Tie and Aro I as supporting the 
viability of conditions imposed on the sale of patented goods. 
199  They have been criticized richly as a result. See supra note 124, at 30-35 (criticizing 
Mallinckrodt as inconsistent with doctrine of exhaustion). 
200  See, e.g., Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equip., 72 F.3d 872 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(holding that purchasers of unpatented but custom-designed pump from patentee did not receive 
implied license to practice the invention, where the pump could be used only in the patented 
process). 
201  De Forest Radio Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236 (1927) (holding that an im-
plied license in favor of one who uses an invention may arise from an equitable estoppel); Wang 
Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 1578-82 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that 
an implied license may arise from an estoppel or otherwise from the patentee’s statements or 
conduct). A comparable problem arises in the context of copyright law. See Nimmer, supra note 
173 (characterizing authorized sale of a copy of a copyrighted work as encompassing an implied 
license to distribute that copy). A license to reproduce a copyrighted work may be inferred from 
the circumstances surrounding delivery of the work, see Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 
F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990), but the copyright owner may characterize those circumstances as an 
express license and thus limit the scope of the user’s rights. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2000) (describ-
ing scope of rights of owner of a computer program); DSC Commc’ns Corp. v. Pulse 
Commc’ns, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that telephone companies were not 
“owners” of software within the meaning of § 117, given acquisition of program under a license 
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linckrodt. Even though the court specified that the restriction had a 
contractual character, it noted that the patentee could choose to sue in 
contract or in patent.202 Related corollaries include the notion that if 
the patentee’s intent matters most, then that intent might encompass 
control over reuse of the patented item,203 and the specification that 
intent is manifested at the time the item is delivered to the consumer, 
and not later. Whether there is assent or not, notice—that is, design— 
matters.204  
Analytically identical situations arise in a variety of contexts, in-
cluding genetically engineered seeds,205 technical standards for com-
puter and broadcast networks critiqued as “architecture,”206 and first 
sale and exhaustion problems in trademark law. These last problems, 
as defenses to a claim of infringement by a trademark owner against a 
reseller or reconditioner of the marked good, are cousins of similar 
questions in copyright and patent. As with trademark questions gen-
erally, however, they are framed less in terms of the identity of the 
thing resold or reconditioned and more in terms of the relationship 
                                                                                                                  
 
agreement). 
202  Mallinckrodt, Inc., v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 707 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
203  See Kendall Co. v. Progressive Med. Tech., 85 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (finding that 
a “single use only” limitation on patented compression device manifested patentee’s awareness 
that users would buy replacement sleeves even before they wore out). 
204  See Met-Coil Sys. v. Korners Unlimited, 803 F.2d 684 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding that 
customers who purchased patented roll-forming machine received an implied license to use the 
machine where patentee/seller failed to include notice with sale negating presence of implied 
license). In light of Bowers, it is not clear whether the Federal Circuit would adhere to a sub-
stantive notice requirement today. Other courts, in cases involving related subject matter, have 
solved the notice problem in creative ways. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 
393 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding collector of electronic data from Internet database bound by elec-
tronic notice given to computer program). 
For a pointed critique of notice-based liability for unauthorized reuse of things, see Jean 
Braucher, Amended Article 2 and the Decision To Trust the Courts: The Case Against Enforcing 
Delayed Mass-Market Terms, Especially for Software, 2004 WISC. L. REV. 753, 769-72 (distin-
guishing warranties that accompany products on the ground that they originate with the tort 
regime, rather than with a contract or property model, and therefore do not depend on notice or 
assent by the consumer).  
205  See Dan L. Burk, DNA Rules: Legal Implications of Biological “Lock-out” Systems, 92 
CAL. L. REV. 1553, 1557-60 (2004); J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 
U.S. 124 (2001) (affirming judgment of infringement of patented seed technology where defen-
dant violated terms of limited label license). 
206  Lawrence Lessig popularized the “architectural” analogy in the context of his argument 
that legal regulation might be designed into technical standards. See LESSIG, supra note 71. A 
recent controversy, involving a Federal Communication Commission mandate that digital tele-
vision signals incorporate a so-called broadcast flag in order to deter their unauthorized re-
distribution, shows that the normative implications of the analogy are far from clear. Compare 
Randal C. Picker, From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and 
the Propertization of Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 291-93 (2003) (suggesting virtues of 
embedded control technology), with Crawford, supra note 46 (arguing that embedded technol-
ogy interferes with evolutionary processes connected with creativity). 
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between the reseller and the thing. An authorized sale of the marked 
good exhausts the mark owner’s rights in that good. Unlike patent 
law, under which a reconditioned item can be lawfully resold so long 
as the resold item is not the “patented item” itself, trademark law 
grants to the mark owner the presumptive right to say what the thing 
is—that is, “an object produced by a certain firm”—on resale as well 
as on initial sale. Resale of marked goods in their original packaging 
is permitted.207 Sale of refurbished goods is likewise acceptable so 
long as they are sold as such, and not as originals.208 Repackaging of 
original goods under the original mark is also acceptable, so long as 
the reseller informs consumers that it has done the repackaging.209 
Modifying the packaging or redistributing marked goods in a way that 
misleads consumers about quality or distribution limitations associ-
ated with the original producer is forbidden.210 Importing gray market 
marked goods is lawful under trademark law so long as the goods are 
“genuine,” that is, they are not materially different from marked 
goods produced by or under the authority of the mark owner.211 
American legal doctrine has been no more explicitly Hegelian than 
it has been explicitly Aristotelian, but the power and influence of 
thing-by-design should not be understated as a limit on the effective 
range of legal regulation. This is its principle virtue, particularly as 
thing-by-design blends, both knowingly and unwittingly, with thing-
by-nature. Individual autonomy occupies a central place in the history 
of Western thought, and recent developments in American property 
law point heavily toward personal control of both movable things and 
thing-interests.212 Thing-by-design emphasizes the role of the per-
                                                                                                                  
207 Enesco Corp. v. Price/Costco Inc., 146 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1998). 
208  E.g., Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947) (permitting sales of 
refurbished spark plugs under the Champion mark, so long as they were clearly sold as such; 
resale of repaired goods held acceptable unless repair renders the good no longer the “thing” it 
once was); Nitro Leisure Prods. L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (find-
ing that refurbisher of golf balls marked with original mark adequately disclosed that balls were 
refurbished, even though the defendant re-applied the plaintiff’s mark after refurbishing com-
plete); Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Michel Co., 179 F.3d 704, 710 (9th Cir. 1999) (allowing 
seller of reconditioned “Roixes” to retain “Rolex” trademark because the alteration made by the 
seller resulted in new product).  
209  E.g., Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924). 
210  E.g., Davidoff & Cie, S.A. v. PLD Int’l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(finding infringement where reseller etched off batch codes on goods intended for domestic 
distribution); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Northside Dev. Corp., 86 F.3d 3, 7 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding 
infringement in resales of cough drops whose expiration date had passed). 
211  E.g., SKF USA Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 423 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Warner-
Lambert Co., 86 F.3d at 7-8; Lever Bros. v. United States, 981 F.2d 1330, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 
1993); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 
1987); El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392, 395-96 (2d Cir. 1986).  
212  See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 
(1982) (distinguishing objects for property purposes according to the extent to which they are 
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sonal autonomy of inventors, creators, and suppliers and producers, 
and of autonomy generally, in promoting both a democratic political 
system and a market economy. Both substantively and rhetorically it 
connects an ontology of the world to some of the central commit-
ments of the American political and economic system.   
V. THING-BY-CONTRACT 
The strengths of thing-by-design—its consistency with themes of 
autonomy and the natural order of things, its relative independence 
from problematic baseline questions,213 and its claim to superior com-
petence in an area of discretionary decisions—simultaneously render 
it susceptible to two sorts of attacks. One resembles the challenge to 
thing-by-nature. If we regulate the thing by regulating its properties, 
then there is a sizable risk that we will get the specification wrong 
somehow, and the implicitly perpetual character of thing-by-nature 
means that the error may be difficult to correct. The same is true with 
respect to thing-by-design. We might regulate thing-by-design by 
shaping the design process, but regulation may miscalculate badly 
here too, either by yielding too much discretion to the designer, or too 
little. In the former case, error correction may again be problematic. 
For example, producers of certain manufactured things have begun to 
use thing-by-design to claim that a designed thing may not be re-
paired without the producer’s permission.214 In the latter case, failure 
to respect the dynamic character of design may interfere with the evo-
lution of things and practices by freezing them in outdated forms. 
Debates over the legality of distributing and using file sharing soft-
ware are, in an important sense, debates about the design of things.215 
                                                                                                                  
 
bound up with our personal identities in the world). One strand of takings doctrine draws heav-
ily on the autonomy interest of the property owner in making economically viable use of his or 
her property. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Penn 
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
213  Notwithstanding ever-present concerns with the extent of meaningful autonomy in any 
individual case, and with whether firms should be invested with privileges of autonomy compa-
rable to those enjoyed by human beings. 
214  See Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). In England, a similar analysis supported a recent judgment in favor of the 
vacuum cleaner manufacturer Dyson against a competitor that sold copies of spare parts for the 
machines. See Dyson Ltd. v. Qualtex (UK) Ltd. [2004] EWHC 2981 (Ch). The exclusive right-
to-repair follows earlier cases upholding an exclusive right-to-service. See, e.g., Triad Sys. 
Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Com-
puter, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993). 
215  See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text. On the idea of the evolution of mate-
rial culture, see Belinda Barnet, Technical Machines and Evolution, CTHEORY, Mar. 3, 2004, at 
a139, http://www.ctheory.net/text_file.asp?pick=414 (last visited March 9, 2005); Niles El-
dredge, Biological and Material Cultural Evolution: Are There Any True Parallels?, 13 PERSP. 
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Second, and related, is the problem of spillover or distributional ef-
fects. The design of a thing may impact individuals and communities 
who are not the “intended” targets of the design.216 What is worse, the 
apparent naturalism of the designed thing may lead affected individu-
als or communities systematically to understate the scope of those 
effects. 217 
A third model of things appears to avoid the unilateralism of the 
design approach and not to conceal the artificiality of its objects. It 
does not rely on a metaphysical, ontological sense of the real. Instead, 
it asks, why not trust the market to deal with the issues of thingness? 
“The market” is obviously a manufactured thing in itself; what “the 
market” means in this Part is the notion that things can be defined and 
classified via voluntary two-party transactions. Set aside, for the mo-
ment, the oft-repeated and never completely refuted objections to 
market discipline of this sort—that markets offer incomplete and mis-
leading choices (via network effects, capture of industry standards, 
incomplete information, and other market failures that lead to subop-
timal design).218 And set aside, also, the various cognitive and other 
limitations on contracting decisions that limit the power of contract-
based utilitarianism. The fact remains that across a broad range of 
legal disciplines and economic markets, things are what we agree that 
they are, and we value the fact that such a system appears to allow the 
                                                                                                                  
 
IN ETHOLOGY 113 (2000). 
216  This is the problem attacked by Julie Cohen’s proposed “right to hack” a DRM system, 
postulated as a way of marrying copyright’s preemption doctrine to the DMCA. See Julie E. 
Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089, 1141-42 
(1998); see also Chander, supra note 36. 
217  Modern research in cognitive psychology offers an intriguing possible explanation for 
why arguments that appeal to natural thingness may be persuasive, and why they should some-
times be distrusted. We may have distinct portions of our cognitive faculties specially devoted 
to recognizing and analyzing “things.” Appeals to the naturalness of artificial things are espe-
cially useful, in law and elsewhere, precisely because we may be programmed to be receptive to 
them. But mistaking the artificial for the natural may prevent us from realizing certain benefits, 
or from avoiding certain costs. See STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS 27-31 (1997) 
(considering the possibility that the human mind contains subsystems that are dedicated to 
different sorts of reasoning, about physical objects, logic, and so forth). If that is so, the research 
raises questions concerning the wisdom of regulation that lets producers design rules in, and 
take advantage of, a cognitive bias that may naturalize those design rules. Less speculatively, 
empirical psychology demonstrates the importance of framing to individual decision-making. 
See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 
47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). If the design of the thing can be conceived of a part of the story 
of the thing, see ROSE, supra note 1, then it is clear that who is telling the story, or who controls 
the story, matters a great deal. See also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice 
and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. 251, 256-57 (1986) (describing how framing, among 
other cognitive biases, changes how a story is narrated). 
218  These limitations, and the corresponding effects on future users of things, are the core 
of Joel Reidenberg’s objection to the premise that the market should evaluate technical stan-
dards. Reidenberg, supra note 48.  
 9/19/2005 9:50:08 PM 
2005] OBJECTS, CONCEPTS, AND DIGITAL THINGS 437 
descriptive and normative value of things to emerge as a result of the 
preferences not only of their designers, but also of their consumers. 
The intellectual and conceptual underpinnings of thing-by-contract 
should be clear enough without a detailed exposition here. There are 
more than faint echoes of social contract theory, running from Hobbes 
and Locke through Rousseau to Rawls, which argues that authority 
derives from the consent of those subject to it, rather than on the fic-
tion that authority is “natural.” Shubha Ghosh synthesizes both the 
political and economic dimensions of social contract theory in order 
to critique its usefulness as a policy tool,219 but his description, which 
is centered on Hobbes and Locke, highlights the sense in which the 
property dimensions of social contract theory empower individuals to 
frame and distinguish objects from the state of nature. Delineated 
things enable individual autonomy in the political sphere (thus im-
plementing fully the sense that precontracting interests are genuinely 
individualistic), and it enables individuals to accumulate wealth in the 
economic sphere (thus implementing fully the sense that the primary 
motivation of the individual is self-interested and appropriative).220  
Thing-by-contract is not based solely on theories of social con-
tract, not least because social contractarians do not mean that social 
and economic reality really is the product of consent-based institu-
tions. The social contract is a rationalizing device that allows us to 
comprehend the legitimacy of the relationships that surround us. 
Theoretical foundations for the concrete contractual character of our 
objects can be traced to formal “freedom of contract” principles asso-
ciated originally with Adam Smith and today with judges and com-
mentators grouped as legal economists, and with the original Ameri-
can Legal Realists.  
From both perspectives, what I described in Part II as the evolving 
blending of “real” and “legal” things is not merely a by-product of the 
social and technological changes described in that Part. Blending 
them, via thing-by-contract, is precisely the point of both theory and 
practice. Felix Cohen described property as purely relational, lacking 
                                                                                                                  
219  See Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain 
Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1321-28 (2004). As he observes, the 
fundamental problem with social contract theories generally is that they are static and bilateral. 
Circumstances change, but the terms of the bargain do not. They fail to acknowledge the multi-
plicity of interests implicated by social policy. And their legitimacy ex ante exists only with 
references to the alternatives presented, in context. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN 
THE LIBERAL STATE § 66 (1980). 
220  See generally David Gauthier, The Social Contract as Ideology, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
130 (1977) (describing contractarianism as supposing that bargains derive from pre-social 
needs). 
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any object whatsoever.221 Wesley Hohfeld dismissed the very notion 
of rights in rem, preferring instead to characterize rights with respect 
to a thing (such as a copyright or a patent) as “multital” rights.222 
Critical property theorists embraced the disappearance of the object 
and the adoption of the relational “bundle of sticks” metaphor, in or-
der to articulate and remedy power imbalances embedded in tradi-
tional thing-oriented property jurisprudence.223 More recent scholars 
have noted that the Legal Realists did not discard objects entirely.224 
Rather, they reconstructed things in terms of the relations they repre-
sent. This more measured view of legal history is shared by scholars 
known for working primarily within economic frameworks225 and by 
those known for working primarily in critical or other noneconomic 
frameworks.226 Though much of the recent discourse has been framed 
in terms of property interests, some have emphasized consent as the 
core mechanism of legitimacy even today.227 The balance of this Part 
describes how thing-by-contract plays a significant role in construct-
ing both property and other kinds of things. 
There is, for example, the bargain theory of patent law, manifest 
both at the level of the patent system as a whole228 and, more impor-
tantly and concretely, at the level of each issued patent. The invention 
protected by the patent, the thing itself, is the result of a deal between 
the inventor and the public.229 The inventor’s part of the bargain is the 
set of exclusive rights secured by the patent. The public’s part of the 
bargain is partly the disclosure of the invention that is mandated be-
fore the patent issues and partly the free use of the invention enabled 
                                                                                                                  
221  Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 360-63 (1954). 
Cohen was inspired by twentieth century physics, which he took as rejecting the notion that 
physical reality required a position in space. But Cohen got his physics (and thus his metaphys-
ics) wrong. Einstein did not deny the truth of reality, only the duality of space and time. 
222  Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reason-
ing, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917). 
223  See Grey, supra note 140; Vandevelde, supra note 26. 
224  See supra note 4. 
225  See Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 371, 418 (2003) (describing the core of property as “rights to acquire, use, and dispose of 
things”). 
226  See Radin & Sunder, supra note 18. 
227  See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Con-
sent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992).  
228  See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (describing the patent system as 
a “carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of new 
and useful advances in technology”); Ghosh, supra note 219, at 1319-21 (reviewing history of 
the patent system as a “quid pro quo,” and urging rejection of bargain metaphor in favor of 
regulatory view of patent law).  
229  Justice Story invoked the quid pro quo metaphor for patenting in Pennock v. Dialogue, 
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 23 (1829). In Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 215-17 (2003), the Court 
distinguished application of the bargain metaphor in patent law from its possible application to 
copyright law. 
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after the patent expires. Not only does the bargain metaphor help 
commentators discuss and refine patent policy,230 but in practice it 
helps courts refine application of a variety of patent doctrines, and it 
helps us to appreciate the process of obtaining a patent in the first 
place. Patented things exist in law as claims, in which the bargain is 
crystallized and which in a very real sense—in light of the give-and-
take between inventors and patent examiners—are products of 
agreements between inventors and the public. As I noted above,231 
patent law vacillates between the sense that the invention is the claim 
itself,232 and the sense that the claim represents the invention. Thing-
by-contract illuminates strands of that jurisprudence that focus on the 
latter.  
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku 
Kogyo Kabushiki Co.233 adopts the core notion that the point of the 
patent system is to bargain over the character of the thing itself, in the 
form of the claims. The case articulated circumstances under which 
applicant statements during patent prosecution would lead to prosecu-
tion history estoppel and limit the availability of the Doctrine of 
Equivalents to prove liability for infringement. Since “the nature of 
language makes it impossible to capture the essence of a thing in a 
patent application,”234 a patentee must be allowed recourse to the 
Doctrine of Equivalents to ensure that the scope of its legal rights 
corresponds to the thing invented. Equivalents liability cannot extend, 
however, to claim scope that the patentee has, in effect, bargained 
away, via representations and positions taken during the prosecution 
process.235 To the extent that the legitimacy of the bargain is under-
                                                                                                                  
230  See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continua-
tions, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 95-96 (2004) (describing the benefits conferred or withheld under 
existing patent policy by deploying the bargain metaphor).  
231  See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text. 
232  See 35 U.S.C. § 112(2) (2000) (“The specification shall conclude with one or more 
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant 
regards as his invention.”); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 
558, 621 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Inherent in our claim-based patent system is . . . the principle that 
the protected invention is what the claims say it is, and thus that infringement can be avoided by 
avoiding the language of the claims.” (quoting Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., 932 F.2d 
1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991))), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2001). 
233 535 U.S. 722 (2001). 
234  Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 731; see also Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 
391 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (“An invention exists most importantly as a tangible structure or a series of 
drawings. . . . [The] conversion of machine to words allows for unintended idea gaps which 
cannot be satisfactorily filled. Often the invention is novel and words do not exist to describe it. 
The dictionary does not always keep abreast of the inventor. It cannot. Things are not made for 
the sake of words, but words for things. To overcome this lag, patent law allows the inventor to 
be his own lexicographer.”). 
235  See Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 736-38. Thing-by-contract does not explain the entirety of 
patent law, but it is clearly reflected in this instance. Note that the Doctrine of Equivalents may 
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mined by the competence and knowledge of the parties, patent law 
takes an important step to resolve those problems by constructing the 
imaginary bargainer: the Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art, or 
PHOSITA, whose perspective is critical to resolving most questions 
regarding the character of the bargain in a particular case.236  
Trade secret and copyright law likewise rely heavily on thingness 
defined bilaterally. Any problem in trade secret law depends in the 
first place on the existence of a manufactured thing, a trade secret. As 
practicing lawyers know, the most effective way to create that secret, 
and thereby to obtain trade secret protection for some bit of informa-
tion, is to ensure that all parties to the information—employees, joint 
venturers, contractors, and so forth—agree expressly that the material 
to which they are given access is and should be treated as a trade se-
cret.237 The formalities of contract-based trade secret protection—
stipulations that the contract covers trade secret subject matter and 
that protection for the secrets consists of the contractual creation of a 
confidential relationship238—may be collapsed by practitioners and 
courts into this single, practical standard: did the parties to the con-
tract agree that some process, technique, or other information consti-
tutes a trade secret, a thing, to be protected by law? The agreement 
defines the thing. Breach of the agreement constitutes appropriation 
of the thing.239 The technique is particularly well known in transac-
                                                                                                                  
 
be characterized as bridging the gap between thing-by-contract and thing-by-nature, to avoid 
uncritical reliance on the precise language of the claims themselves, and to apply the bargain 
construct of patent policy to the invention itself.  
236  See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1575, 1648-51 (2003). 
237  In some states, contractual protection for material designated as a trade secret may ex-
ceed the scope of protection available at common law. See, e.g., Richardson v. Suzuki Motor 
Co., 868 F.2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (applying California law). Adam Mossoff argues that trade 
secrecy is grounded in possession and use, rather than in obligation, that is, thing-by-design 
rather than thing-by-contract. See Mossoff, supra note 225, at 415-17. 
238  The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines “trade secret” so as to encompass the possibil-
ity of contractual creation of a confidential relationship, and defines misappropriation so as to 
include breach of a contractual obligation of confidentiality. A trade secret is “information, 
including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: 
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to 
the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (ii) 
is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (1985). “Misappropriation” of a trade secret includes disclo-
sure of use of the trade secret by one who was under an obligation to maintain its secrecy. Id. 
§ 1(2)(ii)(B)(II). 
239  Vincent Chiappetta proposes that all contract-based trade secret cases be interpreted in 
precisely this way, in light of the policies of trade secret law. See Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, 
Chameleon or Intellectual Property Olympian? A Normative Framework Supporting Trade 
Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 96-101, 149-50 (1999) (proposing a reconstruction of 
trade secret law that divides breach of duty cases, and particularly contract-based cases, from 
“bad acts” cases). 
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tions involving computer software,240 but there is no principled or 
practical reason explaining why this is or should be so. Firms use 
nondisclosure agreements to create trade secrets based on contract 
rather than based on common law or statutory definitions, and in 
many cases, courts have endorsed these agreements.241 
Relying on contractual trade secret status as a foundation for a 
misappropriation claim is controversial in the context of software 
distributed under shrink-wrap or click-wrap licenses,242 given the con-
flict between the allegedly “secret” status of the information and the 
fact that it is broadly distributed under agreements that impose confi-
dentiality obligations that are all but unenforceable. No reported deci-
sion has passed on the claim that such wide distribution of software 
defeats a trade secret claim brought by the developer,243 but thing-by-
contract in the context of computer programs and data has moved 
elsewhere nonetheless, away from its original focus on trade secrecy, 
and toward the model of licensing the software copyright described 
earlier. Whereas the last Part described the software license model as 
a key example of thing-by-design, this Part describes it, with a 
slightly different emphasis, as a key example of thing-by-contract. 
Software licensing is a perplexing phenomenon in the law because 
it relies ambiguously but simultaneously on two legal predicates. 
There is the traditional concept of licensing as permission granted 
unilaterally, perhaps (but not necessarily) in exchange for royalties or 
a fee. In this sense, the software license represents thing-by-design. 
The producer controls the thing and the terms on which it may be 
used. There is, in addition, a more recent concept of agreement, in 
which the licensor promises to provide material for some specified 
use by the licensee, and the licensee promises not only to pay the li-
censor but also to refrain from certain specified acts. The promise not 
                                                                                                                  
240  See, e.g., Micro Data Base Sys., Inc. v. Dharma Sys., Inc., 148 F.3d 649, 654 (7th Cir. 
1998) (finding that Article 2 of the U.C.C. applies to a contract for the sale of custom software). 
241  See, e.g., Celeritas Techs. Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1359-60 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998) (holding that issuance of patent does not extinguish trade secret status of underlying 
information); IDX Sys. Corp. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 285 F.3d 581, 585 (7th Cir. 2002) (upholding 
right to contract to protect proprietary information that is not otherwise secret); Bernier v. 
Merrill Air Eng’rs, 770 A.2d 97, 103 (Me. 2001) (noting that a confidentiality agreement need 
not be limited to information meeting definition of trade secret). 
242  The controversy, which involves the effectiveness of a “trade secret” label attached to a 
product distributed to millions of consumers, is summarized in Mark A. Lemley & David 
McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 528 & n.211 
(1998).  
243  An unreported district court decision found that mass distribution did defeat a software 
developer’s entitlement to an injunction for misappropriation of trade secrets. See Stac Elecs. v. 
Microsoft Corp., CV-93-413-ER (C.D. Cal. May 13, 1994 and June 8, 1994), reported in 48 
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 165 (1994), appeal voluntarily dismissed, 38 F.3d 
1222 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
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to engage in reverse engineering of the software is the most important 
of these supplemental stipulations, both because of its obvious incon-
sistency with the default rules of the Copyright Act,244 and because of 
its central importance in defining the thing that is the subject of the 
parties’ agreement. This is the sense in which the software license 
represents thing-by-contract. The software user, having agreed not to 
reverse engineer the program, has acquired use of a different thing. 
The agreement transforms the program from one thing into another. A 
computer program delivered under the default provisions of the Copy-
right Act (like a computer program acquired subject to an obligation 
to maintain trade secrets) is subject to reverse engineering. The pro-
gram has the equivalent of a soft shell. It can be opened and exam-
ined. A program acquired under a license with an enforceable “no 
reverse engineering” clause is akin to a program with a hard shell. No 
examination is allowed.  
Where thing-by-design looks at software licensing as a matter of 
regulating the work/medium distinction and first sale interests of us-
ers and consumers, thing-by-contract focuses on the agreement as the 
source of the object. This permits ignoring reverse engineering and 
first sale “rights” as substantive concerns of intellectual property pol-
icy and makes the contract itself the relevant thing. Shrink-wrapped 
and click-wrapped “goods” and services become distinct things. This 
is the approach of shrink-wrap and click-wrap agreement jurispru-
dence, with ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg245 at its intellectual core. In 
exchange for things of a certain sort, consumers pay what courts be-
lieve to be lower, or at least fair, prices.246  
The district court opinion in Davidson & Associates v. Internet 
Gateway, Inc.247 captures this perspective. A developer of an online 
multiplayer computer sued a group of defendants who created an un-
authorized version of the game environment, reverse engineering the 
original in violation of an End User License Agreement: “the defen-
dants did not purchase the [plaintiff’s] Blizzard software, rather they 
purchased a license for the software,”248 not the software, or a copy of 
                                                                                                                  
244  Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1335-38 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Dyk, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
245  86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
246  The operative principle of the case law may be summed up in the phrase, “you get what 
you pay for.” See Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1091-92 (N.D. 
Cal. 2000); I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D. Mass. 
2002); Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002); ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d 
at 1453; M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 314 (Wash. 2000). 
247  334 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (E.D. Mo. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 
422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005). 
248  Id. at 1177. 
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the software. Patent cases characterized in the last Part as enforcing 
servitudes on chattels fit the thing-by-contract model equally well, to 
the extent that the Federal Circuit and lower courts have emphasized 
that restrictive notices on patented products are enforceable by virtue 
of their mimicking a formal assent model. In the words of one court 
discussing seeds whose use was subject to a restrictive notice derived 
from two patents, “The seeds were no longer simply ‘seeds.’”249 
Though the practice is characterized as “limited label licensing,” 
courts emphasize not only the producer/patentee’s power to condition 
distribution of the patented thing (thing-by-design) but also the fact 
that in form, at least, these licenses take the form of contracts (thing-
by-contract). The dual basis of such restrictions has been most clear 
in cases involving patented seeds,250 but contractual dimensions ap-
pear to have been critical in the Federal Circuit’s rejection of a re-
strictive notice claim involving disposable cameras in Jazz Photo v. 
International Trade Commission,251 and in the court’s acceptance of a 
restrictive notice that accompanied a medical device in Mallinckrodt 
v. Medipart.252 The point is that the courts are concerned with the 
character of the relevant thing, and they locate that character in a for-
mal agreement that creates the thing.  
A final example picks up on the themes noted in Part II of this Ar-
ticle, which described the increasing reconfigurability of our material 
environment, and particularly its electronic dimensions, as a justifica-
tion for exploring the meaning of thingness in the first place. That 
concern was not evident in descriptions of thing-by-nature, largely 
because the naturalness of that model assumes a fundamentally 
changeless world. Thing-by-design assumes a certain degree of con-
tingency, but the tendency to naturalize and therefore conceal its 
workings also tends to obscure its connections with the reconfigura-
bility premise. Thing-by-contract, however, treats virtual, social, and 
material worlds all explicitly as bargains. Everything is subject to 
negotiation. It is little surprise, then, that the context in which thing-
                                                                                                                  
249  Farmland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scruggs, 886 So. 2d 714 (Miss. 2004). 
250  Limited label licenses or other licenses restricting reuse of bioengineered agricultural 
products have been enforced in a number of cases. See J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-
Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001); Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., v. Ottawa Plant Food, Inc., 
283 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (N.D. Iowa 2003); Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 
2004); McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291; Monsanto Co. v. Good, No. Civ.A.01-5678 FLW, 2004 WL 
1664013 (D.N.J. July 23, 2004); Monsanto Co. v. Swann, 308 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Mo. 2003); 
Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 249 F. Supp. 2d 746, 754 (N.D. Miss. 2001); Monsanto Co. v. Tran-
tham, 156 F. Supp. 2d 855 (W.D. Tenn. 2001). 
251  264 F.3d 1094, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“It was undisputed that no express conditions of 
sale, license terms or restrictions attended the sale of these cameras. There was no express 
contractual undertaking by the purchaser.”). 
252  976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
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by-contract is most clearly evident is electronic data itself. Individual 
pieces of electronic data tend to be like ideas and facts in copyright 
law. They are ethereal and intangible, difficult to classify and more 
difficult to protect.253 Agreements can thingify data.254 The plaintiff in 
ProCD converted the contents of telephone books from across the 
United States into a single electronic database. Under copyright law, 
each telephone number would have been treated as an unprotectible 
fact, and the database itself also would likely have been regarded as 
an unprotectible collection of facts.255 Via a contract that prohibited 
reposting any of the contents of the database on a computer network 
(such as the Internet), ProCD succeeded in making each phone num-
ber a legal thing, protected by contract law.256 Equivalent protection, 
based directly or indirectly on assent to or knowledge of a claim of 
right to control the use of data, has been extended to databases and 
data consisting of prices of overseas trips,257 registration information 
for Internet domains,258 prices of items up for electronic auction,259 
and real-time scores of a professional golf tournament.260 In the eyes 
of the law, and given the presence of various mechanisms of assent, 
they are all recognizable things. 
The Realist premises of thing-by-contract appear clearly in re-
cent developments in copyright law, in models of “open source” 
                                                                                                                  
253  See J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 
VAND. L. REV. 51, 64-69 (1997). 
254  For different views of the data protection problem, see Gibson, supra note 48, at 230-
40 (describing “re-reification” solution to database protection); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Shaping 
Competition on the Internet: Who Owns Product and Pricing Information?, 53 VAND. L. REV. 
1965 (2000) (describing implications of price ownership for competition). 
255  See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
256  See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453-55 (7th Cir. 1996). 
257  See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2003) (upholding 
injunction under Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for “unauthorized” access to computer data-
base and noting that database owner may rely on Web site notice of terms of use to withdraw 
consent to access). 
258  Register.Com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 402 (2d Cir. 2004). 
259  See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
eBay’s claim that the defendant unlawfully appropriated its auction data via electronic means 
relied on the common law tort of trespass to chattels, not on breach of contract, but the underly-
ing structure of the argument is the same in both cases. Bidder’s Edge acted in contravention of 
actual and constructive (i.e., electronic) notice of eBay’s objection. The court noted that grant-
ing eBay’s suit was prompted at least in part by the company’s desire to improve its negotiating 
position with Bidder’s Edge, id. at 1064 n.9, and, as David McGowan argues, the result may be 
justifiable on the ground that it encourages bargaining over valuable but intangible things. 
David McGowan, Website Access: The Case for Consent, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 341, 341-42 
(2003). 
260  Morris Commc’ns Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 364 F.3d 1288, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2004). 
The case is thematically inconsistent with National Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 
841 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that real-time scores of professional basketball games likely could 
not be the subject of misappropriation claim), though the latter case did not involve a contract 
claim. 
 9/19/2005 9:50:08 PM 
2005] OBJECTS, CONCEPTS, AND DIGITAL THINGS 445 
software licensing, sometimes known as “Free and Open Source 
Software,” or F/OSS. “Open source” licensing refers to a license 
regime under which the source code of a computer program is 
made available to users of a program’s executable form and users 
are free to access, modify, and redistribute that source code, so 
long as any redistribution remains subject to the open access and 
modifiability provisions that accompanied receipt and use of the 
earlier version. 
Whether the license terms are enforceable legally is unclear. What 
does seem certain is that the license form coordinates relationships 
among users and developers of a computer program, who may not be 
part of a traditional firm and may otherwise be separated significantly 
in time and space.261  
To the critical commentator, an open source community and pro-
gram are relation-based responses to an oppressive scheme of default 
intellectual property rights. To the Coasean commentator, they are 
alternatives to the firm as solutions to transaction costs obstacles in a 
complex market environment. In either case, or in both, an open 
source program is a dynamic and relational thing, or thing-by-
contract. The open source example demonstrates vividly how thing-
by-contract redresses inequitable concentrations of power and author-
ity implicit in a traditional and static view of things. Thingness suffers 
from the weaknesses inherent in systems that concentrate knowledge 
and power at the center, rather than distributing it.262 Thing-by-nature 
and thing-by-design each implies that the thing-maker knows best, 
when a properly distributed system may know better. The physical 
reality of technological artifacts, literally and metaphorically, both 
software and hardware, is inescapable. So is the fact that technology 
allows us to encode “relationships” relatively purely and precisely 
into those artifacts. Under a thing-by-contract model, F/OSS takes the 
conditions of the world and cures the inequities of thing-by-nature 
and thing-by-design by taking the material and legal reconfigurability 
of things to its logical extreme. An open source program is literally 
what its users agree that it is. 
The respectable Legal Realist pedigree of thing-by-contract comes 
with an equally respectable Legal Realist critique. Thing-by-contract 
takes the state of the pre-assent world for granted. In many cases, if 
not all, the recognition and allocation of things worth bargaining over 
                                                                                                                  
261  See Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE 
L.J. 369 (2002) (analyzing distributed production processes). 
262  See JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE (1998) (noting, following Hayek and von 
Mises, the governance problem inherent in ex ante arguments for concentrations of knowledge, 
authority, and decision-making power in the state).  
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is an inescapable problem.263 Assent implies choice, knowledge of 
choices, and capacity to bargain, or at least to choose. Some or all of 
these may be lacking, particularly to the extent that the model fails to 
fit our intuitions about the world. In many cases where the model is 
particularly powerful, as in shrink-wrap and click-wrap agreements 
and notice-and-acknowledgement frameworks that turn data into 
things, thing-by-contract implies that we are making choices when we 
are not aware of doing so. Those making choices may thingify too 
much, if they undervalue negative distributive and downstream con-
sequences of their bargains, an especially difficult problem if thing-
bargains with authoritative implications are durable. They may 
thingify too little, if they undervalue positive consequences.264 Bar-
gaining to create things has the effect of commodifying objects and 
concepts that ought not to be commodified under any circumstances, 
as matters of public policy.265 We may end up, in short, with a surplus 
of bad thing-bargains and an insufficient number of good thing-
bargains.266 In the context of thing-by-contract, regulators can deal 
with these problems on a bargain-by-bargain basis, and make produc-
tive use of the thing-by-contract model, by addressing the salience 
and the significance of the practice of assent.  
Perhaps the most troubling dimension of thing-by-contract is not 
its implicitly one-dimensional model of the process of bargaining 
itself, but its failure to articulate a connection between the single bar-
gain or “private ordering” that constitutes the thing itself, and the 
market in things that supposedly results. As Mark Lemley recently 
argued in connection with economic justifications for intellectual 
property rights, the “private ordering” model is incomplete without 
the discipline of the market as a whole.267 Things exist not only in a 
bilateral, static sense, between two people, but also in an aggregate, 
dynamic sense, in the world at large.268 Thing-by-contract in isolation 
                                                                                                                  
263  See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004); Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private 
Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295 (1998). 
264  See Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Sustainable In-
frastructure Commons, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917 (2005). 
265  Radin & Sunder, supra note 18, at 19-20. Davis Baird argues that commodification and 
thingness ought to be distinguished. Things are knowledge-bearing objects; commodities are 
not. The difference lies in the extent to which thingness supports sharing and the gift economy. 
Commoditization undermines that dimension of things. See BAIRD, supra note 18, at 211-37.  
266  And who is to say which is which? Thing-by-contract as a descriptive model is often 
coupled, implicitly or explicitly, with a normative framework that justifies bargains as welfare-
enhancing or even maximizing.  
267  Lemley, supra note 263, at 148-49.  
268  At the extreme, post-structuralist literary theory suggests that literary things (i.e., texts) 
have no static meaning even in a bilateral author/reader relationship. The difficulty of translat-
ing that perspective to law shows just how important the text itself remains. See Robert H. 
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is risky if it produces a world in which a single object is represented 
as multiple sorts of legal things, depending on the kinds of bargains to 
which it is subject, without a method for reconciling them. In its best 
form then, thing-by-contract cannot exist in a vacuum. One must ap-
preciate the broader context of the bargain.  
VI. THING-BY-PRACTICE 
In this contextual form, however, thing-by-contract becomes a 
different model, which I call thing-by-practice.269 A patented 
technology may not be the subject of trade secret protection, but a 
patentee might use a contract to try to capture a technology that has 
passed into the public domain—for example, by requiring a patent 
licensee to pay royalties even after the patent expires. Doctrinally, 
preemption keeps thing-by-contract within its proper limits. The 
patent bargain takes precedence over a private bargain. Under 
Brulotte v. Thys Co.,270 the patented thing cannot be resurrected under 
the guise of a contract, and the patented thing disappears along with 
the patent. Preemption, in this example, comes from somewhere; in 
this case, it comes from the public domain, which is the broader 
context of the bargain. Thing-by-practice, then, does more than sand 
the rough edges of thing-by-contract by contextualizing the practice 
of assent. Thing-by-practice takes the question of aggregating 
individual preferences and frames it explicitly as the question of 
social practices, rather than as an individual choice. It looks directly 
at things as how they are used, rather than as how they are given or 
created. Thingness is treated as based not merely on context (in an 
                                                                                                                  
 
Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of the Work, 68 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 725 (1993) (arguing that post-structuralist literary theory suggests revisions to copyright 
law’s traditional focus on the “work of authorship,” such as expanding application of the 
idea/expression distinction to address use of code and convention by alleged infringers).  
269  New Historicist critics allege a dynamic relationship among the authority of the text or 
thing itself, of the author or designer of the thing, of the individual reader, and of the larger 
social processes engaged in the production, use, and interpretation of the thing. The post-
structuralist and postmodern argument that the aesthetic (read: the relationship) is everything, 
see JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SIMULACRA AND SIMULATION (Sheila Faria Glaser trans., 1994), is 
supplemented by recognition of the ongoing and simultaneous role of the material (read: the 
thing). See, e.g., STEPHEN GREENBLATT, RENAISSANCE SELF-FASHIONING: FROM MORE TO 
SHAKESPEARE (1980). Literary criticism and cultural critique are integrated, with the critic’s 
role being to investigate “both the social presence to the world of the literary text and the social 
presence of the world in the literary text.” Id. at 5.  
270  379 U.S. 29 (1964); Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2002) (fol-
lowing but criticizing Brulotte); see also Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 
(1979) (upholding a royalty agreement on an invention for which patent protection was sought, 
but not granted). 
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important sense, property rights have always been contextual271) but 
explicitly on norms governing distribution and consumption regarding 
a particular referent in that context. Thingness is not defined by the 
producer, but by the audience, or by consumers, whether via “the 
market” or some other or additional mechanism. Meaning-making is a 
cultural practice.272 One might even make the argument that meaning-
making is a matter of unilateral decision-making by consumers, rather 
than by designers,273 but the question of thing-making by individual 
consumers is better regarded as another instantiation of thing-by-
design.274 This is thing-by-practice. 
How is one to know whether and when a practice exists that de-
fines a thing? It should be evident already that the modern edges of 
discrete models of thing-by-nature, thing-by-design, and thing-by-
contract begin to blend not only toward one another, but toward this 
particular result. Things are defined by context, and the question is to 
define and describe that context more or less broadly.275 Viewed 
purely from the standpoint of the model’s potential as a regulatory 
resource, thing-by-practice (whether viewed as an evolution from 
earlier models, or as a discrete model of its own) suggests a greater 
variety of particular tools, given the dynamic character of practices in 
the world. But there have to be limits of some sort. Otherwise, both 
practices and things devolve into formless, unstable blobs. 
Defining those limits, that is, understanding what thing-by-practice 
actually means, is one of the central questions of twentieth century 
philosophy and social science. Even a brief review of those disci-
plines demonstrates just how difficult it is to confine thing-by-
practice at any level, general or specific. From one perspective, the 
question most closely resembles the concerns of philosophical subjec-
                                                                                                                  
271  See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 
885, 979-80 (2000) (arguing that formal legal definitions of property cannot diverge too far 
from social practice without losing all semblance of legitimacy). 
272  See, e.g., Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and 
Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127 (1993) (arguing for limits on right of publicity based on 
communitarian sense of the “meaning-making” inherent in the fame that underlies the right). 
273  See F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 51-54 (2004) (considering the scope of the authority of avatars—representations of 
players—in online multiplayer game environments). 
274  The idea that the individual consumer has the authority unilaterally to decide what the 
thing “is” has been rejected, in copyright cases at least. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 
483 (2001) (finding implicitly that a print newspaper retains its character as a newspaper not-
withstanding the consumer’s ability to extract individual articles via an electronic database); 
UMG Recordings v. mp3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding implicitly that 
consumers are not permitted to convert album recordings to digital singles via an Internet stor-
age system). 
275  See Bernstein, supra note 4, at 351-52 (arguing that images or representations of ob-
jects are necessary to law, in contrast to mere abstractions; the basics of human cognition dictate 
that images of objects are necessary constituents of our understanding). 
 9/19/2005 9:50:08 PM 
2005] OBJECTS, CONCEPTS, AND DIGITAL THINGS 449 
tivism, most often associated in the twentieth century with the later 
work of Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein argued that a thing should be un-
derstood in terms of having a concept of the thing, and that concepts, 
in turn, should be understood in terms of practical abilities: the ability 
to classify things or to recognize things or to make inferences, in a 
“language-game.”276 Wittgenstein distinguished the (Kantian and Car-
tesian) Realist theory that ideas or concepts are objectively “real,” 
such that having an idea is fundamentally a matter of contemplating 
or viewing an “object,” in other words, that ideas are mental particu-
lars or objects in the mind, to be distinguished from particular in-
stances or objects in the world.277 
Words and language serve as authoritative symbols not of an un-
derlying reality; instead, they derive their meaning and authority from 
their use in context (Wittgenstein thus offered a pragmatic account of 
semantics). Symbols refer to concepts, which are patterns of relations, 
rather than to things or to objects. A word “means” the role it is em-
ployed to perform, and things are defined by our ability to sort things, 
not by their correspondence to a concept of a certain kind of thing. 
Wittgenstein used the phrase “family resemblances” to refer to these 
patterns.278 There is no such thing as pure symbol and no such thing 
as pure thing. There is only meaning via symbol plus use. In a related 
Wittgensteinian vein are pragmatist philosophers,279 institutional so-
                                                                                                                  
276  WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 82, §§ 6-17. 
277  See id. §§ 1-3, 15. 
The philosophic debate over the merits of concepts is intense. Defenses of objectivism in-
clude JERRY A. FODOR, CONCEPTS: WHERE COGNITIVE SCIENCE WENT WRONG (1998); Jerry 
Fodor, Having Concepts: A Brief Refutation of the Twentieth Century, 19 MIND & LANGUAGE 
29 (2004); BARRY STROUD, THE QUEST FOR REALITY: SUBJECTIVISM AND THE METAPHYSICS 
OF COLOUR (2000). Perhaps the most sophisticated contemporary advocate of subjectivist the-
ory is Daniel Dennett, Real Patterns, 88 J. PHIL. 27 (1991), reprinted in DANIEL DENNETT, 
BRAINCHILDREN: ESSAYS ON DESIGNING MINDS (1998) (finding a middle ground in “real pat-
terns” between the binary positions of ontology—reality is real (realism or naturalism, i.e., some 
things are real or naturally independent of and prior to our conception of them), or is illusory 
(instrumentalism)—in considering mental states). In this sense, Dennett argues that beliefs are 
“real.” Id. 
278  WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 82, §§ 66-67. Legal scholars have located Wittgenstein’s 
influence in a wide range of legal issues, so that legal terms (such as “corporation,” “negotiable 
instrument,” or “privacy”) are the products of institutional conventions that constitute legal 
discourse. Cf. H.L.A. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 L.Q. REV. 37 (1954) 
(noting that concepts, such as “corporation,” are really bundles of relationships that represent 
complex functions but do not describe or define anything).  
279  See, e.g., BRANDOM, supra note 15, at 166-85 (following and extending Quine, by 
making reference to the central semantic concept, rather than meaning, and defining reference in 
terms of its pragmatic social and communicative role). On the relevance of this view to law, see 
Dennis M. Patterson, Law’s Pragmatism: Law as Practice and Narrative, 76 VA. L. REV. 937 
(1990) (outlining a pragmatist theory of legal discourse, based on narrative; describing law as an 
activity, rather than a thing). But see Michael Steven Green, Dworkin’s Fallacy, or What the 
Philosophy of Language Can’t Teach Us About the Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1897 (2003) (arguing 
that the philosophy of language has no jurisprudential consequences; i.e., that talking about or 
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cial scientists,280 and some contemporary sociologists, anthropolo-
gists, and linguists,281 all of whom, in one way or another, argue that 
                                                                                                                  
 
recognizing something as law does not make it law). 
In Part III supra, I distinguished practice that describes an objective thing (thing-by-
nature) from practice that constitutes a thing (thing-by-practice). It may be better to put the two 
perspectives on a philosophical continuum. See HAUGELAND, supra note 153, at 325-54 (distin-
guishing between science and games as metaphorical resources for thinking about different 
things, depending on the character of their authority); PUTNAM, supra note 153 (arguing that 
though meaning is usage, words have referents and offering his famous aphorism, “meaning just 
ain’t in the head!”); QUINE, Ontological Relativity, supra note 9; Ronald J. Allen & Brian Le-
iter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA. L. REV. 1491, 1493-99 (2001) 
(summarizing “naturalized” epistemology as based on empiricism about perceptions of human 
experience). Something “counts” as knowledge, in other words, if it is based on reliable cogni-
tive processing, situated in social practices and processes that produce beliefs. Id. (citing and 
following Quine, Epistemology Naturalized, in QUINE, ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND OTHER 
ESSAYS, supra note 9, and ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, EPISTEMOLOGY AND COGNITION (1986)).  
In a related spirit is Jeremy Bentham’s distinction between “real” entities (objects existing 
in the material world) and “fictitious” entities (abstractions, which require language for their 
existence), see Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Ontology and Essay on Language, in 8 THE 
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM (John Bowring ed., 1838–1843), a precursor to Hart, and later to 
Foucault. See H.L.A. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, 49 PROC. OF THE 
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 171 (1948–1949), reprinted in LOGIC AND LANGUAGE 151 (Anthony 
Flew ed., 1965) (arguing that there are concepts with antecedents in the “world of facts,” and 
concepts without, so that the questions, “what is a concept?” and “what is its authority?” ought 
to be separated); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 21-49 (A.M. Sheri-
dan Smith trans., 1972) (1969) (distinguishing between discursive objects, which are interpret-
able, and material objects, which are not). Bentham’s epistemology, however, was more prag-
matic than ideal. Bentham “sought a method by the use of which the human mind could learn 
from, and build on, observation and experience. The task of such a logic, in his view, is to 
define strategies for the best use of the rational faculties, where ‘best use’ is defined in terms, 
ultimately, of successfully advancing human purposes and satisfying human needs and inter-
ests.” GERALD POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 60 (1986). 
280  See Roger Friedland & Robert Alford, Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices, 
and Institutional Contradictions, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL 
ANALYSIS, supra note 172, at 232; Ronald L. Jepperson, Institutions, Institutional Effects, and 
Institutionalism, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 
172, at 143. 
281  See, e.g., WIEBE E. BIJKER, OF BICYCLES, BAKELITES, AND BULBS: TOWARD A 
THEORY OF SOCIOTECHNICAL CHANGE (1995); Brown, supra note 1; GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK 
JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN 
THOUGHT (1998); LATOUR, PANDORA’S HOPE, supra note 39, at 304.  
Social or conventional frameworks for things may support the naturalization phenomena 
(thing-by-practice or thing-by-design becomes thing-by-nature) described earlier. See supra 
notes 156-57 and accompanying text. This process is inevitably practice-based, though precisely 
how it works—or how it might be interrupted—is not well understood. See Kathleen M. Carley, 
On the Evolution of Social and Organizational Networks, in 16 RES. IN THE SOC. OF ORG. 3-30 
(David Knoke & Steven B. Andrew eds., 1999) (describing model of socio-cognition in which 
knowledge networks (who knows what information, and what information is related to what), 
cognitive social structures (who knows whom), and individual cognitive networks (what each 
individual knows) coevolve); EDWIN HUTCHINS, COGNITION IN THE WILD (1995) (describing 
model of “distributed cognition”); Edwin Hutchins, Material Anchors for Conceptual Blends, 37 
J. PRAGMATICS 1555 (2005) (describing “distributed cognition” as human thought grounded in 
material practice, rather than mental processes or structures, so that things are “cognitive arti-
facts”); Rajiv C. Shah & Jay P. Kesan, The Recursive Regulatory Model (2004) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author) (postulating a theory of recursive engagement among individu-
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we use our shared experiences of the world, including our language, 
to construct the existence, meaning, and authority of things.282 From 
different traditions, Davis Baird (philosophy)283 and Etienne Wenger 
(cognitive psychology)284 generalize: “Things” are efficient bearers of 
knowledge and learning that are created by and bind social groups. 
Where twentieth century Realists draw a sharp distinction between 
what the philosopher Rudolf Carnap termed “synthetic truths” (mere 
“rules of language”) and “analytic truths” (“matters of fact,” known 
by experience), subjectivists and pragmatists reject that distinction.285 
Truth follows from practice.286 
Thing-by-practice is clearly pragmatic in this last sense, but there 
are those who are both convinced of the need to incorporate practice 
into a model of things, yet reject subjectivism. (Interestingly, recent 
research in cognitive neuroscience makes a related point: things may 
exist in our brains, not just in our minds.287 Their speculations offer 
an approach that, if successful, would marry the real and pragmatic 
theories of concepts to a pragmatic theory of material objects. A 
grand unified theory of things, in other words.) This is Martin Hei-
degger’s approach, to center a philosophy not on the person (who 
                                                                                                                  
 
als, institutions, and objects, combining Latour’s actor/network theory and the structuration 
theories of Giddens and Orlinkowski). 
282  Perhaps the most prominent contemporary legal philosopher working in this tradition is 
Frederick Schauer. See Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Func-
tion of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231; Schauer, supra note 153. 
283  See BAIRD, supra note 18, at 118-65 (advocating a “materialist epistemology,” or un-
derstanding things as forms of knowledge, even (or especially) when those things are not trans-
parent). 
284  See ETIENNE WENGER, COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE: LEARNING, MEANING, AND 
IDENTITY 58-102 (1998) (describing how the authority of things derives from their social con-
text, the complex social practices and conventions that mediate within and among communi-
ties).  
285  See HILARY PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY AND OTHER 
ESSAYS (2002) (describing how modern philosophy and some modern economics recognize that 
description and evaluation infect each other, so that practice influences categories); QUINE, 
Ontological Relativity, supra note 9 (putting these phenomena on a single continuum). 
286  See, e.g., Appadurai, supra note 18, at 5 (describing “the human transactions and calcu-
lations that enliven things,” or “things-in-motion,” that illuminate their human and social con-
text); Aafke Komter, Heirlooms, Nikes and Bribes: Toward a Sociology of Things, 35 SOC. 59 
(2001) (borrowing a taxonomy from Fiske to distinguish four ways in which people may relate 
to one another and to things, and noting that where parties to a transaction do not share the same 
frame, a thing may have conflicting social lives). 
287  The economy of concepts emphasized by the discipline of concept learning, see Palm-
ieri & Noelle, supra note 1, exists not merely as a mental or social convenience. It may exist at a 
psychological level. Concepts may constitute shared cognitive phenomena that permit generali-
zation, inference, and different levels of abstraction. Concepts establish references, describe 
referents, and establish domains of reference. Meaning and communication proceed from that 
point. See Lawrence W. Barsalou & Katja Wiemer-Hastings, Situating Abstract Concepts, in 
GROUNDING COGNITION: THE ROLE OF PERCEPTION AND ACTION IN MEMORY, LANGUAGE, 
AND THOUGHT (Diane Pecheer & Rolf A. Zwaan eds., 2005).  
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interprets the world of things),288 but on things themselves.289 Hei-
degger rejected theory altogether; when he asked, explicitly and 
bluntly, what is a thing?,290 he answered that question directly in the 
form of experience, rather than by referring to artifacts or concepts. 
Heidegger distinguished between “present-at-hand” “objects” (Vor-
handenhut), alienated from the self and available for detached exami-
nation, and “ready-to-hand” “things” (Zuhandenhut), as we use and 
experience them through time and space,291 or what modern sociolo-
gists might refer to as “situated” or “embedded” objects. Heideg-
gerian “things” have no meaning in our lives apart from our practical 
experience of them, other than as objects of study. Thingness per se 
                                                                                                                  
288  The shared communicative dimension of thing-by-practice means that it retains the de-
rivative weakness that language is itself colored by experience. See Edward L. Rubin, The 
Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1840-41 (1988); cf. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 460 (1899) 
(“We must think things not words, or at least we must constantly translate our words into the 
facts for which they stand, if we are to keep to the real and true.”). Because of my own effort to 
categorize techniques of thing-making, I dodge the important question of the inevitability of our 
reliance on linguistic structures to access our experience, known generally as the “linguistic 
turn” in twentieth century theory. See John E. Toews, Intellectual History After the Linguistic 
Turn: The Autonomy of Meaning and the Irreducibility of Experience, 92 AM. HIST. REV. 879, 
881 (1987) (book review). 
289  Heidegger regarded language as metaphysical, but in other respects his argument an-
ticipated the work of contemporary cognitive linguists, who suggest that language is embodied 
experience. See GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE & DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES 
REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 5 (1987); Mark Johnson, Law Incarnate, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 949, 
957-59 (2002) (emphasizing the “embodied, situated” nature of concepts and rules, rather than 
the givenness of background assumptions regarding context). 
290  See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, WHAT IS A THING? (W.B. Barton, Jr. & Vera Deutsch trans., 
1967) (1935) [hereinafter HEIDEGGER, WHAT IS A THING?]. A thing is the existing (vorhanden) 
bearer of many existing yet changeable properties, i.e., systems of “something else.” Heidegger 
earlier staked out “the thing” in practical terms to distinguish his theory from Kant’s thing-as-
such, or noumenon, referring to the thing (das Ding) in experiential terms, denoting a gathering 
of people, or an event. See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, The Thing, in POETRY, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT 
161 (Albert Hofstadter trans., 1971). 
Heidegger’s method followed the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl, 
which also inspired the hermeneutics of Gadamer and his followers. See EDMUND HUSSERL, 
IDEAS: GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PURE PHENOMENOLOGY 96, 105-20, 220-26 (W.R. Boyce 
Gibson trans., Collier Books 1969) (1931) (arguing that the world as an experienced thing 
precedes any questions about its metaphysical reality; to interpret an object is to make sense of 
the world and create meaning for ourselves). The creation of meaning via this “intersubjective” 
process—individual construction of the world, and sharing of that construction with others—is 
methodologically individualistic. Only individuals are intentional actors, and institutional be-
havior is accounted for only in terms of individual action. The hermeneutic tradition tries to 
capture the situated social dimension of interpretation. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, The Na-
ture of Things and the Language of Things, in PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS, at 69-71 (David 
E. Linge ed. & trans., 1976). For an application of the hermeneutic tradition to law, see George 
H. Taylor, Critical Hermeneutics: The Intertwining of Explanation and Understanding as Ex-
emplified in Legal Analysis, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1101 (2000). 
291  See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 98-101 (John Macquarrie & Edward Rob-
inson trans., 1962) (1927).  
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fails to represent the true character of the world as a dynamic negotia-
tion between and among all of us living in it: 
 It now becomes clear that we understand the term “thing” 
in both a narrower and a broader sense. The narrower or lim-
ited meaning of “thing” is that which can be touched, 
reached, or seen, i.e., what is present-at-hand (das Vorhan-
dene). In the wider meaning of the term, the “thing” is every 
affair or transaction, something that is in this or that condi-
tion, the things that happen in the world—occurrences, 
events.292 
“Things” in this sense do not occupy a distinct place in the Hei-
deggerian universe. They become part of the ongoing interpretive 
state of Being that Heidegger called Dasein.293 Things are revealed 
via the Greek mode of techne, and the revealing itself draws out 
things. Being in the world is ontologically prior as a mode of reveal-
ing. Essence is not the unchanging stuff of Aristotle. It changes as we 
encounter things.294   
Heideggerian “seeing that produces things” is complex enough in 
philosophical terms, even on the premise that it rejects theoretical 
construction in favor of the practical. Yet it is precisely in rejecting 
theory that the critique abandons the pretense that a common coherent 
framework could be worked out to identify a “thing” in any given 
legal context.295 Perhaps patent law, with its explicit concern for tech-
nical “things” and its Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art 
(PHOSITA) construct for evaluating patent validity, comes closest to 
developing a mechanism for processing the kinds of experiential 
questions that Heidegger anticipated.296 In any other application, a 
theory of thing-by-practice requires a somewhat messy blending of 
Heidegger and Wittgenstein, with a dose of David Hume’s conviction 
                                                                                                                  
292  HEIDEGGER, WHAT IS A THING?, supra note 290, at 5; see MARTIN HEIDEGGER, The 
Question Concerning Technology (1954), in BASIC WRITINGS 287 (David Farrell Krell ed., 
1977) (relating things to the Greek techne, appreciating technological artifacts as we experience 
them, without reducing them to mere instruments).  
293  See generally HEIDEGGER, supra note 291 (describing the structure of “everydayness,” 
or “Being-in-the-world,” an interconnected system of equipment, social roles, and purposes). 
294  See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BASIC QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY 76-77 (Richard Rojce-
wicz & Andre Schuwer trans., Indiana Univ. Press 1994) (1938). 
295  Compare Linda Ross Meyer, Is Practical Reason Mindless?, 86 GEO. L.J. 647 (1998) 
(celebrating the openness to practical reason that Heidegger invites), with Brian Leiter, Heideg-
ger and the Theory of Adjudication, 106 YALE L.J. 253 (1996) (attempting a theory of practical 
reasoning for adjudication, based on the Heideggerian critique). 
296  See John R. Thomas, Of Text, Technique, and the Tangible: Drafting Patent Claims 
Around Patent Rules, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 219 (1998); see also Nard, 
supra note 82. 
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that convention, rather than reason, was the source of knowledge,297 
and empirical approaches from a variety of domains.298 In all, thing-
by-practice reflects a pragmatism that seems best to approximate the 
messiness of the world as we find it, but that some may reject as too 
complex and insufficiently precise. 
Despite these practical difficulties, thing-by-practice is often 
effective in rebutting Realist criticism that the reification of legal 
concepts wrongly confuses the social and the natural.299 Part II of this 
Article built its premise largely out of an unarticulated thing-by-
practice foundation, illustrating how the adaptability and flexibility of 
thing-by-practice means that it is both inevitable and at times 
beneficial, particularly when spillover or distributional issues can be 
addressed by broadening the community that defines “things.” In 
property law, for example, Hanoch Dagan argues that the Realist 
conception of property as forms or relations can be recharacterized 
profitably along institutional, or practical, lines.300 In social terms, 
Dagan’s thesis uses thing-by-practice to consolidate the expectations 
and forms of ideal relationship within a social group.301 Michael 
Carrier, Jacqueline Lipton, and Adam Mossoff have each reframed 
                                                                                                                  
297  See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 484-513 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 
1978) (1739) (expressing skepticism regarding the power of positive law and noting the degree 
to which it should track social conventions); Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, 
Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1128-30 (2003) (discussing Hume and the role 
of convention, rather than agreement, as answering questions regarding how objects become 
property). 
298  See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004) (advocating a practice-based or pattern-oriented approach to ques-
tions of fair use in copyright law). 
299  See Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the “Fuel of Interest” from the “Fire of Genius”: 
Law and the Employee-Inventor, 1830–1930, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1135-36 (1998) (charac-
terizing patents as reified legal things, fixing a particular social order); Douglas Litowitcz, 
Reification in Law and Law Theory, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 401 (2000) (characterizing reifi-
cation as the confusion of the natural and the social, and discussing reification theory of Georg 
Lukács and tracing it to the commodity fetishism described by Marx); Gary Peller, The Meta-
physics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151 (1985) (taking a critical view of reification as 
fixing dynamic social relations in artificially “natural” arrangements); Steven L. Winter, Tran-
scendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1105, 1108 (1989) (rejecting “objectivist” theories of cognitive processing, which treats 
the world as filled with “objects” that exist independent of human interaction). 
300  See Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1517 (2003). 
301  The conceptual link here is to Davis Baird’s materialist epistemology of things, which 
holds that tangible things embody social knowledge in much the same sense that Dagan applies 
to institutions. See BAIRD, supra note 18. This mirrors the external perspective of Thomas 
Merrill and Henry Smith, see supra note 139 and accompanying text, and of Clarisa Long, see 
supra note 138 and accompanying text, that thingness offers information cost advantages, but 
combines it with an internal perspective that emphasizes the coherence of the thing itself. Dagan 
disagrees with the Merrill and Smith thesis that modern property rules are bounded by a nume-
rus clausus principle, on the ground that the numerus clausus principle does not account for the 
internal governance function of institutions. See Dagan, supra note 300, at 1567-68. But I sus-
pect that the institutional model is elastic enough to account for his concern. 
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intellectual property doctrines along property lines to emphasize the 
advantages of a thing-oriented approach from the standpoint of access 
to information.302 In economic terms, classical property rules on 
chattels303 imply that the law expects the beneficiaries of thingness to 
internalize the costs of thing-formation. When there are barriers to 
fully internalizing those costs (and generating those benefits) via 
private transactions (for example, coordination costs or other cultural 
or social limitations prevent members of a group from expressing 
their preferences in a transactional setting), it makes sense to follow 
an approach to thingness that defines the thing (and absorbs its costs) 
in terms of shared practices.  
Thing-by-practice encompasses intangible and conceptual things 
in the law as well as (and perhaps even more than) physical things. 
Property rights are at times the products not of what an “owner” 
claims as property, but as what some relevant community treats as 
property. This was ultimately the point of classic property cases such 
as Pierson v. Post304 and Ghen v. Rich,305 and it comes to us in cases 
such as G.S. Rasmussen & Associates, Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Service, 
Inc.,306 recognizing a property interest in an FAA airworthiness 
certificate for a particular aircraft design. Carol Rose notes that the 
question of property in things in these cases depends on the 
possibility of possession, not because of the inherent characteristics of 
the thing itself, but because of the communicative function of 
possession in the context of the symbolic practices of the group.307 
                                                                                                                  
302  See Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 
54 DUKE L.J. 1 (2004); Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 
FLA. L. REV. 135 (2004); Adam Mosoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 
45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 372-74 (2003) (describing intangible, intellectual property as not concep-
tually distinct from tangible property); cf. James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and 
the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 67-68 (2003) (analo-
gizing the several forms of the public domain in intellectual property law to the several concep-
tions of “property”); Hope M. Babcock, Should Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council Pro-
tect Where the Wild Things Are? Of Beavers, Bob-o-Links, and Other Things That Go Bump in 
the Night, 85 IOWA L. REV. 849, 900-01 (2000) (describing “public trust” idea in environmental 
law as a reification of property’s communal norms). 
303  See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text. 
304  3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (holding that a property right in a fox does not arise 
via the chase). 
305  8 F. 159 (D. Mass. 1881) (holding that a property right in a whale may arise via har-
pooning it). 
306  958 F.2d 896, 902-03 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[T]hree criteria must be met before the law will 
recognize a property right: First, there must be an interest capable of precise definition; second, 
it must be capable of exclusive possession or control; and third, the putative owner must have 
established a legitimate claim to exclusivity.” (footnote omitted)). 
307  Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 79-85 
(1985). A “commonly understood and shared set of symbols . . . gives significance and form to 
what might seem the quintessentially individualistic act: the claim that one has, by ‘possession,’ 
separated for oneself property from the great commons of unowned things.” Id. at 88. 
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Thingness is recognized as such not merely because of the value 
associated with the resulting property right,308 but because the 
community explicitly or implicitly acknowledges thingness in its 
context. Robert Ellickson’s study of the social norms of California 
cattle ranchers is a justly famous example of social practices creating 
a legal institution with little “reality” behind it except the behavior of 
its participants.309 A para-legal regime based on social norms may be 
a conceptual thing-by-practice without a concrete referent. But 
comparable arguments have been made regarding tangible things, 
including books310 and automobiles.311  
The relevant response of the community may be purely cultural, or 
commercial, or both. Copyright law specifically rejects thingness (and 
copyrightability) in certain cases under the doctrine of scenes à faire, 
on the ground that certain characters and settings are effectively ge-
neric to the type of expressive work involved.312 The rule exists to 
protect readers and other consumers in their ability to enjoy cultural 
traditions of certain sorts. A related doctrine in trademark law, that 
distinctive marks may lose legal protection if they become generic via 
use,313 exists to protect consumer and competitor access to that term 
in order to communicate about products of that class. The “staple item 
of commerce” doctrine in patent and copyright law limits application 
of doctrines of secondary liability for infringement when liability is 
premised solely on the defendant’s sales of an item that may be used 
to infringe the plaintiff’s right.314 Copyright law borrowed the “staple 
item” concept from patent law but added the gloss that the item must 
be “capable” of “substantial noninfringing uses” or “commercially 
significant noninfringing uses,”315 a twist that highlights the role of 
                                                                                                                  
308  See Cohen, supra note 66. 
309  ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 
(1991). 
310  See Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books L.L.C., 150 F. Supp. 2d 613, 621-22 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (relying on industry practice to determine the meaning of the phrase “in book 
form” in publishing agreement), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002). 
311  See Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 272 F. Supp. 744, 748 (D. Mass. 
1967) (discussing Ford’s argument that the design features of its dashboard, which disadvan-
taged after-market suppliers of automobile radios, were “important and essential components of 
an automobile in today’s style-minded market”), aff’d, 390 F.2d 113 (1st Cir. 1968). The district 
court did not rely on Ford’s argument in refusing to enjoin Ford’s behavior. 
312  E.g., Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 361 F.3d 312 
(6th Cir. 2004). 
313  E.g., Yellow Cab Co. of Sacramento v. Yellow Cab of Elk Grove, Inc., 419 F.3d 925 
(9th Cir. 2005); Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2002). 
314  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000) (exempting sale of “staple article or commodity or 
commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use” from patent liability); Sony Corp. of Am. 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434-42 (1984) (borrowing patent rule for applica-
tion to copyright law). 
315  Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. 
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commercial and cultural practice in defining the existence of the “sta-
ple item” in question.316 
Thing-by-practice appears to have the greatest application in what 
are primarily commercial contexts. The question of distinctiveness in 
trademark law, for example, has traditionally been largely a function 
of how the mark is perceived in the relevant market.317 Barton Beebe 
concludes, “The trademark, then, is not an irreducible, indivisible 
thing, but rather a set of relations, specifically of semiotic relations of 
reference. It is more wave than particle.”318 Cases questioning the 
legal thingness of FAA certifications do not arise frequently, but 
cases questioning the legal status of Internet domain names have be-
come more common. For some purposes, and when there is some 
relevant commercial market, domain names are legal things. Kremen 
v. Cohen,319 following G.S. Rasmussen, holds that domain names may 
be the subject of claims for conversion. They may be the object of in 
rem legal proceedings.320 They may be the objects of security transac-
tions.321 When no relevant commercial practice is involved, domain 
names may not be things. They may not be garnished to satisfy a 
debt.322 
Similarly, whether a given transaction amounts to a security inter-
est in personal property under the Uniform Commercial Code de-
pends not on the characterization of the transaction by the parties, or 
even on the parties’ intent, but on the economic characteristics of the 
transaction in the context of the market.323 Transactions in computer 
programs that involve distribution of a complete copy of a noncus-
tomized program in exchange for payment of a one-time fee have 
been held to be subject to the rules of Article 2 of the U.C.C.324 The 
                                                                                                                  
316  See Madison, supra note 298, at 1662-77 (framing file sharing cases in terms of con-
sumer practice). 
317  See Steven Wilf, Who Authors Trademarks?, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 10 
(1999) (describing the public as an “interpretive community”). 
318  Beebe, supra note 24, at 648. 
319  337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003).  
320  The Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000), au-
thorizes relief under certain circumstances based on an in rem filing against the offending do-
main name. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (2000). 
321  See Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Commercial Law Collides with Cyberspace: The Trouble 
with Perfection—Insecurity Interests in the New Corporate Asset, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 37 
(2002) (evaluating two scenarios for perfecting security interests in domain names).  
322  Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80 (Va. 2000). The result in 
Umbro is criticized in Juliet M. Moringiello, Seizing Domain Names To Enforce Judgments: 
Looking Back to Look To the Future, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 95 (2003) (noting commercial impor-
tance of treating domain names as property-like assets). 
323  U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (2001); see PSINet, Inc. v. Cisco Sys. Capital Corp. (In re PSINet, 
Inc.), 271 B.R. 1, 43-46 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001); C.F. Garcia Enters., Inc. v. Enter. Ford Trac-
tor, Inc., 480 S.E.2d 497, 499 (Va. 1997). 
324  See, e.g., Micro Data Base Sys., Inc. v. Dharma Sys., Inc., 148 F.3d 649, 654 (7th Cir. 
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product is a “good” rather than a “service,” despite the intangibility of 
the program and the fact that the economic value of the deal lies in 
that intangible “thing,” rather than in any tangible medium, such as a 
disk or tape, because commercial and consumer markets have come to 
treat it as such. The now-failed enterprise to encode the license-as-
thing principle325 in a new Article of the U.C.C. and later in the Uni-
form Commercial Information Transactions Act (UCITA) was prem-
ised on the idea that the licensing model was so well established as a 
market and cognitive phenomenon that it satisfied a Llewellyn-ish 
standard for statutory codification.326 The failure of the codification 
movement was not so much a failure of the thing-by-practice model 
as it was a failure to show that both producers and users of computer 
programs recognized the practice. 
In many respects, the patent doctrines of repair and reconstruction, 
first sale, and implied license and exhaustion, discussed earlier in 
connection with thing-by-nature and thing-by-contract, dovetail with 
the thing-by-practice approach. One important early strand of first 
sale reasoning in patent and copyright cases concerned whether the 
patentee or the copyright owner had received a fair “reward” in ex-
change for the patented or copyrighted item.327 If so, the item passed 
into the stream of commerce, and the rights holder was not entitled to 
make any further claims regarding reuse or resale of that item. The 
thingness of the item in these cases, that is, the line between what 
belonged in a sense to the rights holder and what belonged to the con-
sumer, was determined by the market as a whole, regardless of the 
nominal form of the transaction, and regardless of whether or not the 
transfer was voluntary. The Court wrote in 1942: 
 
[T]his Court has quite consistently refused to allow 
the form into which the parties chose to cast the 
transaction to govern. The test has been whether or 
                                                                                                                  
 
1998); Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 675 (3d Cir. 1991); ePresence, Inc. v. 
Evolve Software, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 159, 163 (D. Mass. 2002); Olcott Int’l & Co. v. Micro 
Data Base Sys., Inc., 793 N.E.2d 1063, 1071 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 
325  See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text. 
326  See Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, 38 DUQ. L. 
REV. 459 (2000); Nimmer, supra note 173. 
327  See, e.g., United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942); Adams v. Burke, 
84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456 (1873); Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544, 547 (1872); 
Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 663 (1895); United States v. Univis Lens 
Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251 (1942). A similar justification has been offered for copyright’s first sale 
principle. See, e.g., Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847, 854 (2d Cir. 
1963); Lantern Press, Inc. v. Am. Publishers Co., 419 F. Supp. 1267, 1272-73 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); 
Burke & Van Heusen, Inc. v. Arrow Drug, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 881, 884 (E.D. Pa. 1964). 
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not there has been such a disposition of the article 
that it may fairly be said that the patentee has re-
ceived his reward for the use of the article.328 
 
The mere existence of the reward does not govern, but rather whether 
it was “fair”—a primitive reading of market processes.329  
More recently, “fair reward” arguments have given way to differ-
ent justifications, still based on thing-by-practice. In copyright law, 
for example, there is the doctrine of first sale, codified in 17 U.S.C. 
§ 109,330 which immunizes owners of lawfully made copies of copy-
righted works from claims that they distributed or redistributed those 
copies without the copyright owner’s permission. The doctrine may 
be said to deal with anticompetitive concerns and consumer inter-
ests,331 but it has been defended recently by the Copyright Office on 
the ground that it exists merely to give effect to the traditional distinc-
tion between copyrighted works and objects that embody them.332 
There is the notion of implied license, which enables the use of things 
that we receive on the ordinary understanding that use is intended.333 
“Useful articles” receive special treatment when questions of copy-
rightability arise; tangible dimensions of expressive objects are not 
foreclosed from copyright protection entirely, but the rules are set up 
to limit the scope of copyright to expression that can somehow be 
“separated”—either physically or conceptually—from objects.334 The 
                                                                                                                  
328  Masonite, 316 U.S. at 278. 
329  The role of the market as an aggregator and provider of “justice” for things overlaps 
here with the place of the market as defined by the “normal” consumption and use of objects. 
See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text (describing role of “normal” commercial activ-
ity in constructing rule against restraints on alienation). 
330  17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000). The first sale “right,” in truth a defense to a claim of in-
fringement of the distribution right, does not extend to rentals of computer programs or phon-
orecords. See id. § 109(b). Codification of the distinction between the work of authorship and its 
tangible form is a closely related cousin. See id. § 202. 
331  See R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. 
L. REV. 577 (2003) (focusing on affordability and availability policies underlying the doctrine). 
332  See UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 78-92 (2001) 
(concluding, among other thing, that changes to the information landscape did not mandate 
development of a right of “digital first sale” to protect consumer expectations in electronic 
settings). On the wisdom of borrowing a digital first sale right from the analog world, compare 
Ann Bartow, Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More Like a Book, 48 
VILL. L. REV. 13 (2003) (urging emulation of offline norms in rules for online behavior), with 
Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Without Restricting Innova-
tion, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1374 n.112 (2004) (questioning wisdom of that approach).  
333  The paradigmatic implied license decision is Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 908 
F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990). In isolation, the doctrine has the flavor of thing-by-contract. As some 
have attempted to extend it, however, its thing-by-practice character becomes clear. See Robert 
W. Gomulkiewicz, De-Bugging Open Source Software Licensing, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 85 
n.73 (2002) (“It may not be a first sale when someone simply gives a copyrighted work for free 
with no explanation: the recipient may simply receive an implied license.”). 
334  See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987); Kar-
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substance of the distinction may be based on how works and objects 
are perceived by the marketplace335 or on how they are used,336 but in 
either case, copyright reaches limits imposed by economic or social 
practice rather than by nature or design.337  
First sale and exhaustion cases also demonstrate that the thing-as-
practice model is weakest where the practice is poorly understood or 
is changing. Express limitations on repair and disposal of the thing, 
and copyright-style protection for the form of the thing rather than 
merely the expression, are controversial precisely because they 
conflict so clearly with apparently settled expectations regarding 
thingness. Litigation over so-called tethered products embodying 
intellectual property interests (so called because they are designed to 
be experienced only in conjunction with specified counterpart 
devices) has focused precisely on the extent to which their use is 
governed by existing consumer expectations, or by the dictates of the 
manufacturer. In Universal City Studios v. Corley,338 the Second 
Circuit upheld application of the anticircumvention provisions of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to a defendant who 
“trafficked” in software that enabled owners of DVDs to watch their 
discs (including lawfully purchased discs) on machines other than 
DVD players licensed by film producers. By contrast, in Chamberlain 
Group v. Skylink Technologies,339 the Federal Circuit refused to 
interpret the DMCA so as to forbid a consumer from making 
unfettered use of a software-equipped garage door opener that the 
consumer had bought and paid for. Notwithstanding that the 
consumer’s use of an aftermarket remote control necessitated a form 
of electronic access to the original door system’s computer code, the 
court wrote: “Consumers who purchase a product containing a copy 
of embedded software have the inherent legal right to use that copy of 
the software. What the law authorizes, Chamberlain cannot 
revoke.”340 The manufacturer and plaintiff, Chamberlain, was not 
                                                                                                                  
 
jala, supra note 128, at 448-49, 452. 
335  See Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 
252-53 (1998) (outlining different approaches to defining art).  
336  See Karjala, supra note 128, at 448-58. 
337  Brandir International, which adopted Robert Denicola’s “perspective of the artist” 
standard for the conceptual separability of aesthetic from utilitarian dimensions of useful ob-
jects, is the exception that proves the rule, since it necessarily anticipates that artists seeking 
protection for aesthetics in useful objects must prove that their design choices were themselves 
artistic, measured against some relevant artistic or design community. Brandir Int’l, 834 F.2d at 
1145-46. 
338  273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
339  381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
340  Id. at 1202. 
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permitted to change the character of a thing already subject to an 
established set of consumer expectations. 
The precise source of those expectations, however, remains unar-
ticulated. It is difficult to imagine that universal garage door openers 
or DVDs have been available and in use for so long that all of Ameri-
can society shares a cognizable sense of what we ought to be able to 
do with them. We are left with the intuitive importance of the physi-
cal thing.341 Joseph Liu notes that the copyright rules dealing with 
tangibility in copyright have an important salutary effect, balancing 
producer, consumer, and reuser interests.342 In conception and design, 
however, the rules simply reflect traditional understandings of the 
law. Things are special in copyright, as they are elsewhere in law, 
because of how we experience them. But we do not know precisely 
why.343 
                                                                                                                  
341  See Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy 
Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1301 (2001) (“Copyright law structures itself 
around . . . understandings about the physical environment and physical property ownership.”). 
342  See id. at 1336-37. Carla Hesse’s intellectual history of copyright points out that what 
we now recognize as the basis for the consumer’s right in the lawful copy originated as a dis-
tinction between the form of the author’s work and the work itself, as a basis for the author’s 
right. Carla Hesse, The Rise of Intellectual Property, 700 B.C.–A.D. 2000: An Idea in the Bal-
ance, 131 DAEDALUS 26, 35 (2002); see also Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copy-
right: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the ‘Author,’ 17 EIGHTEENTH 
CENTURY STUD. 425 (1984) (tracing the form/expression distinction to Fichte and from Fichte 
back to Kant). What we experience today as thing-by-practice had its philosophical origins in 
thing-by-nature.  
343  American Studies scholars have argued that “the book” constitutes a distinctive, even 
exceptional, physical and economic commodity, though without really explaining why this is so. 
This view treats the expansion of intellectual property interests in American law during the 
nineteenth century as vindication of interests in the physical, rather than as vindication of inter-
ests in the intangible. See JOSEPH LOEWENSTEIN, THE AUTHOR’S DUE: PRINTING AND THE 
PREHISTORY OF COPYRIGHT (2002) (arguing that the culture of books and the idea of the author 
are intimately tied to the physical act of publishing); JOSEPH LOEWENSTEIN, BEN JONSON AND 
POSSESSIVE AUTHORSHIP (2002) (finding that possessive ownership was tied historically to 
printing and the accountability that it brought to authorship); MEREDITH L. MCGILL, AMERICAN 
LITERATURE AND THE CULTURE OF REPRINTING, 1834–1853 (2003) (describing going-into-print 
in America as the beginning of the struggle between individual rights and social demands). “In 
the American debate over literary property, both sides define the text as an extraordinary com-
modity, an exception to the laws that govern ordinary things.” Meredith L. McGill, The Matter 
of the Text: Commerce, Print Culture and the Authority of the State in American Copyright Law, 
9 AM. LITERARY HIST. 21, 22 (1997). Wheaton v. Peters, as McGill points out, firmly estab-
lished in American copyright law the distinction between the “thing” that consisted of the au-
thor’s original work and that remained his property under the common law, on the one hand, 
and the printed versions of that work, on the other hand, “things” whose publication triggered 
the interest of the civic sphere and the application of statutory copyright. Id. at 41-42. On the 
counterpart English context of book manufacturing, see ADRIAN JOHNS, THE NATURE OF THE 
BOOK: PRINT & KNOWLEDGE IN THE MAKING 2-5 (1998) (arguing that the development of the 
printed book was not inevitable; rather, the printed book is the product of a “complex set of 
social and technological processes”). 
Putting “the book” front and center in American copyright contrasts with the critical view 
of copyright as the story of the “romantic author” whose interest happens to be vindicated via 
commodified texts. The canonical version of the theory is MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND 
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Much as these examples illustrate how thing-by-practice can 
serve as a useful and broadly accepted mediator of conflicts be-
tween social evolution and overly rigid legal forms, both the forms 
and practices of modern technology challenge the model. Form 
offers a clear challenge. Despite the application of Article 2 to 
transactions in computer software, computer programs and other 
digital products cannot be appreciated readily as “things” like 
books, machines, or anything else. 
To what extent does it really make sense to evaluate and rely on 
social or cultural practices, or even markets, with respect to such rap-
idly changing technology? Metaphors may be helpful here, in encour-
aging courts to recognize the consumer-created thingness of digital 
objects.344 Metaphors that are poorly applied, however, may mis-
lead.345 It is not clear that thing-by-practice is sufficiently robust to 
handle the complexity and dynamism of modern things.346  
Instability and manipulability of markets and practices creates a 
second challenge. Thing-by-practice raises difficult empirical ques-
tions concerning knowing what practices are and knowing what prac-
tices count. For example, in the software developer community and 
perhaps beyond, the configurability of business practices has created 
a contest over the proper source of practice for the thing-model. 
Software developers have spent the last thirty years trying to persuade 
consumers to accept the inevitability (as well as the wisdom) of the 
licensing paradigm for computer software. Glen Robinson has argued 
that enough time has passed to dispel any lingering notion that con-
sumer expectations might justify a presumption that software is in 
fact being sold.347 I have disagreed,348 though we frame the question 
in different terms.349 Does the modern marketplace permit producers 
to capture thing-by-practice and recast it as thing-by-design? Per-
haps.350 A similar conflict may be at work in differing perspectives on 
how to analyze peer-to-peer software applications for file sharing. 
                                                                                                                  
 
OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993). 
344  See Michael J. Madison, Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C. L. 
REV. 433, 437 (2003) (arguing that “[t]he Internet-as-place metaphor should be interpreted 
doctrinally in ways that are consistent with user experience of Internet, rather than via formal, 
abstract, and absolutist notions of ‘property’”). 
345  See Hunter, supra note 10 (critiquing the cyberspace-as-place metaphor); Lemley, su-
pra note 10 (same). 
346  See supra notes 41-66 and accompanying text.  
347  See Robinson, supra note 38, at 1467. 
348  See Madison, supra note 172, at 308-16. 
349  Robinson looks at the individual consumer; I look at the social practice. 
350  The merchandising right cases in trademark law are another example of this sort of re-
casting. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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Should the law focus on social practices that treat this software itself 
as a “thing” comparable to the thingness of the Sony Betamax?351 Or 
should the law focus on the practices that surround the copyrighted 
things—works of authorship—that flow through file sharing networks 
without the permission of copyright owners?352 
VII. THING-BY-POLICY 
The fifth and final alternative, then, avoids these conflicts, prefer-
ring to use thingness simply and explicitly as a proxy for policy goals, 
rather than as a starting point for an inquiry into the thingness of the 
thing. This model returns explicitly to the Realist and relational prem-
ise that this Article promised initially to distinguish. We may like to 
think in terms of a world of things, whether or not the world initially 
presents itself to us that way,353 but the legal system may not allow 
thingness simply to be. Law regulates, and as regulator the law is 
pleased to take advantage of our intuitive thing-making cognitive 
apparatus. But in the end, legal things may be nothing more (or less) 
than constructs of values, individual and communal. Lloyd Weinreb 
has criticized the call for identifying “what sort of thing something is” 
as inferior to dealing with the relevant interests as stake.354 Felix 
Cohen called legal things metaphors that were “transcendental non-
sense” when taken seriously in themselves.355 Outside of law, and 
speaking not of legal fictions but of material things themselves, cul-
tural critics of the same era lamented (and others celebrated) the dis-
appearance of the authenticity of the material wrought by modern 
technology.356 Contemporary critical theory descends from the same 
position, both in law357 and otherwise.358 It has been adopted whole-
                                                                                                                  
351  See, e.g., supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
352  See supra note 316 and accompanying text. 
353  Moreover, we may prefer to think in terms of things that we have, rather than in terms 
of things that we do not have. See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1261-62, 1268 (2003) (noting that what psychologists term the “en-
dowment effect”—that we value what we have over objectively equivalent things that we do not 
have—derives partly from physical possession and partly from constructed preferences for 
things); Rose, supra note 307 (exploring the common law maxim, “first possession is the root of 
title”).  
354 Weinreb, supra note 126, at 1254. He notes that much of copyright is founded on an 
uncritical, conventional account of “the nature of things.” 
355  Cohen, supra note 66, at 812. 
356  See BENJAMIN, supra note 13. 
357  See Grey, supra note 140; Vandevelde, supra note 26. 
358  See FOUCAULT, supra note 279, at 47-49 (describing the disappearance of things en-
tirely, in favor discourse); JEAN BAUDRILLARD, From the System to the Destiny of Objects, in 
THE ECSTASY OF COMMUNICATION (Sylvere Lotringer ed., Bernard Schutzee & Caroline 
Schutzee trans., 1988) (1987) (asserting the totalizing dominance of the subject and the disap-
pearance of the object). 
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sale by much of the discipline of law and economics.359 I call this 
final model “thing-by-policy.” 
The three core intellectual property doctrines—copyright, patent, 
and trademark law—are the first and easiest places to see this regula-
tory perspective at work.360 All three doctrines have as their essential 
concern the intangible thingness of the copyrighted work, the pat-
ented invention, and the distinctive “mark.” Their boundaries are de-
termined in a variety of ways, many of which are unambiguously 
constructs of relevant policies. In copyright, this is done typically 
only ex post, during litigation to enforce the copyright, but the scope 
of the work—the thing created by the author—is defined by the law 
nonetheless, by the distinction between unprotectible “idea” and pro-
tectable “expression,”361 by the doctrine of “substantial similarity,”362 
and by the concept that authorial works must be protected in a “tangi-
ble medium of expression” before protection will attach.363 In patent 
law, the law supplies definitions both ex ante and ex post (rules defin-
ing patentable subject matter and patentability in the particular case—
                                                                                                                  
359  Entitlements are conventionally defined in relational terms, in that they might be char-
acterized by liability rules, property rules, or inalienability rules. See Jules L. Coleman & Jody 
Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335 (1986); Guido Calabresi & A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathe-
dral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
360  Calling patents, copyrights, and trademarks “regulatory” deliberately evokes the exten-
sive literature debating the nature of the doctrines as regulatory or proprietary. See, e.g., JESSICA 
LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 171-82 (2001) (arguing that copyright is properly conceptualized 
as an unfair competition regime); Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87 
(2004) (arguing that copyright law manifests a trend away from a property rights model, toward 
a regulatory model).  
361  17 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (2000) (distinguishing original works of authorship from proc-
esses and methods of operation); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (seminal case understood 
as distinguishing idea from expression). Some courts have been particularly explicit in recogniz-
ing this character of the inquiry: 
What is basically at stake is the extent of the copyright owner’s monopoly—from 
how large an area of activity did Congress intend to allow the copyright owner to ex-
clude others? We think the production of jeweled bee pins is a larger private preserve 
than Congress intended to be set aside in the public market without a patent. A jew-
eled bee pin is therefore an “idea” that defendants were free to copy.  
Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971).  
Thing-by-policy is not exclusively a modern device. Under the 1790 Copyright Act, which 
extended copyright protection to books, a district court determined that a market (price) circular 
was not the subject of copyright protection because according to copyright policy, it was not a 
book: “The term ‘science’ cannot, with any propriety, be applied to a work of so fluctuating and 
fugitive a form as that of a newspaper or price current, the subject-matter of which is daily 
changing, and is of mere temporary use.” Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999, 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1829) 
(No. 2,872). 
362  See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (applying 
an “abstraction-filtration-analysis” framework to substantial similarity questions involving 
computer programs, in order to give proper scope to role of the public domain). 
363  See Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that 
video game display was “fixed” for copyright purposes because it meets the statutory standard 
of being perceptible for more than a transitory period of time). 
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novelty, nonobviousness, enablement, written description, and so 
forth364) and solely ex post, during infringement litigation (the process 
of claim construction, the “all elements” rule for infringement, and 
the doctrine of equivalents).365 The structuring of the legal thingness 
of trademarks is similar. What “is” the mark is defined ex ante by 
limiting protection to “distinctive” marks and ex post by the “likeli-
hood of confusion” standard for infringement. 
The core structures of intellectual property law, in other words, 
can be recharacterized in terms of the search for things,366 not because 
things themselves are the true foci of the law, but because the law 
expresses its policies—legal exclusivity that creates incentives to be 
creative and innovative; protection of fair competition in the market-
place—through things. Two points bear extra emphasis. One is that 
the search for the relevant thing consists of the search for the underly-
ing phenomena-in-fact (the “work,” the “invention,” and the “mark”) 
rather than the search for the legal phenomena (the copyright, the 
patent, the trademark). At the end of the analysis, “factual” and “le-
gal” things are identical; once rules governing protection and in-
fringement are applied, the legal right is coextensive with what the 
right owner in fact created, invented, or made distinctive.367 Two is 
that this process of identifying the thing, which is intuitively a pro-
prietary concept, is itself regulatory. Any conflict between property-
based and regulatory constructions of intellectual property systems 
may be overstated. Copyright, patent, and trademark inescapably 
share characteristics of both. 
Intellectual property doctrines that raise different problems of 
scope, because they implicate competition concerns that surround 
tangible things themselves, likewise can be understood in the thing-
by-policy framework. Courts have held that copying a copyrighted 
                                                                                                                  
364  The requirement that the patent claim be supported by a written description of the in-
vention has been enhanced precisely in areas, such as bioscience inventions, where public policy 
concerns are especially pronounced. See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1015 (2004); see also Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & 
Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1304-05 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing 
en banc) (arguing that Federal Circuit should address general applicability of written description 
requirement en banc because of general policy concerns). 
365  See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997) (con-
firming applicability of all-elements rule to doctrine of equivalents analysis, as a balance be-
tween notice function of patent claims and the interest of the patentee). 
366  Cf. Long, supra note 4, at 471-95 (arguing that information costs represent the right 
metric for determining optimal thingness in intellectual property doctrines). 
367  Wendy Gordon therefore characterizes copyright and patent rights as in rem rights. 
Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, 
Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1378-84 (1989). But see Jessica 
Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 971-72 (1990) (expressing skepticism at the 
capacity of copyright law to cabin thingness). 
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computer program in order to “reverse engineer” it is permitted in 
order to identify its non-protected “ideas,” and they point to policy 
justifications as reasons for not respecting the found thingness of the 
work. As the court noted in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.,368 
affirming that such reverse engineering constitutes fair use, “[A]n 
attempt to monopolize the market by making it impossible for others 
to compete runs counter to the statutory purpose of promoting crea-
tive expression and cannot constitute a strong equitable basis for re-
sisting the invocation of the fair use doctrine.”369 The “staple item of 
commerce” doctrine discussed in terms of thing-by-practice370 is 
equally a manifestation of policy arguments. Sale of the “staple item” 
is treated as sale of a thing that lies beyond the reach of copyright, 
because of the harm to competition in markets for things that would 
follow from the opposite result. “The staple article of commerce doc-
trine must strike a balance between a copyright holder’s legitimate 
demand for effective—not merely symbolic—protection of the statu-
tory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in substan-
tially unrelated areas of commerce.”371  
That balance, in other words, gives us the thing that we know as 
the VCR. Cases arising under the DMCA addressing tethered 
goods372 (DVDs linked to DVD players, computer sound files linked 
to specified media players, print cartridges linked to computer print-
ers, video games linked to specified virtual game environments) test 
the policy justifications for the tethers by framing disputes in terms of 
the things being made and used. In Lexmark International v. Static 
Control Components,373 the court’s ruling for the defendant, a manu-
facturer of computer chips that were used ultimately by consumers to 
bypass technology that prevented consumers from using non-
Lexmark print cartridges with Lexmark printers, was reinforced by 
the court’s sense that Congress, expressing its concern for consumer 
protection in the context of the DMCA, could not have intended this 
result. For policy reasons, in other words, a printer remains a printer. 
It cannot be converted to a limited use printer via software sleight-of-
hand. 
Patent law offers the same insight, but it does so in cases that 
reverse the sensibility about tangible and the intangible that informs 
the copyright and DMCA cases. Is a computer program sufficiently 
                                                                                                                  
368 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). 
369  Id. at 1523-24. 
370  See supra notes 314-16 and accompanying text. 
371  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). 
372  See supra notes 31-53 and accompanying text. 
373  387 F.3d 522, 549 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting the statement of Rep. Bliley). 
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concrete to qualify as a patentable thing? Patenting the abstract 
mathematics that characterize a program might be disallowed because 
exclusive control over what today might be called a “platform” 
resource—a foundational technology, on which later inventions 
depend—would interfere with later innovation. “Phenomena of 
nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract 
intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of 
scientific and technological work.”374 Or the competitive implications 
of patenting abstractions may be less severe. The invention is thus a 
“thing” rather than an abstraction, and a patent may be acceptable.375 
Trademark law presents some of the most difficult doctrinal ques-
tions, since trademarks are not supposed to be “things” at all.376 There 
is, formally, no such thing as a trademark right “in gross,” divorced 
from the sale of a good or provision of a service,377 and “merchandis-
ing right” cases, in which the plaintiff’s mark and the plaintiff’s mer-
chandise are effectively one and the same (such as a t-shirt with a 
Nike logo), have been heavily criticized by scholars.378 Firms may 
attempt to protect products themselves using trademark law, efforts 
that are limited on policy grounds by concerns for competitive mar-
kets and on doctrinal grounds, expressing that policy, by trademark’s 
functionality doctrine. Design features of a product may be (intangi-
ble) trademark things, unless competitive concerns dictate that they 
be treated as (tangible) nontrademark things.379 Trademark-as-thing in 
                                                                                                                  
374  Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
375  See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1376-77 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (rejecting district court’s concern for competition in the marketplace as a basis 
for the business method exception to patentable subject matter). 
376  But see Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual Property Is Property?, 
68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715, 720-21 (1993) (considering the benefits of treating trademarks as 
property). 
377  See Vittoria N. Am. L.L.C. v. Euro-Asia Imps., Inc., 278 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2001). 
Courts will often find ways around the formal rule, particularly when trademarks are used as 
collateral. This is thing-by-practice as much as thing-by-policy. See, e.g., Patterson Labs., Inc. v. 
Roman Cleanser Co. (In re Roman Cleanser Co.), 802 F.2d 207, 208-09 (6th Cir. 1986); Money 
Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 676-78 (7th Cir. 1982).  
378  See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 24; Litman, supra note 24. 
379  Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120-22 (1938) (articulating early form 
of trademark law’s “functionality” doctrine by linking it to the right to copy an article that is the 
subject of an expired patent). The modern form of the functionality doctrine depends largely on 
thing-by-nature, see supra note 95, and partly on thing-by-policy. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson 
Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (“The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, 
which seeks to promote competition by protecting a firm’s reputation, from instead inhibiting 
legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product feature.”); TrafFix 
Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001) (“[C]opying is not always discour-
aged or disfavored by the laws which preserve our competitive economy.”); Abercrombie & 
Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 630-31 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting 
that the kind of “thing” that can constitute trade dress must depend, ultimately, on trademark 
law’s goal of protecting distinctiveness and avoiding consumer confusion). 
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these contexts is comprehensible in policy terms even if the line here 
is, at times, almost impossibly imprecise. 380 
Thing-by-policy is hardly limited to intellectual property cases. 
The question of thingness has been consciously manipulated by courts 
in order to police subject matter boundaries in other areas. The law of 
rescission of contracts for mutual mistake depends in part on whether 
the contracting parties correctly perceived the character of the “thing” 
that was the subject of the deal, a standard that courts once took liter-
ally381 but today treat metaphorically, as a proxy for the allocation of 
risk.382 Products liability doctrine based on defective design is framed 
today around a policy-driven risk/utility calculus, rather than the tra-
ditional consumer expectations principle.383  
Elsewhere, thingness mediates policy concerns where traditional 
doctrine otherwise leaves courts without good tools. In People v. 
Kwok,384 a California appellate court upheld a burglary conviction 
where the defendant had a key made to fit the door of the victim’s 
house. The homeowner’s interest in exclusive control over access to 
the home justified treating the defendant’s actions as “theft” of prop-
erty, even though the defendant only temporarily dispossessed the 
victim of the lock to her door so that the key could be made.385 In 
State v. Nelson, 386 the defendant borrowed photographs of the victim, 
copied them, and returned the photographs. The Supreme Court of 
New Hampshire upheld a conviction for theft. The court’s reasoning 
was similar to that of the court in Kwok; the victim was not perma-
nently deprived of any physical thing, but was treated as if she were. 
According to the court, she had been deprived of that which is 
“[i]ntegral to ownership, . . . the right to exclude others from possess-
ing, using and enjoying a particular item of property.”387 An insurance 
                                                                                                                  
380  Graeme Dinwoodie criticizes ontological approaches to trademarks and urges an ap-
proach that more explicitly grounds trademark thingness in policy objectives. Graeme B. Din-
woodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to Trademark Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 
611 (1999). 
381  See Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919, 923 (Mich. 1887) (concerning a seller who de-
sired to rescind a contract for sale of the pregnant cow Rose 2d of Aberlone, “the mistake [as to 
her pregnancy] was not of the mere quality of the animal, but went to the very nature of the 
thing”). 
382  See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON 
CONTRACTS (5th ed. 2003) § 9.26, at 365-66.  
383  E.g., Jay M. Feinman, Un-Making Law: The Classical Revival in the Common Law, 28 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 37-38 (2004) (describing the move away from consumer expectations as 
the basis of design defect liability, and toward the risk/utility approach); John W. Wade, On the 
Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973). 
384  75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 40 (Cal. App. 1998). 
385  Id. at 49. 
386  842 A.2d 83 (N.H. 2004). 
387  Id. at 86. 
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company was relieved of its duty of defense under a general liability 
policy when computer software distributed by the insured, America 
Online, was alleged by consumers to have damaged their computers. 
The policy covered “physical damage to tangible property.” After a 
lengthy and largely unnecessary recitation of the differences between 
“hardware” and “software,” the court got to the heart of the matter. 
Damage to the operating systems of consumer computers did not con-
stitute damage to relevant tangible “things” because under the oppo-
site interpretation, “St. Paul’s risk would have been much greater and 
the premiums for such a policy undoubtedly would have been more 
expensive.”388 Whether a computer server constitutes a thing-like 
“chattel” for legal purposes may depend entirely on the underlying 
policy concerns at stake in the litigation. An Internet Service Provider 
(ISP) was held not liable for “negligent entrustment of chattels” when 
one of its customers used ISP resources to spy on naked athletes in 
locker rooms, because the ISP’s services are used lawfully by the vast 
majority of its customers.389 “[T]hese are lawful commodities whose 
uses overwhelmingly are socially productive. That Web hosting ser-
vices likewise may be used to carry out illegal activities does not jus-
tify condemning their provision whenever a given customer turns out 
to be crooked.”390 A computer server is a chattel, however, when 
someone is trying to access data stored on that server, without the 
permission of the server’s owner. In that case, there is liability for 
“trespass to chattel,” though the real harm, as the court acknowledged 
in eBay v. Bidder’s Edge,391 is policy-based. “If BE’s activity is al-
lowed to continue unchecked, it would encourage other auction ag-
gregators to engage in similar recursive searching of the eBay system 
such that eBay would suffer irreparable harm from reduced system 
performance, system unavailability, or data losses.”392 
The final and perhaps most elaborate illustration of thing-by-
policy comes from the antitrust area. What is an operating system for 
a computer? The answer turns out to depend on economics and public 
policy, not computer science. In the opinion that has become known 
                                                                                                                  
388  Am. Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 347 F.3d 89, 98 (4th Cir. 2003). A 
strongly worded dissent noted that other courts have divided on the issue and that the tenuous 
distinction between “data” and “hardware” did not justify dismissing the duty to defend claim at 
the pleading stage. Id. at 99-103 (Traxler, J., dissenting). The majority, in other words, justified 
a policy-based distinction by resorting to its construction of thingness. The dissent relied on a 
different construction of thingness. 
389  See Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660-62 (7th Cir. 2003). 
390  Id. at 659. 
391  100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
392  Id. at 1066. 
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as “Microsoft III,”393 the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit analyzed whether Microsoft Corporation violated the 
Sherman Act by, among other things, “bundling” its Internet Explorer 
browser software with its Windows operating system—distributing 
what had previously been believed to be two computer programs as a 
single, integrated program. The established law of “tying” holds that 
tying two products together in a single transaction, so that consumers 
who want to buy one product are forced to accept a second, is per se 
unlawful.394 The definition of “product” is given in economic terms, 
primarily by consumer demand. “[A] tying arrangement cannot exist 
unless two separate product markets have been linked.”395 An unlaw-
ful tie occurs when purchases of product A, as measured by consumer 
demand, are tied to product B.  
Did Microsoft unlawfully force purchasers of Windows to accept 
copies of Internet Explorer, when the natural result of the combina-
tion would be induce some substantial number of computer users to 
rely on Internet Explorer to the exclusion of what was then its princi-
pal competition—the Netscape Navigator browser? The answer de-
pended on whether the Windows operating system, excluding Web 
browser functionality, constituted an independent product. Alterna-
tively, perhaps the “operating system” included browser functionality, 
in which case no tying claim would lie. More concisely, what is an 
operating system?  
Rather than approach the question purely as a technological mat-
ter, or purely as an economic matter, the court fashioned a rule that 
was explicitly designed to balance Microsoft’s legitimate interest in 
technological innovation, the fact that in many contexts consumers 
benefit from innovation and from software development processes 
that integrate formerly disparate functionalities into single products, 
and the public’s interest in markets free from anticompetitive behav-
ior.396 The court concluded, therefore, that a rule of reason approach 
would apply, rather than the per se rule against tying derived from 
Supreme Court precedent. It held that in a software tying case such as 
this one, the government bears the burden of showing that the harm to 
competition from integration of the programs outweighs its efficiency 
                                                                                                                  
 393 United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft III), 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Micro-
soft II is the name given to United States v. Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft II), 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998), interpreting an earlier consent decree. Microsoft I involved judicial review and 
approval of the consent decree. See United States v. Microsoft (Microsoft I), 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995). 
394  See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Eastman Kodak Co. v. 
Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992). 
395  Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21. 
396  See Microsoft III, 253 F.3d at 84-95. 
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benefits.397 What “is” an operating system is the product of a policy 
balance, taking into account both the designer’s interest, consumers’ 
interests, and broader public policy concerns.398  
The flaws in the court’s approach (in particular, its failure to con-
sider the timing of the inquiry) should not overshadow the fact that 
the test fits comfortably alongside other policy-based standards for 
evaluating “predatory design,” in which manufacturers allegedly de-
sign products specifically for anticompetitive purposes. In Microsoft 
II, which involved a contempt proceeding against Microsoft for an 
alleged violation of an earlier antibundling consent decree, the Court 
of Appeals concluded that Microsoft, as the designer, was entitled to a 
presumption in its favor to the extent that Windows and Internet Ex-
plorer were combined as a result of “genuine technological integra-
tion.”399 “Genuine” integration meant that the result should be treated 
as one product, “regardless of whether elements of the integrated 
package are marketed separately.”400 The court defined a genuine 
technological integration as any “product that combines functional-
ities . . . in a way that offers advantages unavailable if the functional-
ities are bought separately and combined by the purchaser.”401 The 
court set an extremely low bar for determining whether a product 
meets this test. All the defendant has to show is “a plausible claim” 
that the combination “brings some advantage.”402  
In a related vein, the Areeda antitrust treatise would ask whether 
the practice of bundling is universal in the market?403 If so, the bundle 
should be considered one product, not two. Universal or predominant 
bundling indicates that the bundle is, on balance, beneficial, since 
consumers prefer either the cost or the quality of the bundle over the 
freedom to choose independent products that unbundling provides. 
                                                                                                                  
397  Id. at 95-97. 
398  The court’s reasoning can be compared with essentialist approaches of different sorts. 
Instead of suggesting that the court should identify “the” product, Mark Patterson argues that 
conflicts between intellectual property laws (which permit certain activities that could be char-
acterized as anticompetitive) and antitrust law (which seeks to deter and punish anticompetitive 
behavior) can be managed by distinguishing between the intellectual property right itself and the 
product in which the right is embodied. Mark R. Patterson, When Is Property Intellectual? The 
Leveraging Problem, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1134-35 (2000). By contrast, Andrew Chin 
argues for a functionalist definition of “software product” based on the user’s perspective. 
Andrew Chin, Decoding Microsoft: A First Principles Approach, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 
16-17 (2005) (arguing that Microsoft should have been found liable for illegal tying, based on a 
“first principles” approach to what constitutes a software product, based on software engineer-
ing principles and antitrust market analysis). 
399  Microsoft II, 147 F.3d at 948. 
400  Id. 
401  Id. 
402  Id. at 950. 
403  10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES & THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1744 (2d ed. 2000). 
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Judge Wald, dissenting in Microsoft II, would assign consumer inter-
ests greater weight in the policy balance than the rule of reason test of 
Microsoft III, making an “operating system” even more transparently 
a creature of the law than the Microsoft III panel admitted.404 
In the European Union’s (EU) subsequent investigation of Micro-
soft for the allegedly anticompetitive practice of bundling the Win-
dows Media Player with the Windows operating system, the EU deci-
sion nominally identified the thingness of the operating system itself 
according to conventional economic measures—consumer de-
mand405—though its remedy (requiring that Microsoft offer versions 
of Windows without the Media Player) shows clearly that the demand 
measure is explicitly a policy construct.406 
Using thingness to balance technological innovation and consumer 
or public protection has been a frequent problem for computer system 
developers,407 but it is hardly limited to that environment. The point 
                                                                                                                  
404  Microsoft II, 147 F.3d at 956-64 (Wald, J., dissenting). On mixing/matching “prod-
ucts” tests in bundling cases, see In re Data General Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 490 F. Supp. 
1089 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (blending the manufacturer perspective, the consumer perspective, and 
other manufacturers’ perspective). 
405  See Commission Decision of 24.03.2004, supra note 166 (on appeal to the European 
Court of First Instance). 
406  See Picker, supra note 36; Ian Ayres & Barry Nalebuff, Going Soft on Microsoft? The 
EU’s Antitrust Case and Remedy, 2 THE ECONOMISTS’ VOICE No. 2, Art. 4 (2005), available at 
http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol2/iss2/art4 (arguing as a matter of competition policy that the EU 
antitrust remedy should have included not only an unbundling requirement (as it did) but also a 
must-carry provision, such that the Windows-plus-Windows Media Player combination must 
also include some rival media players). The EU approach is doctrinally closer to the traditional 
Jefferson Parish test for identifying separate products, focusing on how the market treats the 
products. See, e.g., United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960) 
(noting additional factors relevant to determining consumer demand), aff’d, 365 U.S. 567 
(1961). The fact that this inquiry is subordinate to competition policy is clear from refusal to 
deal cases such as Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) 
(finding that the “bundle” had to include access to the plaintiff’s mountain; the product “thing” 
is constructed by law to include something that the defendant does not sell) and Verizon Com-
mications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398, 410 (2004) (holding 
that the plaintiff had no remedy under antitrust law for an incumbent local telephone exchange’s 
violation of Telecommunications Act of 1996, which creates a duty to provide access to tele-
phone network elements on an “unbundled” basis; the court found that the products here are 
unbundled by operation of law, and there was no antitrust violation in refusing to sell a thing 
that the defendant does not sell, but that is constructed by law for policy reasons). 
407  See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV. A. 98-1232 (TPJ), CIV. A. 
98-1233 (TPJ), 1998 WL 614485, at *8 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1998) (discussing litigation against 
IBM’s retying CPUs of mainframe computers to peripheral devices). Cal. Computer Prods. v. 
Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 744 (9th Cir. 1979) (affirming IBM’s right to integrate 
disk functions into CPUs). Cf. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 
1979) (refusing to impose duty on monopolist in camera market to disclose format changes to 
competitors). Predatory product design has also been referred to as “anticompetitive” product 
design, “predatory product innovation,” or “technological predation.” 3A AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 403, ¶¶ 776-781. For skepticism regarding predatory product design 
claims, see Joseph Gregory Sidak, Debunking Predatory Innovation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1121, 
1142 (1983) (arguing that due to the difficulty of measuring the variables in predatory product 
design claims, courts and litigators risk “turn[ing] the courtroom into a colloquium on applied 
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of ex post regulation of things is to account for public concerns that 
the design process presumably omits. Consumer protection is a cost 
that the producer does not internalize; regulation spreads that cost 
across society as a whole, enabling decision-makers to make discre-
tionary judgments on society’s behalf about the costs and benefits of 
regulation in the particular case. Thing-by-policy denaturalizes the 
thing. Automobile manufacturers have been accused of predation in 
failing to accommodate aftermarket sales of sound systems. In one 
early case, the court did not rule on the merits, holding that the plain-
tiff, who sought to hold Ford liable for its failure to design the 
dashboard of its cars so that the dash would accommodate aftermarket 
radios, had not proved that it was entitled to injunctive relief.408 The 
court in Town Sound and Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors 
Corp.409 addressed the situation directly, holding that Chrysler could 
not be held liable for “bundling” substandard car stereos with its cars. 
Consumers were not harmed by predatory behavior by the manufac-
turer, but by their own disinterest in choosing better sound systems: 
“The response of the antitrust laws is caveat emptor: if car purchasers 
do not comparison shop, that is their problem, so long as Chrysler is 
doing nothing to stop them.”410 
The on-sale bar of patent law, under which inventors are prohib-
ited from obtaining a patent on an invention that has been available 
for sale to the public for more than a year before the patent applica-
tion is filed, raises a related concern. If the inventor offered a product 
for sale earlier than a year before filing, the public may be prejudiced 
because the inventor is allowed practically to profit from market ex-
clusivity for a period that is longer than the statutory patent term. Was 
the “thing” offered the same as the “thing” patented? The question 
does not hinge on the metaphysics of the sale, since a “sale” of the 
thing may occur before the “thing” itself exists. As the Supreme 
Court noted in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics,411 which established that the 
one-year bar period begins to run when the invention is “ready for 
                                                                                                                  
 
econometrics”). See also supra note 160 and accompanying text (discussing product design). 
408 Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 390 F.2d 113 (1st Cir. 1969). The lower 
court noted that plaintiff had plausibly argued that radios and automobiles continued to be 
distinct products, unlike “bumpers, hang-on fender lights, outside auto trunks and luggage racks 
which were in vogue decades ago,” which “became parts of automobiles and lost their identities 
as accessories. Radios have retained their identity as separate products.” Automatic Radio Mfg. 
Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 272 F. Supp. 744, 748 (D. Mass. 1967). 
409  959 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1992). 
410  Id. at 489. 
411  525 U.S. 55 (1998) (explaining various types of information costs). 
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patenting,”412 the question is primarily one of policy. Did the inventor 
appear to have been acting unfairly with regard to the legitimate in-
terests of the public?413 
Thing-by-policy is, therefore, the most comprehensive and flexible 
of the thing frameworks that the law uses. It can handle both enduring 
things and idiosyncratic things, things that touch all of us or things 
that concern only a few. Policy-makers can legitimately manipulate 
thingness to serve all or any of a range of policies, and can work the 
process in reverse, manipulating policy arguments to create or un-
dermine thingness as the policy winds demand. That breadth, of 
course, is precisely the weakness of the model; despite their authorita-
tive character in practice, that authority is no more legitimate than the 
conceptual policy apparatus that thingness serves at any given mo-
ment. Things are of the law, not of our lives. Thingness devolves into 
case-by-case examinations of relevant policies, from broad concerns 
over information, transaction, and/or fragmentation costs,414 to nar-
rower concerns with incentives and attribution, to consumer concerns 
with price, quality, and autonomy, or to cultural interests in stability 
and cultural meaning.415 All of these concerns can be lumped into a 
policy-based theory of things, as Henry Smith does when he argues 
that the forms of property embody trade-offs between different com-
municative dimensions of property-ish things.416 Broad, lay audiences 
for things demand more formally defined property rights, which are 
easier to comprehend. Narrower, relatively expert audiences are better 
able to process more nuanced, contextual property rights, which take 
more time to comprehend.417 First sale in copyright and exhaustion in 
patent are manifestations of the former, for example; “what is a book” 
                                                                                                                  
412  Id. at 67.  
413  Id. at 63-65. 
414  See Merrill & Smith, supra note 104, at 24-42 (discussing information costs); Heller, 
supra note 4, at 1187-1202 (discussing fragmentation). 
415  On the policy benefits of durable thingness as such in the intellectual property realm, 
compare Keith Aoki, Adrift in the Intertext: Authorship and Audience “Recoding” Rights— 
Comment on Robert H. Rotstein, “Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of 
the Work,” 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 805 (1993); Justin Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property 
and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923 (1999); William M. Landes & Richard 
A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 CHI. L. REV. 471, 486-88 (2003) (all making 
policy-based arguments in favor of more durable thingness of copyrighted works), with Carter, 
supra note 376, at 723; Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Infor-
mation as a Common-Pool Resource, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111 (2003); David Rice, 
Copyright as Talisman: Expanding ‘Property’ in Digital Works, 16 INT’L REV. L. COMP. TECH. 
113 (2002); Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal 
a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365 (1989) (all sug-
gesting policy-based reasons for reducing thingness of intellectual property rights). 
416  Smith, supra note 297. 
417  See id. at 1111. 
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is a function of what the law constructs as consumer needs, not what 
the law observes as consumer practices.418  
With thing-by-policy, law simply makes up things as it goes along. 
But there is no prior reason why things should be cheap or easy, and 
our intuition may be precisely the opposite—that things are valuable 
precisely in proportion to their complexity or expense. Thing-by-
policy thrives as the kind of ex post descriptive exercise that pervades 
the law, strengthened by its flexibility and adaptability across do-
mains and across time. But it is weakened necessarily by its failure to 
demand a connection to common experience. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The book is the paradigmatic thing in law and in culture. It exer-
cises a unique authority, combining text and heft, concept and materi-
ality.419 Taking things seriously means recognizing that authority in 
other material and conceptual forms, and searching for its sources. 
This is not Ahab’s pursuing the white whale, only to find it and be 
destroyed. This is appreciation and respect for new forms of author-
ity, and understanding its sources and its limitations. My argument 
can be summed up in the following three steps.  
First, the law does not go far enough to recognize that things are 
important. The conventional account holds that people are important, 
and what people do with things are important, but things are not. But 
that is not so. There are debates in a variety of places in the law about 
“things”—how to define them, classify them, and define their legal 
implications—but the debates are often seen as proxies for debates 
about relationships and interests and policies. What interests me is the 
sense that the debates may really, in fact, be about things. Things play 
important roles in our lives but are underappreciated in the law, by 
virtue of Realist and post-Realist jurisprudence and scholarship. The 
literal and figurative reconfigurability of the world teaches us to ap-
preciate the role of things in creating and exercising authority in law. 
We know this when we consider high technology and particularly 
computer technology. “Code” regulates much as law does. But this is 
more generally true of things, and we should look for and understand 
                                                                                                                  
418  See id. at 1175. 
419  See supra note 343. Scholars of text argue that books, as artifacts, cannot be under-
stood independently of the institutions and communities, such as libraries, that interpret and 
ultimately order them. Books as material objects are therefore both critical and provisional, 
since their existence depends not on constructs of authors or texts, but on institutions and com-
munities that surround them and are bound by them. See Geoffrey Nunberg, The Places of 
Books in the Age of Electronic Reproduction, 42 REPRESENTATIONS 13 (1993), reprinted in 
FUTURE LIBRARIES (Howard Bloch & Carla Hesse eds., 1994). 
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regulation-by-thing in all areas of thingness, rather than focusing our 
energy exclusively or largely on the artifacts of computer science.  
Second, the law does not appreciate sufficiently that things do not 
just exist. Things come from somewhere, and after they arrive they 
change, and the law has a meaningful role to play in constructing 
things and managing their evolution. Thingness in the law is not sim-
ply given. It does not fall neatly into traditional legal categories such 
as “property” or “contract,” or nonlegal categories such as “technol-
ogy” or “the market.” The law creates and enforces thingness, and 
creates and enforces the authoritative character of thingness, and it 
does so in a variety of ways. Exposing that variety takes some effort, 
as it requires crossing disciplinary boundaries both in law and else-
where. But if the results enable us more clearly to see the character of 
authority in our lives, and both the virtues and drawbacks of that au-
thority, then the effort is worthwhile.  
Third, bringing transparency to the processes of thing-making and 
thing-changing yields a wealth of possibilities in terms of both con-
ventional and unconventional legal regulation. Once we see that there 
are several different ways in which things are made, we see the possi-
bility of different alternative regulatory universes in which things are 
given and then regulated, or regulated in various ways during the 
process of their construction. The very notion of thingness suggests 
the existence of a dividing line between what is unregulable and regu-
lable. Interposing the legal construction of thingness suggests that this 
line can be moved depending on regulatory interests. Critiques of 
thingness, and policy analyses of problems that concern things in any 
sense, can and should draw on the multiple senses of created thing-
ness in developing both theoretical and practical arguments. The lit-
erature contains arguments addressing the choice between “law or 
code” as regulatory substitutes,420 and arguments addressing “law and 
code” as complements.421 By taking things apart, we see that the tools 
for appreciating and using (or rejecting) thingness in any regulatory 
context are far richer than one might initially suppose. The five mod-
els reviewed here represent only a rough taxonomy. As I note at sev-
eral points, the models overlap with one another and in some areas 
blend together. For analytic purposes, they are useful starting points. 
Any policy-maker may pick and choose, accept or reject, all or parts 
of each model or some of them, hopefully taking account of their re-
spective strengths and weaknesses in the context of the regulatory 
                                                                                                                  
420  See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. 
L. REV. 501 (1999).  
421  See R. Polk Wagner, On Software Regulation, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 457 (2005). 
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question at hand. Distinguishing the models suggests different kinds 
of questions to ask and highlights the merits of different answers.  
A failure to appreciate the thingness of things undervalues the 
benefits of thing-based authority. Thingness can be a good thing.422 It 
also undervalues the benefits of challenging thingness. Things are 
authority, and authority is power. The insistence on thingness and the 
refusal to enable the disassembly of things may have important dis-
tributive consequences, not only in intellectual property domains,423 
but elsewhere, even in the processes of democracy.424 If things are 
embodied culture, then they should be subjected to all of the pressures 
that keep cultures vibrant. We need to value them and re-create them, 
take them apart and improve them, preserve them and share them. 
Excessive deference to “nature” or to “design,” even if we challenge 
the identity and authority of the designers, does not do enough to as-
sure that things themselves are part and parcel of the messiness of 
human existence. To focus too narrowly on producer interests, too 
narrowly on individual interests, or too abstractly on markets or on 
efficiency or “social welfare” misses the inevitably human, and hu-
manistic, character of the problem.425  
Modern materialism forces an integrated account of things that can 
and things that cannot be “physically and permanently” possessed.426 
We have a universe of malleable cultural forms, some of which de-
scend from accepted antecedents, many of which can be modified by 
practice and by law. The question for things is a broader form of the 
                                                                                                                  
422  For example, in a recent article, Robert Merges proposed that Congress amend the 
Copyright Act to provide for enforcement of “limited copyright” notices of the sort promoted by 
the Creative Commons project. See Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 201-02 (2004). Carol Rose argues that the material and interpretive 
flexibility of modern things means that law might affirmatively choose to create complex 
“things,” in explicit contravention of an “information costs” principle that privileges simplicity, 
in order to distinguish things from mere commodities. See Carol M. Rose, Afterword: Whither 
Commodification?, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION, supra note 18, at 402-20. 
423  See Rubenfeld, supra note 145 at 3-5 (describing conflicts between copyright law and 
First Amendment principles); see also Joseph P. Liu, The DMCA and the Regulation of Scien-
tific Research, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 501, 509-16 (2003) (describing scientists’ criticism of 
the DMCA and its effect on certain computer science research). 
424  See Online Policy Group v. Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (holding 
that developer of voting machine software misrepresented copyright claim under the DMCA as 
part of effort to discourage public posting of criticism of its technology). 
425 As Annelise Riles writes: 
[I]t is the mundane technocratic dimensions of law, precisely those dimensions that 
fail to engage humanists’ theoretical, critical, or reformist passions, that are the most 
interesting artifacts of lawyerly work. Hence it is time humanists take on the techni-
cal dimension of legal knowledge as a cultural practice of its own. . . . [W]e can do 
something other than ignore or critique the technocrats and the technologists in our 
midst: we can study them. 
Riles, supra note 39, at 1029, 1033. 
426  See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *14. 
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narrow question raised by copyright and patent: what is the role of 
the law in preserving and shaping the forms that our “creative” insti-
tutions produce? That role is inevitable and essential. The answer 
cannot be found in critical or Realist arguments that the law must 
focus entirely on relationships and values in order to mitigate the con-
cealed influence of power,427 or in economics arguments that the law 
should devise mechanisms so that the allocation of resources maxi-
mizes social welfare.428 There are contexts and methods for creating 
and legitimating thingness that do and should go unchallenged, so 
long as we fairly appreciate what they are. But abandonment of thing-
based descriptions in favor of rights- and rules-based descriptions 
leaves us without a vocabulary adequate to capture actual human ex-
perience. Pragmatism cautions us to test propositions by their conse-
quences in terms of human wants and needs rather than according to 
an ex ante ontology. The fluidity of things both conceptual and mate-
rial challenges the pragmatist’s premise, since we can no longer take 
assurance from modern law’s relative distrust of the conceptual and 
trust of the material.429 The natural law tradition, which measures 
universal principles of truth and morality against “inherent character-
istics in human beings and other animate things as well as in the 
physical word and in social structures,”430 comes in for similar ques-
tioning. We cannot assume the truth of what is “inherent” and what is 
manufactured. Adjudication, legislation, and scholarship should make 
the bases of thingness more transparent, so that the sources and 
weight of authority can be better evaluated, and so that the tools thus 
discovered can be put to more effective use. 
                                                                                                                  
427  See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927) (de-
scribing property as delegated sovereignty over others).  
428  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 14 (5th ed. 1998) (de-
scribing Pareto-optimality). 
429  See Riles, supra note 39, at 1022-23 (describing the transformation of legal form, in 
which a metaphor—law as a tool, or as a machine—is literalized in order to become a further 
tool) (citing ROY WAGNER, THE INVENTION OF CULTURE 42-44 (1975), on the “obviation” of 
symbolic practices, in which symbols come to stand for themselves, that is, actual material 
objects, and MARILYN STRATHERN, AFTER NATURE: ENGLISH KINSHIP IN THE LATE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 194-95 (1992), who describes the literalization of previously metaphori-
cal conceptual relations—the process of making explicit the implicit). 
430  W. MICHAEL REISMAN & AARON M. SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE, UNDERSTANDING 
AND SHAPING LAW 170 (1987); see GEORGE WHITECHOSS PATON, JURISPRUDENCE 80 (2d ed. 
1951) (referring to rules based on nature as beyond the power of man); see also LLOYD L. 
WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 1-7 (1987) (describing natural law as a theory about the 
nature of being, the human condition in particular). 
